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ABSTRACT 
AN EXPLORATORY APPROACH TO SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF 
PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS: 
MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF 
OVERFISHING IN NEW ENGLAND GROUNDFISHERIES IN THE 1990s. 
By Fabienne Lord 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2011 
This thesis seeks to understand how stakeholders' perspectives and understanding 
of social impacts influence decision processes. Understanding stakeholders' 
comprehension of social impacts provides insight as to how they weigh these impacts 
against others when making decisions. Moreover, the way stakeholders influence, or are 
influenced by, management decisions provides information on the use and development 
of methodologies successful in assessing social impacts and communicating the results. 
Built on this information, the main objective is to explore and develop a Social Impact 
Assessment (SIA) approach that could capture and integrate multiple stakeholders' 
perspectives in predicting impacts from ongoing, renewable resource management 
actions. The research is framed around grounded theory and causal analysis. It applies 
qualitative and participatory methods to analyze a case study of the overfishing and 
collapse of the New England groundfish fisheries in the 1990s. 
To enact a fisheries management plan amendment, Environmental Impact 
Statements (EIS, which include an SIA) must be submitted. Agencies use SIA guidelines 
to carry out such assessments but relatively few scientific investigations have looked at 
xiv 
the relevance and accuracy of social variables utilized, their relationships to predictions 
made, and how they are used in policymaking. Lack of evaluation of SIA is thus a major 
limitation to the advancement of the discipline. Therefore, an exploratory conceptual 
approach to SIA is developed in this thesis, which includes two components: a detailed 
list of social impact and social process variables for fisheries management and a model 
diagram that visually represents causal relationships. The conceptual approach is used to 
document and analyze the aforementioned case study. 
The New England groundfish collapse case study exposed the difficulties of 
balancing management actions intended to achieve biological sustainability with social, 
economic and cultural forces. Technological advances, favorable economic conditions, 
the increase in seafood demand, and government encouragement and assistance, 
encouraged fishermen expand their capacity to fish until industry's infrastructure became 
overcapitalized and the stocks overfished. Emergency actions were thus enacted in 1994. 
Two amendments, 5 & 7, to the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan were 
passed in hopes of ameliorating the situation, leaving little time to predict or understand 
the magnitude of their impacts. This study aims to shed light on the different social 
impacts experienced as a result of these actions. 
xv 
INTRODUCTION 
Premises of the research 
Declining ocean health and the unsustainable harvest of marine resources have 
been recognized as leading environmental and socioeconomic problems (Worm, 2009). 
These issues have been long documented and therefore have been discussed and 
addressed many times by Congressional and other commissions. Fisheries management 
and its socioeconomic dimensions were among the issues debated in the U.S. 
Commission on Ocean Policy final report, released in 2004, and in the Pew Oceans 
Commission report, issued in 2003. The Pew Oceans Commission recommended a 
fishery policy that "should conserve and manage fisheries in order to support diversity, 
flexibility, resilience, and adaptability within the industry and fishing communities" 
(2003, p. 109). Additionally, as suggested by the U.S. Commission, more information on 
the socioeconomic and political influences to fisheries decision-making is necessary to 
reform the management system (U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). These reports 
also recommended changes in fisheries management policy as well as comprehensive 
actions to reduce conflict between socioeconomic forces and sustainable harvest levels. 
In 2006, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson 
Act), the premiere fisheries regulation and conservation law, was reauthorized and 
amended to address some of these concerns. The key issues addressed with the 
reauthorization included the reduction of overfishing practices, the assurance that 
fisheries management decisions be based on ecological principles and sound scientific 
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information, and the collection, assessment and utilization of additional socioeconomic 
data in management planning and decision making (Buck, 2005; Council on 
Environmental Quality [CEQ], 2004). More recently, these same issues were reiterated in 
the National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Coasts and Great Lakes signed by 
President Obama June 19, 2010. This Executive Order strengthens, amongst other things, 
the governance and coordination of ocean management. 
Overfishing and the subsequent collapse of fish stocks throughout the nation in 
the 1990s exposed the difficulty of balancing management measures with social, 
economic and cultural forces (Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). To address such 
issues, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Magnuson Act require the 
integration of social values into its decision-making processes. When the Magnuson Act 
was reauthorized by the Sustainable Fisheries Act in 1996, three national standards were 
added to the prior list of seven. In particular, National Standard 8 requires management 
measures to "take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing 
communities" in order to assure their continued participation and to minimize negative 
economic and social impacts. The national standards guidelines defined a 'fishing 
community' as a community (i.e., a place) that is dependent on or substantially engaged 
in harvesting or processing fish (MSA sec.3 16 USC § 1802 (3)(16). In recent years, 
social scientists questioned the adequacy of this definition of community. The term 
community has been explored and refined by scholars to become a place where members 
share common significance and purpose that shape identity. Community can be shaped 
by factors such as kinship, use of space, values, feelings and ideas attached to the place, 
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common choices and social interactions, shifting movements, coherency and cohesion 
(Arensberg, 1961; Barth, 1992; Williams, 2002). The definition of fishing communities is 
important not only from a legal standpoint but also for prescriptive social analysis; the 
definition sets the boundaries of what features should be assessed in predicting and 
measuring social and economic impacts resulting from regulations. However, there is still 
no clear guidance as to how these impacts should be weighed in final decisions. 
Therefore the trade-offs between environmental and social goals can be of much debate, 
especially when taking into account the complex social identity of fishermen. 
A prime example of such enviro-social conflicts is the collapse of the New 
England groundfish fisheries. After the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1976, the 
groundfish fleet built up quickly. Financial incentives from the federal government 
promoted advanced harvesting technology, acquisition and construction of new and more 
modern vessels and the existing quota management system was abandoned in 1982 and 
replaced by what proved to be ineffective controls on net mesh size, areas area closures 
and minimum fish landing sizes (Apollonio and Dykstra, 2008). As a consequence, 
yellowtail flounder, cod and haddock stocks collapsed from overfishing. Despite all the 
scientific advices, the management system did not take the necessary actions to prevent 
overfishing and to rebuild the population (Hennessey and Healey, 2000). Catches and 
landings tumbled while fish price escalated due to increased consumer demand for fish. 
In 1991, environmental groups challenged regulation in court, claiming that the 
parameters did not meet the legal mandate to end overfishing and rebuild depleted stocks. 
This set in motion a series of emergency actions. For instance, the terms of the consent 
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decree were addressed in Amendment 5 to the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries 
Management Plan, adopted in 1994 to urgently reduce fishing mortality. Then, with 
continued decline of the major stocks, Amendment 7 (1996) broadened and reinforced 
regulations enacted under Amendment 5. To buffer the impacts of new rules on the 
industry, the federal government provided $86 million in grants for assistance programs. 
Inevitably, though, the industry had to downsize while tough, stock recovery measures 
were given time to succeed. 
Amendments 5 and 7 were severe and due to their emergency nature, were 
enacted so quickly as to disallow time to predict and understand the magnitude of their 
impacts. Since scientists' assessments were not confirmed by on-the-water fishermen's 
experience, the industry immediately questioned the relevance of emergency actions 
(Hartley & Robertson, 2006), so fishermen's anticipation of social and economic 
consequences resulting from these regulations was influenced by perception and 
interpretation rather than facts. It is this point precise point of contention, and lack of 
management foresight to its occurrence, that is central to an understanding of 1990s 
policy conflict arenas a whole. 
Focus of the research and contextualization 
This research focuses on how stakeholders' perspectives and their understanding 
of social impacts influence the decision-making processes. A stakeholder is defined by 
Freeman as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
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an organization's objectives" (1984, p. 46). Using this definition, the meaning of "fishing 
community" expands to incorporate a wider range of stakeholder groups than those 
defined by National Standard 8. It includes not only resource dependents or users -
fishermen and the processing industry - but also fishermen's wives or family members, 
NMFS personnel, council members, council staff, US Coast Guard personnel, groups 
invested in marine issues (e.g., environmental groups), and the general public. 
Taking into account the perspectives of various stakeholders allows any 
management intervention to be seen from multiple angles, and this has four key 
advantages. First, understanding key stakeholders comprehension of a social impact 
provides information as how they will weigh these impacts against others when making 
decision. Second, a wide range of ideas, concerns and expectations related to the 
proposed regulation can predict the likely success of its implementation. Third, 
multidimensional thinking and the incorporation of innovative ideas allows for regulation 
refinement. Fourth, sharing perspectives between key stakeholders, and thus recognizing 
their interrelatedness, may itself enhance everyone's understanding of social impacts. 
These abilities are important because knowing how different groups understand and 
perceive a social impact provides information as to how said groups influence or are 
influenced by management decisions. Consequently, this information can give insight as 
to the use or development of methodologies to assess social impacts and communicate 
the results to stakeholders. 
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NMFS provides operational guidelines for assessing the potential impacts of 
management actions. For programs such as fisheries management plans, NMFS must 
present Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), which include a Social Impact 
Assessment (SIA). The main purpose of SIA is to identify, predict and evaluate potential 
social effects caused by regulation change. By predicting impacts for alternative 
actions/plans, SIA provides some guidance regarding terms and conditions for 
amendment approval. In recent years, scholars in the field of SIA have criticized the 
conceptual frameworks upon which such assessments are based (Ross & McGee, 2006; 
Vanclay, 2002a). The principal issues cited are the relevance and accuracy of social 
variables, their relationships to predictions made, and how they are used in policymaking. 
There is little attention given to the precision of predictions relative to the impacts that 
occurred as a result of past activities. It therefore is difficult for the discipline of SIA to 
advance, grow and change without reflection on and evaluation of its theoretical basis of 
practice (Ahmadvand, Karami, Zamani, & Vanclay, 2009; Sadler, 1992; Vanclay, 
2002a). 
Many scholars have found the existing lists of social impact variables, available in 
international and American guidelines for SIA, to be inadequate and contradictory 
(Asselin & Parkins, 2009; Schooten, Vanclay, & Slootweg, 2003; Vanclay, 2002a, 2006). 
According to these studies, many impact variables are not in themselves impacts (e.g. 
population growth). Rather, they represent measurable outcomes of social change 
processes, which may or may not produce impacts depending on the context. Identifying 
actual impacts and their experienced scale, and distinguishing them from processes, is 
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important because it leads to a better understanding of how a single change acts to 
produce a single or cumulative impact. 
This research is based on the premise that SIA concept is inaccurate and that its 
weaknesses are reflected in SIAs produced for fishery management where generic lists of 
variables that do not necessarily reflect impacts experienced by fishermen are used. 
Moreover, the current SIA framework does not take into account complex, interactive 
social systems with the nuance required to assess cumulative impacts. Further, other 
external issues also reduce the quality of SIA used in fishery management process, 
including time limitations, budget constraints, and data availability. Finally, SIA process 
in fisheries management has not yet been subjected to a thorough national or regional 
program evaluation. 
Objectives 
This short summary introduces the central research question of this thesis: How 
multiple stakeholders' perspectives and understanding of social impact influence decision 
processes. The main objective is to explore and develop an SIA approach that could 
capture and integrate multiple stakeholders' perspectives in predicting impacts from 
management actions. The research is framed around grounded theory and applies 
qualitative and participatory methods to analyze the case study of overfishing and 
collapse of New England groundfish fisheries in the 1990s. 
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The first objective is to critically examine SIA concepts by reviewing literature 
and guidelines currently used in fulfilling legal mandates. I examined the applicability of 
the SIA process within the framework of national policy and fishery regulation. Based on 
this analysis, the second objective was to explore and develop a different conceptual 
approach to SIA that could be used for the ongoing process of managing renewable 
resources (as opposed to a project - e.g., a hydroelectric dam - that has an end in itself). 
As a result, I built a list of social impact and social process variables for fishery 
management impact analysis, and I developed a model diagram that visually represents 
causal relationships. The third objective is to use this exploratory conceptual approach to 
document and analyze the case study. 
Method 
Grounded Theory is an inductive methodology where the theory is developed 
from the data (Dey, 1999; B. Glaser, 1978; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2008; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1996). This methodology was particularly appropriate for building the list of 
social impacts and processes variables as it aims to reduce the researcher's preconceived 
ideas about salient theoretic propositions. By using content analysis, it was possible to 
determine relationships between categories and their properties. Grounded theory also 
offers an analytical framework for examining at causality. Causal relationships are 
characterized by three aspects of prior knowledge central to generating hypotheses for 
causal induction: the context, the plausibility of causal relationships, and the functional 
form (conditions and characteristics) of those relationships. Because not all indicators of 
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social impacts can be or are measured, inferring a potential impact may be a way to 
acknowledge the possibility of occurrence. If key indicators in the causal path are 
supported by evidence that the 'nature' of relationships between processes and impacts 
regularly correlate, and that the sequential process is plausible, then it is possible to 
hypothesize the probability of impact occurrence. Because social systems are complex, 
causal model diagramming helps determine relationships of interest between impacts and 
processes. In addition, it helps to visually present the impact analysis. Summarily, the list 
of social impact variables can be used as a menu of potential impacts or as probes for 
interviews. 
The list of social impact variables was constructed based on the same data used to 
document the case study. This documentation consists of New England area newspaper 
articles, fishing industry press, public documents from 1991 to 1998, literature on the 
social dimension of fishery management, and social impacts literature. The software 
NVivo 8 was used to code the database of texts. Because some documents have inherent 
biases, for example industry press may reinforce resentment toward regulation, 
identification of and compensation for such biases was carried out through interviews. 
Thirty interviews were conducted with people related to the fishing industry in the states 
of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine and the interviews were essential to both 




The case study focuses on emergency regulations for groundfish in New England 
in the 1999s. More precisely, it is detailed account of management actions focusing on 
Amendment 5 (1994) and 7 (1996) to the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management 
Plan which regulates New England groundfish stocks. To understand the reasons why 
emergency actions were implemented in 1994, the narrative goes back to the First 
Groundfish Plan (1977 to 1982) and is then followed by the Interim Groundfish Plan 
(1982 to 1986). During that period (1977-1986), the industry grew rapidly because of the 
increasing demand for seafood coupled with a federal financial program promoting 
technological advancement in, and the resulting expansion of, the industry. Despite 
regulation, fishermen caught fish at a pace beyond reproduction and growth rates. Passed 
in 1986, the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan and subsequent 
Amendments 1 to 4 (1986 to 1994) failed at reversing the slide. Overfishing guidelines, 
published by NMFS in 1989, and the Conservation Law Foundation lawsuit (1991) were 
two catalysts that set in motion actions to stop overfishing. Simultaneously, Amendment 
5 aimed to prevent further increases in fishing capacity and Amendment 7 to plan stock 
rebuilding. 
Analysis of impacts to stakeholders 
The social impacts of Amendments 5 and 7 were identified by looking at causal 
relationships using causal model diagrams for stakeholder groups: commercial and 
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recreational fishermen, fishermen's wives and family members, owners and employees of 
the support industry, US Coast Guard personnel, NMFS personnel, Council staff and 
members, environmental groups and the general public. The narrative describes either 
how stakeholders perceived the consequences of overfishing and the related regulation on 
their personal and/or professional lives (e.g., lower catch reducing profitability) or how 
they impacted management actions to end, or not, overfishing (e.g., higher catch by 
fishing in a close area and increasing regulation). Each group provided a unique 
standpoint from which to illustrate the influence of political, economic and cultural forces 
decisions made. This information was crucial in understanding what happened as well as 
the social dynamics of resource use and the social consequences of the management tools 
used. The causal model diagram is useful in showing how impacts occurred as a function 
of management actions as well as in demonstrating varying degrees of sensitivity to 
impact and resiliency. The analysis of documents and interviews shed light on the 
changes in New England groundfish industry in the 1990s. The case study also grounded 
and established the new conceptual model for SIA. 
Conclusion 
The exploratory approach for SIA developed in this research would be beneficial 
to fishery management because of its practicality at predicting impacts from plan/action 
alternatives. The causal model diagrams help to visualize the causality of impacts, from 
trigger of events to experiences of individuals. It offers an opportunity to strategize 
intervention along the causal chain in order to mitigate or intercept the occurrence of 
11 
unwanted consequences. The list of variables used with the diagram is not a checklist of 
what should be documented; it is a repertoire of possible impacts inferred from a review 
of actual impacts in this fishery. 
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FIRST CHAPTER 
PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT 
Social Impact Assessment 
First legislative mandate: National Environmental Policy Act 
The Nixon administration responded to growing environmental public outrage by 
enacting one of the most important pieces of environmental legislation (Buck, 2006; 
Caldwell, 1998). National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to 
consider the environment when amending their programs. The purpose of NEPA is to 
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to 
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of 
man; to enrich the understanding of ecological systems and natural 
resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on 
Environmental Quality (42 USC § 4321). 
The policy has a clear mandate for all federal agencies "to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony" (42 USC § 
4321 (a)). NEPA requires agencies detail environmental impacts of their proposed actions 
via an EIS and to circulate the EIS for comments from the agency and public. Council on 
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Environmental Quality has statutory obligation such as data collection, oversight of the 
EIS process and annual report to the President on the state of the environment. NEPA's 
greatest impact has come from the recognition of the profound impact of human actions 
on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment and the establishment 
of action-forcing procedures for all federal agencies, regardless of their missions or 
position in the government (CEQ, 2007). 
The two major purposes of the EIS are to disclose in advance prospective 
environmental impacts to better inform decision-makers, and insure citizen involvement. 
The EIS includes: 
The environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse 
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposed action 
be implemented, alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship 
between local short-term uses of the environment and long-term 
productivity, and any irreversible commitments of resources which would 
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
(Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2005, p. 120) 
It also requires agencies to "determine if their proposed actions have significant 
environmental effects and to consider the environmental and related social and economic 
effects of their proposed actions" (CEQ, 2007, p. 4). Therefore, the process requires the 
integrated use of the social sciences in the EIS. The components of EIS that address 
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potential social impact are called social impact assessments (SIA). Each agency has its 
own guidelines about how to prepare EIS and SIA (CEQ, 2007). 
EIS offers an holistic approach to assess beneficial and detrimental ecological, 
aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health impacts, whether direct, indirect, 
or cumulative (40 USC § 1508.14). Direct impacts "are caused by the action and occur at 
the same time and place". Indirect impacts "are caused by the action and are later in time 
or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable" (40 USC § 1508.8). 
Cumulative impact is: 
The impact on the environment which results from the incremental 
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-
Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can 
result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking 
place over a period of time" (40 USC § 1508.7). 
The EIS process should provide a full-disclosure of potential implications from 
proposed actions and offer alternatives. Therefore, negative and positive impacts as well 
as unintended and intended consequences can inform decisions. 
Not all actions undertaken by federal agencies require an EIS. Amongst the first 
steps, the agency goes through a 'scoping' process to determine if the proposed actions 
will significantly affect the human environment. At this stage, the agency assess the 
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"issues involved, support the development of appropriate alternatives, help ensure that 
the analysis considers all direct, indirect and cumulative impacts, and identify appropriate 
mitigation" (EPA, 2005, p. 2). Upon that decision, it will produce either an 
'environmental assessment' (EA) or a preliminary draft EIS. An EA is a concise 
document providing sufficient evidence to determine the low level of significance of the 
impacts which also include some social impact analysis. If the EA shows no significant 
impacts, the agency issues a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI) which can be 
challenged. If the EA is inconclusive and there might be a significant impact, the agency 
must do an EIS1. 
An EIS can be controversial and adequacy can be challenged in federal court. In 
many development projects, this process became a powerful tool used by citizens' 
lobbies to stop project because of an agency's failure to prepare an acceptable EIS and 
consider or fully analyze impacts in advance (Buck, 2006). However, by early 1980s, 
most US federal agencies had formalized environmental and social assessment 
procedures according to agencies' regulations (Burdge & Vanclay, 1996). EISs became a 
requirement in many countries and international institutions. Since 1985, EIS has become 
a key instrument of European Union environmental policy. In 1986, the World Bank 
decided to include both environmental and social assessment for evaluating international 
projects seeking bank financing. EI As and SI As have become an important requirement 
for many agencies around the world which adopted and modified the original NEPA 
procedure. 
1
 A detail account of the NEPA process can be found in A Citizen's Guide to the NEPA (CEQ, 2007) 
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Definitions of SIA 
As mentioned, SIA originated from the EIS process of NEPA in 1970 (Burdge, 
2004). Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, SIA grew as a practice but also as 
discipline. In 1981, SIA practitioners founded the International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA), which provided forum on research and practice. The first SIA 
guideline was written in 1994 by the Interorganizational Committee on Principles and 
Guidelines for Social Impact Assessment (later referred to Interorganizational 
Committee) formed by representative of a range of social science organizations. 
However, each federal agency also crafts its own SIA guidelines. SIA has three levels of 
meaning. In its simplest form, SIA is a tool or a method within EIS. In the second place, 
SIA is a methodology in its own right, such as a series of steps in the managing of social 
issues of a planned intervention. At is broadest level; SIA is regarded as a discipline or a 
field of research and practice to which pertain a group of scholars and practitioners, 
and/or a sub-discipline of applied social science (Vanclay, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). 
The regulatory context of EIS shaped the first definitions of SIA. The definitions 
written by Interorganizational Committee considered: 
Social impact assessment can be defined as the process of 
assessing or estimating, in advance, the social consequences that are likely 
to follow from specific policy actions or project development, particularly 
in the context of appropriate national, state or provincial environmental 
policy legislation (Burdge & Vanclay, 1995, p.32). 
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However, this early definition is limited to the scope of assessment of regulatory 
systems that are modeled on NEPA. Impact assessment can be carried for other purpose 
than legislative by other entities than government (i.e. communities, corporation, or 
university) and focus on a broader scope than just specific projects. This definition also 
excludes past developments and their subsequent impacts, therefore ignoring sensitivities 
to new development. This first perspective and understanding of SIA has been limited to 
the fulfillment of legislative mandate and the role of predicting mostly negative impacts 
of projects (Vanclay, 2003). 
With over 30 years of application, technique, and theoretical bases, SIA made 
considerable progress and became more than a component of EIA. SIA is a philosophy 
about development and democracy that considers "harmful impacts of development, 
goals of development and processes of development" (Vanclay, 2004, p. 269). This 
understanding leads to a different definition of SIA which will be the one considered in 
this dissertation: 
SIA is the process of analyzing (predicting, evaluating and 
reflecting) and managing the intended and unintended consequences on 
the human environment of planned interventions (policies, programs, 
plans, and projects) and any social change processes invoked by those 
interventions so as to bring about a more sustainable and equitable 
biophysical and human environment (Vanclay, 2002b, p. 388). 
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The objective of SIA is to insure that planned interventions (policies, programs, 
plans, and projects) maximize the advantages and minimize the costs, "especially those 
borne by the community and often not adequately taken into account by decision-makers, 
regulatory agencies and developers (Vanclay, 2002b, p. 387). SIA seeks to identify 
potential impacts in advance, in order to take the best decisions on how to proceed, and 
develop mitigation measures that minimize the harm from proposed projects, plans, or 
policies. 
Barriers and constraints confronting; SIA 
For the past 20 years, the number of publications on SIA increased at the same 
pace as the developing projects. There are innumerable guidelines published in 
governmental agencies, programs, organizations across the world (e.g., United Nations, 
World Bank, United Kingdom, Canadian guidelines, NEPA guidelines, SIA for fishery 
management). There are several textbooks on SIA (Barrow, 2000; Becker, 1997, 2001; 
Becker & Vanclay, 2003; Branch, Hooper, Thompson, & Creighton, 1984; Burdge, 1995; 
Finsterbusch, Llewellyn, & Wolf, 1983; Lane, Dale, & Taylor, 2001; Taylor, Bryan, & 
Goodrich, 2004). There are also numbers of peer reviewed journals in which 
professional, applied and scholarly articles are published (e.g., Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review, Human Organization, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 
Rural Sociology, Society and Natural Resources, Practicing Anthropology, Journal of 
Environmental Assessment Policy and Management). 
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For two decades, academics and the wider SIA community identified various 
shortcomings in the field. Previous studies have speculated upon reasons for these 
shortcomings (For more on SIA weaknesses, see: Becker & Vanclay, 2003; Burdge, 
2003; Burdge & Vanclay, 1995; Burdge & Vanclay, 1996; R. J. Burdge, 2003; 
Chadwick, 2002; Coles, 2007; Marshall, Arts, & Morrison-Saunders, 2005; Taylor et al., 
2004). Among the reasons given for the poor assessment, four have caught my attention. 
I focused on these four weaknesses because they are encountered not only in SIA at large, 
but also in fishery management. These weaknesses are discussed in further detail in the 
next section. 
First, the quality of SIA is limited by financial resources, time and personnel such 
as trained and experienced practitioners. Previous research (Burdge & Vanclay, 1996; 
Chadwick, 2002; Vanclay, 2002b) found that unqualified consultants, who have very 
little expertise in social science methodology, often undertake SIA. There is a naive 
belief that social science is common sense and it is assumed that anyone can determine 
the social consequences of an action. The lack of experience may be typified by the use 
of a checklist approach as opposed to properly thinking through the complex causal 
pathways of social impacts (Leistritz, Halstead, Chase, & Murdock, 1983; Leistritz & 
Murdock, 1981; Slootweg, Vanclay, & Schooten, 2001). Moreover, it is not uncommon 
to find that assessments are limited by low budget and short timeframe. Some SIA are 
carried out very quickly with limited fieldwork, and the quality of the study is in part a 
direct result of the time and financial resources made available (Glasson, Therivel, & 
Chadwick, 2005). 
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Second, the consultant or the agency does not choose of the right approach and 
tool to analyze data. Also, data may vary in terms of quality. The need for fieldwork is an 
obstacle. Quantitative versus qualitative techniques are often determined as a function of 
available data rather than fieldwork data (Coles, 2007; Tilt, Braun, & He, 2009). 
Third, there is a lack of quality evaluation of SIA reports and it is a major 
limitation in the advancement of the field (Ahmadvand et al., 2009; Dipper, Jones, & 
Wood, 1998; Sadler, 1992). Agencies and corporations receiving SIA reports rarely take 
the time to question the validity of these assessments (Burdge & Vanclay, 1996). 
Moreover, few scientific investigations have looked at the relevance and accuracy of 
guidelines, their relationships to predictions made, and how they are used in 
policymaking (Ahmadvand et al., 2009; Burdge & Vanclay, 1996; Marshall et al , 2005; 
Ross & McGee, 2006; Teigland, 2000; Vanclay, 2002a). 
Fourth, many scholars found the existing lists of social impact variables in 
international and American guidelines to be inadequate and contradictory (Asselin & 
Parkins, 2009; Pollnac et al., 2006; Schooten et al., 2003; Vanclay, 2002a, 2006; Webler 
& Lord, 2010). It was argued that these lists are too data-driven and focused too much on 
things that could be counted, instead of things that count (Schooten et al., 2003; Webler 
& Lord, 2010). Therefore, there are many potential impacts missing from those lists. We 
might miss things that are important, but difficult to measure. Moreover, Vanclay points 
out that these lists focus on negative impacts and on impacts described from a narrow or 
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ethnocentric point of view (2002a). The debate on what impact should be addressed in 
SIA is based upon the core definition of what is a 'social impact'. 
Concept of "social impact" and its variables 
Defining the meaning of social impacts is not a simple task. In many studies 
regarding SIA, social researchers have made attempts to develop generic classifications 
of impact types that should be considered in SIA (Armour, 1990; Branch et al., 1984; 
Burdge & Vanclay, 1995; Gramling & Freudenberg, 1992; Juslen, 1995; Vanclay, 
2002a). However, there is no consensus on what the concept of "social impact" 
encompasses. If we looked at official guidelines (e.g., ICGPSIA, UN, World Bank, 
Canadian and UK guidance), the concept "social" is thought as attitudes or behaviors; 
common characteristics of people or descriptions of communities; interactions between 
people; interactive systems in communities and institutions. It normally excludes physical 
and mental health because these impacts are most commonly covered in health impact 
assessment. But, health issues are social issues (Nyden, Figert, Shibley, & Burrows, 
1997). Business, markets and economics are often briefly mentioned for being covered in 
Economic Impact Analysis (EIA). Emotions, livability, integrity of government, as well 
as intangible beliefs and culture are variables simply left aside. However, some scholars 
have included more aspects in their assessment to cover all human impacts: 
Aesthetic (landscape analysis), archaeological and heritage, 
community, cultural, demographic, development, economic and fiscal, 
gender, health, indigenous rights, infrastructure, institutional, political 
(human rights, governance, democratization etc.), poverty-related, 
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psychological, resource issues (access and ownership of resources), the 
impacts of tourism and other impacts on societies (Vanclay, 2002a, p. 
190). 
Classifications of type of social impact have an implicit structure. Categories 
mark off territories into which individual impacts are assigned. The categories help 
ensure that there are no systematic omissions in the collection of impacts. While sorting 
impacts into meaningful groups is a matter of much discretion, progress is being made in 
classifying social impacts. The Table 1 presents a review of 7 examples of set of 
categories. One of the most common approaches to define broad SIA categories is to base 
them upon the academic disciplines that study human society. For example, Gramling & 
Freudenberg divided society into biophysical, psychological, social, political, economic, 
and cultural systems (1992). This discipline-based approach is strong because it can 
draw on specialized concepts, variables, and indicators developed in each discipline. Its 
main limitation is that it is not competent at recognizing impacts that cross traditional 
academic boundaries. Consequently, it is difficult to assemble an accurate understanding 
of some impacts. It is a challenge to measure multi-disciplinary impacts because the 
concepts and tools needed to do so may not exist and scholars are not well known for 
collaborating productively with colleagues outside their area of specialization (Austin, 
Park, & Goble, 2008). For instance, impacts to leisure opportunities are not easy to sort 
into a disciplinary framework as it has social, cultural, psychological, political, and 
economic dimensions. 
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Table 1. Sets of categories that identify social impacts variables (chronologically). 
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The generic classification of social impact type, or what can be called checklists 
of impact assessment variables, can refer to categories of quantifiable variables or 
qualitative indicators (number of people vs. perceptions about society). In the article 
Conceptualizing Social Impact (2002), Vanclay reviewed and criticized exiting social 
impact variable lists. He argues that many of these lists are too data-driven, suggesting 
that they focused too much on variables that could be documented instead of identifying 
relevant potential impacts that may be difficult or expensive to measure. It is often 
justified by the saying 'the assessment is based on the best data available' (NOAA & 
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NMFS, 2007). He also criticized that existing lists focus only on narrow and negative 
impacts. For instance, the original version of the Interorganizational Committee on 
Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment (ICPGSIA, 1994) produced an 
organized list of 30 impact variables. The ICGPSIA took a bottom-up view, starting with 
a long list for which data are readily available and grouping these into thematic sets 
similar to Gramling and Freudenberg's sets. The schema, entirely generated from readily-
quantifiable variables, may miss things that are important but which are difficult to 
measure. According to Vanclay, the list of variables is not a list of social impacts. It is 
rather a list of indicators that "should be considered in a study to provide information that 
could be used to determine social impacts that might exist in a particular community" 
(Vanclay, 2002a, p. 188). 
Vanclay created a taxonomy whose categories of impacts mainly relate to 
qualities of relevance or importance to people (Schooten et al., 2003; Vanclay, 2002a, 
2003). For example, quality of the living environment refers to the livability of 
neighborhood and workplace which are impacts felt directly by individuals or groups. 
Vanclay suggested adopting the perspective of the affected individual and grouping 
impacts accordingly. He also differentiates the complex causal mechanisms that produce 
the impact from the impact itself. To ease the thinking through these social systems, he 
listed 88 variables classified under 7 categories of impacts, and 6 categories of processes 
as shown in Table 2 (Schooten et al., 2003; Vanclay, 2002a). 
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Rural to urban migration 
Urban to rural migration 
Waged labor 




Currency exchange fluctuation 
Concentration of economic 
activity 
Economic globalization 





Enhanced transport and rural 
accessibility 
Physical splintering 











Deviant social behavior 
Social Impacts 
Impact 
Health and social 
wellbeing 















Death of self or a family member 
Death in the community 
Nutrition 
Actual health and fertility 
Perceived health 
Mental health and subjective wellbeing 
Aspirations for future for self and children 
Autonomy 
Stigmatization or deviance labeling 
Feelings (positive or negative) 
Quality of the living environment 
Leisure, recreation opportunities & 
facilities 
Environmental amenity value/aesthetic 
quality 
Availability of housing facilities 
Physical quality of housing 
Social quality of housing 
Adequacy of physical infrastructure 
Adequacy of and access to social 
infrastructure 
Personal safety and hazard exposure 
Crime and violence 
Work load 
Standard of living 




Replacement costs of environmental 
function 
Economic dependency 
Burden of national debt 
Change in cultural values 
Cultural affrontage 
Cultural integrity 
Experience of being culturally 
marginalized 
Profanization of culture 
Loss of local language or dialect 
Natural and cultural heritage 
Alteration of family structure 
Obligation to living family & ancestors 
Family violence 
Social network 
Community identification and connection 
Community cohesion 
Social differentiation and equity 
Social tension and violence 
Functioning of government agencies 
Integrity of government and agencies 
Tenure or legal rights 
Subsidiarity 
Human rights 
Participation in decision making 
Access to legal procedures and to legal 
advice 
Impact equity 
Women's physical integrity 
Personal autonomy of women 
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Gendered division of labor 
Gendered division of household labor 
Gendered division of reproductive labor 
Gender-based control over, and access to 
resources 
Political emancipation of women 
Distinguishing impacts from processes 
Vanclay defines impact as a 'change actually experienced by humans (at 
individual, group or society levels) in either a corporeal (physical) or cognitive 
(perceptual) sense' (2002). Implicitly using this definition of impacts, Vanclay examined 
impact variables generally measured in social impact assessment analysis and found 
many that do not measure impacts at all. He stated that there are differences between 
social impacts and social processes. The logic behind their differences comes from 
parallels made between the analysis of environmental functions and conceptualizing 
social impacts (Slootweg et al., 2001). This framework elaborated by Slootweg basically 
identifies the pathway by which environmental and societal impacts emerge from 
projects, by distinguishing process from impact in the physical environment (Figure 1). 
For example, a physical change of the environment, like an increased runoff from 
wildfire decimated forests may or may not cause a significant change to the ecological 
services such as a change in water quality. The differentiation of process and impact is 
also present in the natural hazards literature. Early scholarship on causal models noted 
that hazards events cause harm by first influencing existing processes. These have also 
been called "pathways" (see Hohenemser, Kasperson, & Kates, 1985; R. E. Kasperson, 
Golding, & Tuler, 1989; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Changes in these 
processes then result in impacts or in a second order of processes. For instance, drought 
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places new constraints on water supply systems for a region. Those systems must then 
react to the drought by raising prices, implementing water use restrictions, or seeking out 
other sources of water. Each of those actions produces impacts on people, businesses, 
and communities. 
Figure 1. Integrated framework for environmental and social impact 
assessment from Slootweg, Vanclay and van Schooten (2001) 



























By applying this concept to social impact, Slootweg et al. made clear that many 
changes are not in themselves impacts (2001). For example, the purported impact called 
'population change' does not meet the definition of an impact. An increase in population 
is not in of itself a condition 'felt' or 'experienced' by an individual or a group. Of 
course, 'population change' does lead to impacts (Figure 2). After the population 
increases, people may experience changed perceptions about personal attachment to the 
community (community cohesion). On a more practical level, they may experience 
increased demand for health services (longer waiting hours or delays in having an 
appointment), and possibly annoyance as a result of this change. These are impacts to 
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social entities. Population is an important quality of society and it is necessary to 
understand how a project or a stressor can affect population, but a change in population is 
not a social impact per se. It is a social process. 
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As defined by Vanclay, social processes are human and institutional activities that 
are an established feature of human communities that can be measured objectively, and 
independently of the local context. The inherited perceptions, given meaning or value of 
social processes are context dependent to the acting of various social groups. Some 
groups in society are more resilient and turn new situations into opportunities. For 
example, the process of economic globalization may benefit local seafood processors that 
turned toward Europe for exportations of locally unpopular species. Other groups are less 
capable to adapt and their vulnerability makes them bear the negative impacts. 
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Moreover, impacts and processes can be intentional, unintentional, direct or 
indirect and cumulative. They also take place in time and scale. Social processes that 
result directly from an intervention can lead to impact and/or (several) other social 
processes. As exemplified in Figure 2, the influx of newcomers invoked by a project is an 
intentional process (temporary growth of local population). In the short run, local 
residents may experience longer commute times due to traffic congestion which may 
change their perception of the nature of the community. In the long run, this population 
growth might lead to urban-sprawl and change in demographic composition which in turn 
might change their personal attachment to the community. Identifying actual impacts and 
their scale, as well as distinguishing them from processes is important because it leads to 
a better understanding of the complex causal mechanisms that produce social impacts, 
especially the indirect and cumulative ones. Distinguishing impact from process also 
allows identifying with more nuances, a wider range of impacts in their local meaning. 
This distinction is important for an accurate prediction of potential impacts and for the 
mitigation process. 
The distinction between processes and outcomes is not new, but Vanclay's 
application of this distinction to social impact assessment was an important observation 
in the field of SIA. The conceptual framework has been subsequently applied in both 
academic researches and assessments undertaken by consultants worldwide. For example, 
set of variables was elaborated based on Vanclay's conceptual framework to evaluate the 
social impact of the rural family agro-industry in Southern Brazil (Sulzbacher, 2009). 
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Another example, SIAs conducted for the construction of the Spring Grove Dam, South 
Africa were framed around the concept of processes and impacts (Brugge, 2007, 2008). 
Perception versus reality 
There is an important point to make about individuals' perception versus the 
reality of a situation. Strong opinions anchored in cultural traditions and social networks 
are resistant to change because they provide the references to which individuals compare 
new information (Slovic, 1987). If new evidence is consistent with one's initial beliefs, 
values and norms, it then appears reliable and informative. On the other hand, opposing 
facts tend to be dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980). Furthermore, individuals are also influenced by opinions transmitted by family, 
friends, co-workers, respected public figures and the media (Short, 1984). Therefore, 
dynamics within social group influence whether people downplay the impact of certain 
changes or emphasize others as a means of maintaining the group perception (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1983). This is a critical phenomenon to account for in public policy because 
decisions are influenced as much by people's interpretation of the situation as they are by 
the situation per se (Kasperson et al., 1988). Therefore debates are often a matter of 
perception and interpretation rather than a delineation of facts (Kasperson et al., 1988). 
As mentioned by sociologist William Thomas, "if men define situations as real, they are 
real in their consequences (Thomas & Thomas, 1928). Thus, people adopt behavior and 
make choices based on their perception of a situation and its perceived potential impact 
and these factors can so greatly influence decisions that as they produce large ripple 
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effects. The underlying cause can become lost or skewed, blurring outsiders' ability to 
comprehensively assess decisions made 
From a practical standpoint, this phenomenon complicates the early stages of SIA 
most severely (i.e., the scoping process and projection of impacts) because that is the 
time when the differentiation of perception from reality is most limited by the process 
itself. Deadlines and budget restraints restrict the number of interviews available to 
distinguish the fear of being impacted (perception) from the impact itself (reality) (e.g., 
the fear of being stressed versus being stressed). And because the need for speed in 
assessment is so acute in the early stages, the validity of claims becomes less critical than 
how the situation is perceived, further potentiating the likelihood of mis-analysis 
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SIA and Fishery Management 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act is the 
principal law governing marine fisheries in the United States. The law has been 
reauthorized and extensively amended in 1990, 1996 and 2006: first by the Fishery 
Conservation Amendments of 1990, second by the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, and 
10 years later by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Reauthorization Act of 2006. Among other things, the Magnuson Act established eight 
regional fishery management Councils. Their purpose of the regional councils is to 
develop and recommend management plans and amendments for fisheries in the federal 
waters to the Secretary of Commerce. A fishery management plan (FMP) and its 
amendments specify how a given fishery will be managed. It also identifies important 
problems or emergent issues in the fishery and specifies conservation and management 
measures to address them. These plans are subject to approval and are implemented by 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under the Secretary's authority. As 
defined by Magnuson Act's National Standards 10, any fishery management plan, shall 
"achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery" 
(MSA sec. 2 USC § 1801 (b)(4) while taking "into account the social and economic 
needs of the States" (MSA sec. 2 USC § 1801 (b)(5)(B). It should also "contain 
conservation and management measures to prevent overfishing or end overfishing and 
rebuild the fishery" (MSA sec. 303 USC §1853 (a)(10). In other words, Magnuson Act 
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established a management system to conserve fishery resources while promoting the US 
commercial and recreational fishing industry. 
To ensure that FMP provisions remain consistent with initial objectives, 
continuing research and data needs require monitoring the changes of fishery conditions. 
Plans are reviewed on a regular basis and may be updated through 3 forms of revision: 
amendment, framework adjustment, and emergency and interim actions. An amendment 
usually reflects a shift in management strategy and must go through standard rulemaking 
procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It is submitted to the 
Secretary of Commerce for review and approval. It must also include the appropriate 
environmental analysis under NEPA, which includes a full EIS and extensive public 
hearings. A framework adjustment is in essence, "an adjustment of management 
measures within the scope and criteria established by the FMP and implementing 
regulations. [...] The purpose of a framework measure is to make it possible to manage 
fisheries more responsively under conditions requiring "real time" management" 
(NOAA, 1997, Phase V, part 1). For plans developed or amendments by the New 
England Council, Council meetings provide for public input including at least one public 
hearing (Glossary of Amendment 16). In terms of policy, frameworks are considered to 
have either no significant impact under NEPA, or the same impacts identified in the latest 
amendment. It can be used to adjust management measures (e.g., days-at-sea, area 
closures, total allowable catch, see table 3 for more details), and any exceptions to the 
regulations on a regional, species-specific, or gear-specific basis as needed (Amendment 
2
 A detail account of the FMP/amendment and NEPA processes can be found in Reviewing Environmental 
Impact Statements for Fishery Management Plans (EPA, 2005) 
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5). Framework adjustments are not commonly used by other Councils as they are in New 
England. Emergency and interim measures, based on appropriate findings regarding 
fishery circumstances may be implemented to address urgent circumstances in a fishery 
or to reduce overfishing (MSA Sec 305(c). 
Table 3. Example of management measures used to control fish mortality 
since the adoption of Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan in 
1986 to Amendment 13 (Amendment 13, 2003) 
Days-At-Sea (DAS) 
Minimum fish size 
Mesh size 
Regulated Mesh Area 
Trip limits or 
possession limit 






Moratorium on new 
vessel limits 
Number of days per year that a boat spends at sea on a trip intended to 
catch fish (including steaming time) The allocation of days is 
determined by catch history 
Minimum fish size is the smallest length at which it is legal to keep or 
sell a fish The size depends on the species offish and catch can be 
controlled by adjusting the mesh size of nets 
Fish length selectivity is controlled by the mesh size of the net 
Fishing ground where the use of the minimum mesh size is required 
Landing limit in pound per trip 
Spawning ground and juvenile critical areas closed to fishing at 
certain season 
Year-round area closures to certain types of commercial fishing 
Regulations regarding the use of certain type of gear for specific 
locations and/or seasons 
Trip limits on bycatch of regulated groundfish species 
Moratorium on the issuance of additional vessel permits 
EIS and fishery management plans 
The Magnuson Act is complemented by other federal and state laws, including the 
NEPA, which requires that an EIS be prepared for "major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment." The Council must therefore meet the 
environmental impact analysis requirement and prepare an EIS or an EA for fishery 
management plans (NAO Sec.6 216-63). EIS for fishery management plan analyzes how 
J
 NOAA Administrative Order (NAO) 216-6, "Environmental Review Procedures for Implementing the 
National Environmental Policy Act". 
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economic, social and ecological effects are interrelated, by having "a systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach which ensures the integrated use of the natural and social 
sciences [...] in planning and decision-making" (NEPA 42 USC § 4332 (2)(A). Therefore, 
economic and technical considerations such as management of fishing gears and 
enforceability of regulations must be equally weighted on par with unquantified 
amenities and values, which include such factors as job satisfaction and independent life-
style for commercial fishermen, and appreciation of wild species in their natural setting 
for the non-consumptive user of marine fishery resources (NOAA & NMFS, 2007). 
National Standard 8 and fishing communities 
Magnuson Act specifies that all fishery management plans must comply with ten 
National Standards. In the 1996 amendment to the Magnuson Act, three national 
standards were added to the prior list of seven. National Standard 8 takes into account the 
importance of fishery resources to fishing communities. It states that 
"conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the 
conservation requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, take into 
account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in 
order to: (1) Provide for the sustained participation of such communities; 
and (2) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on 
such communities" (MSA sec.301 16 USC § 1851 (a)(8). 
'Fishing community' is defined as "a community which is substantially dependent 
on or substantially engaged in the harvesting or processing of fishery resources to meet 
social and economic needs, and includes fishing vessel owners, operators, and crew and 
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United States fish processors that are based in such community" (MSA sec.3 16 USC § 
1802(3)(16). 
Increasingly, there has been a theoretical debate over the adequacy of this 
definition of community. The definition of community is important not only for its legal 
implication but also for a regulation design standpoint as it dictates in part, the 
delineation of boundaries and analysis of interaction between and within society and 
environment (Clay & Olson, 2007). It is fundamental in defining which features should 
be analyzed in the prediction and measurement of impacts. Therefore, the definition of 
fishing community has implication for the choice of data, methods and approach to 
fishery social science with regard to policy, its design and implementation (Clay & 
Olson, 2008; Hall-Arber, Dyer, Poggie, McNally, & Gagne, 2001). 
From the literature and the legal documents, communities can be defined from a 
geospatial perceptive (e.g., a place geographically isolated or not) or/and from interests 
other than a place: occupational group (e.g., fishermen), interest groups, associations, 
social class or group of individuals (e.g., gear groups) bounded by nonplace-based ties 
(Clay & Olson, 2007; Sepez, Norman, Poole, & Tilt, 2006). It can also be defined upon 
the concept of cultural and economical dependency on natural resources (e.g., Natural 
Resource Community conceptual model (Dyer & McGoodwin, 1994; Jacob, Farmer, 
Jepson, & Adams, 2001; Olson & Clay, 2001). Regardless of the perspective adopted, the 
definition of a fishing community must account for the commercial and institutional 
apparatus of cities and towns in which they are located; the integration in local economy; 
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the local history and tradition; the social and cultural identity deriving from a sense of 
place; interrelated infrastructure and community supports; political powers; the dynamic 
and complex marine ecosystem (i.e. weather, shore-based human activities, pollution); 
fish stock cycle; seasons; and regulations (Dyer & Poggie, 2000; Hall-Arber et al., 2001; 
Jacob, Jepson, & Farmer, 2005). It is also more important to acknowledge that fishing 
communities change as a function of local development. For example, the rising costs of 
coastal property and other factors increase the likelihood that people engaged in fishing 
activities live away from the port where the fish are landed or processed, leading to 
another interpretation of National Standard 8 (McCay & Cieri, 2000; Wilson & McCay, 
1998). In an effort to find commonalities amongst various perspectives on fishing 
community (from literature and NS8), important themes that differentiate a fishing 
community from a non-fishing community have been identified. They should be taken 
into consideration when assessing impacts. Table 4 regroup important theme relevant for 
defining a fishing community. 
Table 4. Important themes relevant for industrial fisheries, and widespread geographic locations 
(Clay and Olson, 2007. p.35) 
• A certain level of visible connection to the industry (boats, gear, fishing-related businesses) and other 
infrastructure elements 
• Connections among on-land and at-sea networks 
• The frequent role of kinship in the labor process 
• Multiple household and family level ties to fishing (with many fishermen, different generations, and 
gendered fishing related tasks) 
• The frequent persistence of a sense of a cultural connection to fishing through changes from small-boat 
to large-boat, family to industrial, commercial to recreational fishing and even to fishing-related 
tourism that involves little actual fishing activity 
Guidelines for SIA in fishery 
The singularity of fishing communities compared to non-fishing communities has 
called for social assessment approaches compatible with marine resources management. 
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To that effect, NMFS provided interim operational guidance for the use of SIAs. After 
revision, an official operational guidance was issued in 1995. This guideline was based 
upon a national document written in 1994 by the Interorganizational Committee on 
Guidelines and Principles, jointly sponsored by the Forest Service U.S., Department of 
Agriculture, and the National Marine Fisheries Service. Those earlier versions were 
revised in 2003 to provide further guidance on the use of SIA in the light of the 1996 
amendments to the Magnuson Act and the National Standard 8. 
As cited, the Magnuson Act definition of a fishing community is 'based' in a 
geographic location, and includes participants that are dependent on or engaged in fishing 
or processing activities to meet social and economic needs. The SIA guideline mentions 
that many towns and cities have a diverse economy and do not depend only on fishery 
resources to prosper. Although they cannot be regarded as 'fishing community' under the 
Magnuson Act, they still need to be considered during the development of an SIA. 
Similarly, occupational or avocational ' community' of fishermen dispersed through a 
region or state (e.g., billfish anglers, gillnetters), as well as fishermen who seek a 
particular species and that are not linked to any geographic community should also be 
described and considered in the fishery impact statement (NOAA & NMFS, 2007). 
According to the guidelines, the members of fishing communities include 
commercial, recreational and subsistence fishermen, vessel owners, operators, and crew. 
Fishery dependent services and industries include fish processors, reseller, boatyards and 
marinas, ice-houses, tackle shops, fishing guide services, charter fishing operators, etc. 
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The guidelines also note that management measures will impact the families of fishermen 
and service industry, and should be covered in the analyses (NOAA & NMFS, 2007). 
From a policy standpoint, the guideline's description of a fishing community does 
not entirely correspond to the legal definition of fishing communities. The definition of 
community is directly linked to the measurement of impacts, as the choice of 
measurement tools and methods goes accordingly with what is measured. The guidelines 
still present the challenge of defining 'fishing community' in way that it improves data 
collection, databases and impact assessments, all of which translate into the best 
management actions in the context of federal mandates and of budget and time 
restrictions. 
The guideline is structured around a social factor analysis conceptual framework 
and its process is divided the in 4 steps: 
• Description of the fishery or community 
• Selection of social variables and their analysis: deciding which features of the 
community will be assessed 
• Information collection and analysis of the baseline case: description of the past 
and present social system of the fishery and collecting data if necessary 
• Actual social impact assessment: taking findings of social factor analysis and 
assessing alternative management scenarios. 
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The assessment is carried out systematically and the results are to be presented 
coherently. The guideline suggests the use of a matrix of indicators for each five 
categories of social variable which can be compared against the baseline (case status quo) 
and each alternative (see the matrix suggested by the guideline in table 5). 
Table 5. NOAA fisheries guidelines (2003): Framework for social factors analysis 
Social Factor or Variable 
Demographics (Population 
data, education) 
Cultural data related to fishery 
(Norms, values) 
Social Structure and 
Institution (Community, 
family data) 
Cultural data related to 
community (Norms, values) 
Participation in fishery 












The 2003 guideline does not present a detailed selection of sub-variables for each 
category like its earlier versions. However, it includes a fifth category which is 
specifically required by the Magnuson Act. It also specifies that the selection of sub-
variables should be relevant to the analysis and relates to the Magnuson Act and/or 
NEPA action or policy for their: 
Significance, or how strong the impact is likely to be; availability, 
or how available data are with which to measure the variable; efficiency, 
or the extent to which the measurement of one variable obviates the need 
to measure other variables; sensitivity, or the degree to which the variable 
and its measurement clearly register changes from the baseline for each 
reasonable alternative; accuracy, or the degree to which the variable and 
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its measurement yield consistent results; and validity, or the reliability of 
the measure and whether it correctly represents the variable (NOAA & 
NMFS, 2007, p. 18). 
Problems of applicability of SIA to fishery management 
This section aims to address the root causes of shortcoming as they relate 
specifically to SIA of fishery management actions. From the literature, I identified the 
main reasons given for constraining the scope of the assessment and affecting SIA 
quality. I regrouped those under five themes, described below. 
The shortcomings are not distinct issues to be addressed separately; they are 
interrelated and each problem has a domino effect with another part of the assessment, 
which in turn compromises the quality of the assessment. For example, the NOAA 
guidelines proscribe a social factor analysis framework using a generic list of indicators 
and calls for the use of the existing data (NOAA & NMFS, 2007). This tends to reduce 
the complexity of fishery systems' dynamics to simple matrix of possible impacts leaving 
out a wide range of impacts (Tuler, Agyeman, Pinto da Silva, LoRusso, & Kay, 2008). 
The quality and quantity of data used in the assessment affect the degree and precision of 
impact prediction, which in turn influences the evaluation of impacts' significance. The 
problem may not lie only in the assessment process itself but instead be a combination of 
factors that ranges from research design to budget and time restriction. 
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Need for more accurate data. The Magnuson Act specifies little guidance to 
collect social and economic data in concert with specific fisheries management needs. 
Therefore, managers should use the "best scientific information available" to conduct 
SIA (MSA sec.301 16 USC § 1851 (a)(2). There is also a lack of strong baseline data 
upon which to compare potential and actual impacts (National Sea Grant College 
Program [NSGP], 2010). The data available on the fishing industry as well as on other 
groups such as recreational and subsistence fisheries are incomplete (McCay & Cieri, 
2000; Wilson & McCay, 1998). The actual data do not fully represent the range of 
impacts about which fishermen and others may be concerned (Hall-Arber et al., 2009; 
Pollnac & Poggie, 2006; Tuler, Agyeman et al , 2008). 
Local and traditional knowledge could compensate for these gaps, but managers 
question the usefulness and quality of information from the general public and from 
fishermen. On one hand, they recognize that fishermen ought to be involved with 
providing input about their story. But the expertise to gather, evaluate or effectively apply 
local and traditional knowledge is missing (NSGP, 2010). On the other hand, regulators 
seldom know if the information is credible and have to take it on good faith that 
individuals are honestly reflecting experienced impacts (Sharp & Lach, 2003). Since the 
data do not always fit the rigor of science, it is often considered anecdotal and rejected as 
not relevant (Dobbs, 2000; Hartley & Robertson, 2006); consequently, an important 
context is not considered. Many managers expressed their frustrations about the 
difficulties interpreting messages they receive from the fishing community (Sharp & 
Lach, 2003). 
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The lack of data may be partially explained by low budgetary support of social 
science. According to external reviews of NOAA, social science is underrepresented and 
underused, which affects the capacity of the agency to meet its mission and goals. 
Funding toward social science represents 0.6% of FY08 NOAA total budget and has been 
decreasing since FY05 (Hanna, 2009). The report adds that social and economic data 
collection is not organized and efforts have been more disjointed, situational and reactive 
to management needs of the day (Hanna, 2009). 
Another reason contributing to little data is the gathering process delayed by the 
Paper Reduction Act (PRA). The act, amended in 1995 has oversight functions relating to 
information resources in the federal government including information dissemination to 
public, data collection and their use, archive maintenance, privacy and confidentiality 
insurance and appropriate disclosure (PRA 44 USCA § 3504(a). Every agency must 
obtain a Control Number from the Office of Management and Budget before collecting 
information from the general public. The process includes various steps which can take at 
least 120 days.4 This lengthy process can impede data collection in a timely manner 
especially when there is urgency for action. 
4
 The agency must provide sixty days' notice in the Federal Register to seek comments on the need for 
information. After the consultation period, the Agency submits an information collections (CI) application 
to Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for clearance and approval. The request must 
come with a second notice in the Federal Register. The OIRA has 60 days to review the submission (30 
days for comments and 30 days for approval process). If a control number is issued, it must be displayed on 
the collection. In addition to this control number, a notice to respondents must be included on the form 
(PRA 44 USCA § 3504). 
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Furthermore, timeframes for data collection, review and assessment are often too 
short for the timelines of policy makers and managers needing information (Hall-Arber et 
al., 2009; NSGP, 2010). Therefore, time restrictions and budget constraints lead federal 
agencies to use available data from other analyses, though they are not always adequate 
for the assessment at hand (Butler, Steele, & Robertson, 2001; Pollnac & Poggie, 2006; 
Thunberg, 2010). Often these are economic or demographic data that poorly reflect the 
character of social change. This can also present out-dated factual information that 
inadequately explains recent social changes (Pollnac & Poggie, 2006). Qualitative data 
better-suited to the task are expensive, time consuming to collect, and difficult to analyze 
(Butler et al., 2001). Therefore, low quality, scarce availability, or inaccuracy of data can 
lead to an imprecise impact assessment, which in turn may not meet decision-makers 
requirements (Pollnac & Poggie, 2006; Tuler, Agyeman et al., 2008). 
For the moment, baseline data are minimal although there are efforts to improve 
the relevance and quality of data via a permit holder survey and other methods to reach 
crew. Social and economic performance measures have also been identified and 
information on variables such as well being, governance, stewardship, financial viability, 
distributional outcome and equity will be available yearly (Clay, Kitts & Pinto da Silva, 
2010). Furthermore, stakeholder groups express their opinion publicly in newspapers and 
magazines and their comments could complement this information. There are also plenty 
of reports, books and articles on New England fisheries that document perceptions of 
impacts that could be added to base line data. 
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Communication. There is no agreement on priorities and ways to reach the 
Magnuson Act goal of a sustainable fishery, whether through strong conservation 
measures with high social impact or less restrictive regulation with slowed stock recovery 
and longer term social impacts (need references). The difference in focus, knowledge and 
approach among different groups can hinder consensus (Berkes, Folke, & Colding, 
2000). Groups with different interests (e.g., fishermen, environmentalists, scientists, and 
coastal developers), often do not listen to the arguments or views given by the others and 
'hear what they want to hear' (Weeks & Packard, 1997). There is also a tendency to 
discount non-group members as lacking scientific merit or relevance (Eden, 1996; Hall-
Arber & Pederson, 1999; Hartley & Robertson, 2006). The participatory system misled 
fishermen into believing their input would be considered, as often their comments are 
ignored or merely taken under advisement; and this only exacerbates the development of 
resentment (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). The complexity of ecological interaction, its 
science and its application into regulation, as well as their cumulative impacts on 
community, aggravate communication problems (Granek et al., 2009) to a point where 
negotiations deadlock. 
Need for rigorous SIA methodology and framework. One challenge is the 
translation of social science results into a form that is useful for and easily understood by 
managers and policy makers that have different levels of expertise and experience 
(Colburn, Abbott-Jamieson, & Clay, 2006; Sharp & Lach, 2003; Smith & Clay, 2010). 
Some argue that models for fisheries social impact assessment should be more 
compatible with biologists' and economists' approaches rather than qualitative, 
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descriptive formats, and that this would improve its usefulness by council members 
(Sharp & Lach, 2003). Others found that SIA based on readily quantifiable variables 
forces the outcomes of concern to be too narrowly defined (Tuler, Agyeman et al., 2008). 
This led to the introduction of SIA conceptual models for fishery management using a 
limited set of quantitative and qualitative indicator variables. Pollnac (2006) found that 
SIA should encompass a broader set of marine resource management problems (e.g., 
open ocean aquaculture, ocean-based energy resources, marine resource dependent 
tourism) and that the current SIA framework remains inadequate in evaluating 
relationships among variables; the model still lacks the useful connections between the 
information on impacts of policy alternatives and applicability to resource management. 
SIAs have other shortcomings, as pointed out by Tuler: "what is typically missing 
[in SIA] is a nuanced representation of fishery systems' dynamics, including how impacts 
arise from multiple stresses and pressures." (Tuler, Agyeman et al., 2008, p. 180) These 
dynamics are not represented in SIA because the guidelines, although they are intended to 
be tailored to each assessment, do not capture complex and interactive societal and 
environmental systems. Those lists lack the precision to consider indirect and interactive 
effects from multiple stressors, and therefore they misrepresent the range of impacts 
experienced by fishermen (McCay & Cieri, 2000; Pollnac et al., 2006; Pollnac & Poggie, 
2008; Tuler, Agyeman et al., 2008). Moreover, the guideline mentions that cumulative 
impacts should be taken into consideration but it does not include either tools to measure 
them or methodology to meaningfully integrate then in the assessment. As such, "there is 
little consideration of the ways that differential impacts arise or the cumulative and 
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interactive effects of multiple stressors—if they are even considered at all" (Tuler, 
Agyeman et al., 2008, p. 180). 
This lack of precision and nuanced information is also attributable to low quality 
assessment. During the interviews conducted for this research, Council staff complained 
about the unequal quality of SIA, mentioning that, on many occasions, they had to 
rewrite parts of reports or to add information to poor assessments. 
The biggest issue that we have is that social impacts that were 
conducted in the past until now are directly attributed to one factor and 
that is the revenues coming across the boat. If the consequence of a 
proposed action is that revenues are expected to go up, then the social 
impacts are positive. And if the revenues - short term - are going down, 
then they got a [negative] impact even though maybe the short term 
reduction is going to result in a long term sustainability. That is not really 
considered social positive [impact]. There are very few things that come 
up that are independent from being tied to the revenue in social impact 
assessment. And that is so wrong in my opinion. Because the kinds of 
fishing industry we have here have inspired works of literature, plays, 
statues, paintings, and so on. Those are important cultural social factors. 
Those are cultural values that are not picked up in assessment (Personal 
communication, spring 2010). 
The quality of SIA assessment for groundfish plan depends on the experience and 
training of the assessor. Although these analyses are the responsibility of the Council's 
plan development teams, the personnel on these teams vary from plan to plan. As a result, 
the work actually gets done by the Council staff, NMFS science center personnel or a 
consultant. 
Need for program evaluation. Ex post facto analysis or evaluation can be an 
important tool to assess the quality and accuracy of SIA. As Jentoft (2006) points out, 
looking back to see what really happened is crucial before looking forward. Since SIAs 
are conducted in anticipation of regulatory change, common sense dictates a look back to 
assess prior performance at looking forward. The SIA process in fisheries management 
has not yet been subjected to a thorough national or regional program evaluation (Hanna, 
2010). Moreover, the government has not provided real incentives for formal evaluation 
of the social impact assessments process in part because it is not in the mandate of state 
managers, councils or NMFS social scientists to do so (Hall-Arber et al., 2009). 
Consequently, there are limited data and analysis of the actual impacts of the regulation 
implemented. In the long-term, omitting formal follow-up evaluation negatively affects 
the accuracy of impact predictions and thus the decisions that are based upon those 
predictions. The consequences of having mitigation based on erroneous predicted impacts 
can result in a series of negative cumulative impacts and misguided fisheries 
management. 
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Need for sound management structure. The Regional Fishery Management 
Council process was designed "to exercise sound judgment in the stewardship of fishery 
resources [by enabling] the States, the fishing industry, consumer and environmental 
organizations, and other interested persons to participate in, and advise on, the 
establishment and administration of [fishery management] plans" (MSA sec. 2 USC § 
1801 (b)(5). In other words, one of the primary purposes of the councils is to provide the 
opportunity to participants (e.g., the commercial, recreational, environmental, and 
scientific communities, and consumers) to have a say in fishing decisions through having 
a fair and balanced appointment of interests on the council. In New England, most of the 
species managed by the Council are primarily associated with commercial fisheries. It is 
expected that the majority of the council members are from the commercial fishing 
sector. In 1998, of a total of eleven appointed Council members, eight represented the 
commercial fishing sector, two represented recreational interests, and one was considered 
as 'other' (NMFS, 2001). Generally, uneven representation of all groups has a great 
potential for decisions favoring a particular sector or subgroup. For example, recreational 
fishermen felt penalized by the management laissez-faire attitude that led to overfishing. 
Although the situation has evolved and the balance of interests represented on the 
Council changed with the regulation shifting toward sustainability, still a majority of the 
appointed members are from the industry, lobbyist or otherwise represent fishing 
industries. Council members are required to publicly disclose their financial interests in 
fishing or the seafood industry. Once that is done, they can vote on any regulations. If 
their interests at issue are greater than 10 percent, they have to recuse themselves from 
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the Council. Since the threshold is a percentage and not a fixed number, 10 percent is a 
very high threshold which is likely seldom met. In 1998, it was found that about 60 
percent of all appointed members have direct financial interest (but enough to reach 10%) 
in the fisheries that their councils manage and regulate (Eagle, Newkirk, & Thompson Jr., 
2003). 
When personal, financial, or relational considerations influence a 
regulator's decision, even unconsciously, the regulator is less likely to 
make the decision that is best for the population as a whole. Potential 
conflicts of interest, in short, can cloud judgment even for the regulator 
who has the best of intentions and has studied an issue extensively (Eagle 
et al., 2003, p. 27). 
Therefore, there is still a significant risk that some interests are considered 
differently and are given more weight in the final decision. 
Studies of the fisheries management system have shown that conflicts of interest, 
lobbying and poor representation of different viewpoints affect public confidence in 
governmental institutions and public participation in fisheries management (Cloutier, 
1996; Cochrane, 2000; Eagle et al., 2003; Okey, 2003). The potential impacts of 
regulation are identified following the scoping process, which is held at council meetings. 
As mentioned by Eagle: "the widely held perception that, because of conflicts of interest, 
the councils are predisposed to discounting views other than those of their fishing 
constituents further discourages public participation"(2003 p.34). 
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Other institutional factors also significantly impede involvement. Upon first 
meeting, the Council identifies a very broad set of options and narrows them based 
largely upon the biological analysis, which is the primary requirement in the law (to 
overfishing); so then biologists provide analyses of management measure alternatives. 
Thus, the economic and social analyses are often only developed fairly late in the process 
once the management option list is narrowed, and effectively the choice is made. The 
economic and social analyses are not used to sift the options rather to justify the final 
choice. Moreover, the council decision making process is complex and lengthy, involving 
multiple advisory groups. Thus it could be a tedious task to provide meaningful input at 
the right step. It was found that the NEPA scoping process, public , and written 
comments significantly reduce public understanding and can contribute to dissatisfaction 
and sense of unfairness (Lawrence, Daniels, & Stankey, 1997). Moreover, "the fishing 
industry's dominance of the councils dissuades participation by those outside the fishing 
industry" (Eagle et al., 2003, p. 35). The manner in which public input is obtained 
requires more precision to overcome biases as again, it tends to gather comments from a 
limited spectrum of involved parties presenting only few points of view (Butler et al., 
2001). 
Conclusion 
SIA has a clear mandate to document the possible consequences of anticipated 
interventions. Who should conduct the assessment; what to measure; how and to which 
extend to conduct the assessment; what data to use; what should be presented to 
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managers and in which format are questions of much debate and for good reasons. There 
are many approaches to SIA that fit different contexts. In fishery management, the 
context limits the formal application of guidelines suggested by NOAA. The management 
system is complex and limited in terms of budget and time. It involves a natural resource 
that fluctuates in abundance for reasons that are, in part, out of our control. Further, the 
definition of resource users, and thus fishing communities, presents some challenges. 
Therefore, the SIA framework should take these limitations into consideration. By 
reviewing the literature on SIA, I identified shortcomings in the basic concepts of 
defining what an impact is and what processes or causal chain produces impacts. The 
distinction between impact and process, as well as the use of 'pathways,' was an 
important observation also made in other fields of studies such as natural hazard or 
vulnerability assessments. The literature review of fishery management also presented 
major problems for the applicability of SIA. Models based on the assessment of 
wellbeing or vulnerability present assessment frameworks that are foreign to the original 
SIA process mandated by the law. Therefore, their applicability can be compromised by 
their inherent design. However, these models offer important insights as to how to 
identify cumulative and interactive impacts with the refinement required by managers. If 
I were to address some of the problems brought up in the literature and create an SIA 
model, it could: 
• use a minimum data collection without compromising the assessment quality 
• facilitate dialogue 
• be easily understood by managers regardless of their expertise and background 
• link fisheries with other economic sectors (e.g., tourism, coastal development) 
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• represent social system dynamics and address direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts 
• ease the assessment of different policy scenarios 
• increase transparency of assessment 
• foster a better representation of subgroups (e.g., trawlers, gillnetters, longliners) 
To create such a model is not an easy task. The differentiation of impacts and 
process is a useful concept but, in practice, a sound list of variables coupled with the 
vulnerability concept used in a visual model is good starting point in adapting an SIA 
framework to fisheries management. In the next section I describe the development of a 
simplified model that was constructed from a fishery case study. 
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SECOND CHAPTER 
METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The method used in this thesis unfolds according to the main objective: exploring 
and developing an SIA approach that could capture and integrate multiple stakeholders' 
perspectives in predicting impacts from management actions. The research uses grounded 
theory where data are analyzed using inductive reasoning to develop theoretical concepts 
and categories related to phenomenon. It then uses a causal framework (as opposed to a 
comparative approach as suggested by ICPGSIA) to analyze these phenomena. As 
identified in the introduction, one objective is to create a new list of social variables for 
fishery management using multiple data sources linked to the case study of the 
overfishing and collapse of New England groundfish fisheries in the 1990s. The data 
therein consists of a combination of interviews, written press, academic literature and 
public documents (Appendix A).. Another objective is to analyze the case study and 
highlight causal relationships of interest, more specifically stakeholders' perception of 
impacts. To frame the analysis, a causal model diagram is used to illustrate the impact of 
overfishing and management actions on each stakeholder group: fishermen, fishermen's 
wives or family members, processing industry, NMFS personnel, council members, 
council staff, US Coast Guard personnel, groups invested in marine issues (e.g., 
environmental groups), and the general public. Both the list of variables and the causal 
model diagram were published in the article Understanding Social Impacts by Using New 
Variables and Causal Model Diagram in New England Fisheries (Lord, 2011). 
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Conceptual framework 
Since the passage of NEPA, environmental changes and social problems have 
developed in importance and magnitude. The search for solutions fostered theoretical 
development within and across disciplines as well as the need to ask new research 
questions or reexamine old ones with new insight. New methods for gathering and 
analyzing data have been developed. Interdisciplinary research provides an opportunity to 
think outside of disciplinary boundaries and provides fertile ground for the development 
of new paradigmatic structures, which necessitates new tools (Klein, 1990; Nowotny, 
Scott, & Gibbons, 2001). Emergent methods for social sciences are flexible and can 
include qualitative or quantitative methods, or a combination thereof. What is interesting 
is that emergent methods stress the definition of ontology (form and nature of reality) and 
the interconnections between epistemology (relationship between the inquirer and what 
can be known), methodology (theoretical perspectives that derive from the 
epistemology) and method (specific techniques utilized to study a given research 
problem) (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2008). By thinking about methods as being emergent, it 
5
 There is no clear definition of emergent methods. In an attempt to describe them, Chrisler 
(2009) notes "that methods can be called emergent if they are actually new (e.g., self-organizing maps), or 
if they were originally used by other fields and only recently introduced to behavioral science (e.g., 
metaphor analysis), or if they are standard methods that are now being adapted to technologies that have 
only recently emerged (e.g., internet surveys), or if researchers are using standard methods in a way that 
allows additional research questions to emerge from the first wave of data collection and inspire either 
additional waves (e.g., serial focus groups) or alterations to the method during actual data collection (e.g., 
conversational interviews), or if they are mixed methods (e.g., quantitative and qualitative) that allow 
researchers to collect data that can clarify the results of previous studies or that can answer difficult 
questions on topics that have recently emerged."(p. 900) It covers a wide range of methods, which are used 
by many disciplines (i.e., anthropology, communication, criminal justice, education, geography, human 
development, psychology, social work, sociology). 
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breaks disciplinary boundaries. This study is based on such an approach, which 
combines, adapts, applies and modifies multiple methodologies as needed with respect to 
the research objectives. The research is framed around grounded theory and its inductive 
approach for the creation of a new list of variables, and then the variables are used in a 
diagram model based on causal theories. 
Grounded Theory 
This study uses inductive approaches to qualitative data collection and analysis. 
These techniques were originally introduced in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and 
are known as "grounded theory." For the past 40 years, grounded theory has been used as 
a validated method for conducting qualitative research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2000; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). It uses a systematic 
approach to collect and analyze data, and employs inductive reasoning to develop 
theoretical concepts about events. The grounded theory method is based on the 
observation of real phenomena which are compared and/or contrasted with other 
examples within or among case studies. This methodology fosters the conceptualization 
of data rather than imposes a theoretical framework on them. The strength of this 
methodology is based on substantive theories drawn from concrete examples. Substantive 
theories are designed to account for a particular event defined in terms of time and space; 
in comparison, formal theories may have general subjects which are examined under 
many different types of situations escaping these spatial and temporal boundaries (Dey, 
1999). Substantive theory can take into account the complexity of particular 
'conjunctures' (i.e., a combination of events or circumstances at a specific point in time 
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and location) because it locates a particular event in a specific context. It fosters a holistic 
approach to understanding a particular phenomenon rather than an aggregative 
summation of its various parts. Instead of identifying a series of variables that act 
independently, the method develops a comprehensive perspective as to how variables 
connect, intersect or relate within the context as a whole (Dey, 1999). 
One distinctive strategy that grounded theory offers lies in the grouping of 
substantive connections between schemes based on associations, as opposed to formal 
classification. For example, when 3-year-old children are presented with a picture of a 
cat, a dog and a bone, they will tend to group the dog and the bone because the dog will 
eat or bury the bone (substantive connection). Older children tend to group the dog and 
the cat because they recognize the abstract taxonomy of 'animal' (Sayer, 1992). These 
categories are constructed from observation and can be based on similarity and/or 
difference, and they can also be connected theoretically through indentifying substantive 
(causal) relations between things. This distinction is particularly pertinent in coding 
because the methodology aims to reduce the researcher's preconceived ideas about 
salient concepts and theoretic propositions and thereby allows flexible interpretation of 
relationships among key concepts. These emerging concepts are worked to saturation 
(i.e., weighting alternative options against evidence) to identify patterns, repetitions and 
trends. By shifting from open coding to selective coding in terms of core categories, the 
emerging concepts are use to construct a framework of middle-range theories (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Dey, 1999; Glaser, 1978; Glor, 2008; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2008). These 
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theories are then interpreted with regard to the context, particularly of event-analyzed and 
causal relationships. 
Causal relationships 
Inductive reasoning has been researched in other disciplines (e.g., philosophy, 
logic, physics, psychology) and many premises support strong expectations about 
possible causal relationships, such as derivation theories, process theories, manipulation 
theories, counterfactual theories, probabilistic causation, causal calculus (Bayesian 
networks, structure learning), etc. In grounded theory, the relationships among key 
concepts are called 'processes' in reference to the analysis of conditions, interactions and 
causes. Strauss and Corbin define processes as the linking of action/interactional 
sequences as they evolve over time (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). According to them, 
processes mean conditional paths. The path is shaped by interactional sequences that are 
embedded in contextual, causal and specific conditions6 (Table 6). Contextual 
conditions refer to a set of general circumstances or facts that surround a particular event 
or situation. Causal conditions usually lead to the occurrence or development of a 
phenomenon. Specific conditions are defined as very unique qualities and attributes of an 
Grounded theory uses the terms "intervening" and "contextual" conditions in a rather curious 
way, interchanging their meaning. For more clarity, I use the most common definition of the terms. I define 
"contextual conditions" or "context" ("intervening" conditions in grounded theory) as a set of general 
circumstances surrounding an event (time, space, culture, economic status, technological status, history, 
etc.). 1 use the term "specific" conditions ("contextual" conditions in grounded theory) to refer to very 
specific properties or characteristics of an event which vary from settings to settings (for more on grounded 
theory, see Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
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event which vary from setting to setting. The interactional sequences vary in magnitude 
and in dimensional range (Table 6). 
Table 6. Characteristics of conditions (Adaptation from Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Dey, 1999) 




Conditions that lead to the occurrence or development of an event (e.g., antecedent condition, 
present condition that will have impact) 
The broad and general conditions bearing upon action/interactional strategies (e.g., time, space, 
culture, economy, technology, history) 
Specific properties or characteristics of an event (e.g.. location of the event, dimensional ranee as 
described below) 
Dimensional range, magnitude and vulnerability 
What is the source of impact? What is the 
stress or perturbation? 
What is the frequency and timing of stress? 
Is it cumulative or part of a casual chain? 
What is the social and cultural significance of 
the resource? 
Who is impacted? 
Amongst stakeholders, which groups are at 
greater risk to be impacted? 
What is the scale of impact? 
How is the impact evolving over time? 
What are the relationships across scales? 
Is it natural? 
• Pattern of resources 
o Resource cycle and availability 
o Diversity of resources 
Is it human driven? 
• Resources overused 
o Resource depletion 
o Pollution 
o Overfishing 
• Is it influenced by exogenous or endogenous factors to 
fishery management (Dow, 1992; Tuler, Agyeman et al., 
2008) 
o Demographic factors 
o Individual decision-making factors 
o Institutional factors 
o Economic factors 
o Socio-cultural factors 
o Technological factors 




• Linkage between the choices of activities or technologies, 
events and positive or negative consequences (Tuler, 
Agyeman et al., 2008) 
• Institutional significance, economic importance of 
resources to community, historical, lifestyle significance, 
etc. 
Who are the stakeholders? 
• Primary, secondary and tertiary 
o Their characteristics (demographics) and 
activities as group 
What is the vulnerability of impacted groups in terms of 
• Community or individual most exposed to impact 




• Societal level 
• Within days, weeks, months, years 
How is an individual impact echoed at the community, regional, 
and, finally, societal level? 
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What is the severity of the impact? 
How people will most likely respond to and 
cope with the impact? 
How does resilience affect sensitivity and vice 
versa? 
What critical issues in understanding 
vulnerabilities can be use to predict probable 
future actions? 
What are data that can be employed to 
investigate potential impact? 
What are the adequate methods and tools 
used to document and analyze potential 
impact? 
• Distribution of losses amongst groups, communities or 
social classes 
• Equal ability to recover 
o Internal community resources (i.g., association) 
o Social capital and safety net 
• Severe, mild 
• Short-term coping measures and adjustments 
• Fundamental long-term and anticipatory measures 
Background and context 
• Qualitative 
• Quantitative 
• Advantages and disadvantages of methods, tools and data 
sources. 
Causal conditions can be unfolded in various ways, but 'if-then' logic is the 
simplest. On some occasions, a single condition stands out as causal; in other 
circumstances, the consequence arises only if a number of conditions are met. The 
conditions can be defined as necessary and/or sufficient. Necessary conditions are 
absolutely required to exist before the occurrence of the phenomenon. If there is no 
condition, then there is no event. Sufficient conditions do not have to be present for the 
event to occur, but, if they present, then the event will occur. A sequence of condition-
consequences summarized by the 'if-then' rule can be misleading, especially if there are 
multiple (many different factors produce the same effect) or conjunctural conditions 
(several causes which combine to produce the same effect). This is one shortcoming of 
grounded theory. Moreover, a condition may be neither necessary nor sufficient but may 
be classified as conjectural (also called contributory condition). Conjectural conditions 
increase the likelihood of the event occurring but may not be either necessary or 
sufficient. Conjectural conditions are important because although they can neither totally 
prevent nor bring about the event by themselves, they can significantly increase or 
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decrease the likelihood of the event. All of these conditions constitute different forms of 
the relationship between causes and effects, and knowing which of these schemas is 
relevant to a situation can reveal whether a particular causal relationship exists. 
It is important to keep in mind that grounded theory is not concerned with 
establishing (i.e., testing) theoretical prepositions; thus "no attempt is made by the [...] 
method to ascertain either the universality or the proof of suggested causes or other 
properties" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967 p. 104). It is only concerned with the identification of 
sufficient and/or conjectural conditions and not necessary conditions, because necessary 
conditions would require the evidence that a cause is invariably present whenever an 
effect occurs. The emphasis is on identifying the factors and conditions contributing to 
the happening of a phenomenon (Dey, 1999). Necessarily, causations and consequences 
are inferred from available (and unavailable) data and multiple observations. 
Similar to contextual, causal and intervening conditions of grounded theory, other 
theories (e.g., counterfactual theories, causal calculus) point out three basic aspects of 
prior knowledge that are central in generating hypotheses for causal induction: "the 
ontology of entities (properties and relations that organize a domain); the plausibility of 
specific causal relationships; and the functional form of those relationships" (Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2009 p. 665; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2003; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 
2006; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Niyogi, 2007). This prior knowledge is also echoed in 
vulnerability assessment described earlier which is particularly relevant to framing the 
context and its properties (exposure and sensitivities), as well as the underlying 
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interactions (resilience) that play a role in causality. The prior knowledge of causal 
induction combined with the evidence provided by the data observed makes a compelling 
case for predictions about which causal relations are likely to hold and which patterns of 
future events are likely to be observed. 
Nevertheless, inference of causations and consequences presents problems of 
reliability and accuracy. Since each case study is context-dependent, the conclusion may 
be inaccurate to a certain degree or incorrect in certain situations. The conclusion from 
one case to the other may not be transferable due to lack of consistency in the use of 
categories across cases. However, additional observations, rough guidelines and variable 
lists may palliate these shortcomings. 
Another problem is validity, meaning the strength of conclusions, inferences or 
propositions. Cognitive biases may favor incorrect reasoning, which is also true of our 
everyday life. The perception versus the reality of a change - positive or negative - is 
difficult to differentiate, making behavioral assumptions less reliable. To mediate this 
problem, the results obtained can be validated through interviews of various parties to 
determine if the unfolding variables are accurately reflected in the causal analysis. To 
further ascertain feedback, diagrams may provide a helpful tool for drawing causal 
chains. To abrogate the shortcomings of reliability, accuracy and validity, Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) suggest developing a descriptive narrative about the event. Thus, the 
conceptualization of the storyline can be applied to the task of articulating key 
relationships between concepts, and illustrating causal chains. 
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In summary, the analysis starts with inductive reasoning from observations 
working toward theories. Substantive theories are then developed from the grouping of 
concepts in their context. In this research, I use this approach to develop a list of social 
variables for fishery management. The processes emerging from the substantive theories 
have specific paths embedded in contextual, causal and specific conditions, which set the 
base for establishing causal relationships. The model diagram aims to illustrate 
• the change in conditions influencing interaction over time 
• the interactional response to that change 
• the consequences that result from that interactional response 
• how consequences become conditions, influencing the next interactional sequence 
• and how the broad and general conditions bear upon action/interactional strategies 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008) 
The causal relationships are validated by the analysis of the properties and 
relations that organize the domain (ontology), the plausibility of relationships among the 
entities identified within that ontology, and their functional form. A narrative of each 
stakeholder group complements and contextualizes the analysis. 
Method 
This thesis is based on qualitative research, which is well-suited to taking an 
exploratory approach. The first step was to code primary and secondary data, and 
organize the nodes into a meaningful list of impact and processes. The second step was to 
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conduct interviews. Then, the third step was to code interviews and validate the first 
coding. The final coding is presented as the list of social impact and social process 
variables (p.75). The fourth step was to document the case study and explain 
management actions for Amendments 5 and 7. The fifth step was to analyze the 
interviews of stakeholder groups and describe and illustrate with causal model diagrams 
their perspectives to reach an understanding of impacts in relation to decision making. As 
mentioned earlier, stakeholders are defined in this research as groups or individuals who 
can affect or can be affected by the achievement of an agency's objectives (Freeman, 
1984). This includes fishermen, fishermen's wives or family members, owners and 
workers in the processing industry, NMFS personnel, council members, council staff, US 
Coast Guard personnel, groups invested in marine issues (e.g., environmental groups), 
and the general public. 
Coding of primary and secondary data 
The research uses several sources of primary and secondary data, which were 
coded in various steps. Primary sources were the stakeholders themselves. In the early 
stages of analyses, written press covering fishing issues in New England for the years 
1994-1998 provided a useful and rapid means of gaining knowledge regarding 
stakeholder viewpoints and opinions of others regarding stakeholder viewpoints. A total 
of 483 newspaper articles from 21 different sources (Appendix A, Table 12) were coded. 
In the initial phase of the study, I began with an unstructured method of coding 
(free nodes). The use of unstructured coding allows for the creation of categories, which 
are essentially a collection of citations representing concepts. When the coding is 
executed properly, categories emerge from the data. The difficult task is interpreting 
these categories in a meaningful way. From this first analysis emerged 144 human 
dimension characteristics related to fishing at large. These characteristics were regrouped 
under broad categories of impacts based on similarity and various other properties, and 
then relationships among them were hypothesized. As diverse patterns of connectivity 
emerged, basic social processes were interpreted to explain the event being studied and to 
provide the core of a substantive theory. As mentioned by Glaser (1978), basic social 
processes entail change over time. Two types of processes were identified as of-interest 
for this research: 1) basic social-psychological processes occurring at individual and/or 
group levels, and 2) basic structural processes, referring to changes in social structural 
arrangements. One concern was accounting for the role of culture; another was 
determining the influence of contextual features of the environment on the direction and 
form of an identified social process. Consequently, the use of multiple sources of data 
clarified and validated the meaning constructed from different social contexts and by 
different people. Based on these broad categories, I coded public documents specifically 
related to: 
• Amendment 5 to Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (1994-1996) 
o Social impact assessment (Hall-Arber, 1993, 57 pages) 
• Amendment 7 to Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (1996-1999) 
o New England Fishery Management Council meetings minutes (Appendix 
A, Table 13) 
o Public hearing summary (Appendix A, Table 14) 
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o Written comments (Appendix A, Table 15) 
I also used eight interviews from a previous project (Lord, Robertson, & 
Rosenberg, 2008). This research had examined the interpersonal dynamics of cooperative 
research among the participants who monitored the Western Gulf of Maine Closure Area: 
fishermen, policy analysts, social scientists, biologists, ocean engineers and ocean 
geologists (Appendix A, Table 16). Some of the questions were asking for their opinion 
on the reasons and performance of the close areas as a management tool. The participants 
who were studying the close area in the 1990s were able to talk about the balance 
between biological goals and socioeconomic impacts. The interviews were conducted in 
2008 and were also approved by the University of New Hampshire Institutional Review 
Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research. The results of this research 
were presented at the International Symposium on Society and Resource Management 
(ISSRM) in June 2008. 
During this second round of coding, I made constant comparisons among the 
different features, circumstances and sources of information to isolate recurring 
regularities in the data, which then emerged as categories.. The categories were revised, 
modified and amended until a theoretical saturation of meanings was reached; in other 
words, until I could find no more characteristics in the documentation. The categories 
were finally organized according with social impacts and social processes presented by 
Vanclay (2002a) and van Schooten (2003) to create a practical taxonomy relevant to the 
social impact assessment of fishery management. 
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Some documentation used in the creation of the list has inherent bias. For 
example, fishermen's magazines often foster resentment toward regulation. For that 
reason, newspaper quotes were not given the same weight as interview data. Rather, 
newspaper quotes were weighted in relation to the tone of the whole article. For example, 
articles that clearly used quotes to reinforce negative opinions about regulation or about 
fishermen were weighted less than descriptive articles that used quotes to illustrate more 
than one point of view. Moreover, the interviews conducted with stakeholders helped 
identify these biases and validate the first coding. At the same time, the inherent 
complexity of developing appropriate analytical constructs, when combined with the 
sheer volume of information analyzed, threatened the reliability and validity of results. 
However, the use of rigorous coding techniques and computer-assisted qualitative 
methods improved the quality of the analysis by mitigating some of these issues. 
To organize, code and analyze the large database of texts, I used NVivo 8 
software. This computer program provides for storage and analysis of large amounts of 
data in various forms, including PDF, text, image and audio files. It enables the likening 
of words, phrases or paragraphs from files to concepts (nodes), creating an enormous 
amount of connections between concepts and supporting data. This kind of software 
helps the researcher to treat the data from interviews uniformly, to fully use the data 
gathered, to draw on a variety of data, and to systematize and replicate the analysis 
procedure. In this sense, computer-assisted qualitative methods minimized potential 
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unreliability of data collection, processing method and lack of validity in findings 
(Fitzgerald, 2004). 
Interviews 
The research is exploratory and seeks to investigate multiple stakeholder points of 
view. The goal was to triangulate interviews with other sources of data to cover as much 
as possible to broaden the range of perceptions of social impacts. In order to better 
understand stakeholders' perspectives, I wanted to interviews of people related to the 
fishing industry in the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine. The targeted 
groups were identified as 
• Fishermen and former fishermen (captains and owners of commercial fishing 
vessels, and crewmembers, recreational fishermen) 
• Fishermen's wives or family members 
• Employees working in the support industry (supply, distribution, processing plan, 
charter boat) 
• National Marine Fishery Service staff 
• Scientists 
• Council members 
• Environmentalists 
• Local staff and federally elected officials 
• U.S. Coast Guard personnel 
• NGO personnel 
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• Social services personnel 
• Journalists 
While coding, I created a list of 77 names as potential interviewees. These people 
were either cited in newspapers, spoke at a public meeting, or sent a letter to the council. 
Most public documents included participants' full names and addresses. If no personal 
information was provided, I relied on the phone book to contact them. From this first list, 
I found accurate information for 28 individuals whom I contacted either by phone, email 
or post. Some did not return my calls; some refused to talk to me, especially 
environmentalists, NMFS staff and local staff of federally elected officials. Some reasons 
given for not officially participating were that they had no time for an interview; they 
did not remember much about groundfishing; they did not believe in social sciences for 
fisheries management; or they had issues with researchers involved in the study. 
Nonetheless, 10 agreed to participate and they invoked some of following reasons: they 
had information to share; they had nothing to hide; they were happy that someone cared 
to hear their opinion; or they liked that it was an independent study (not funded by any 
public or private organizations). 
The rest of the interviewees were either referred to me or contacted me directly. 
To promote the project, a webpage hosted by the University of New Hampshire 
Cooperative Extension provided a short description of the research. To reach a broader 
audience, the webpage was also available in Italian, Portuguese and French (Appendix 
B). 
7
 Many were eager to talk to me informally, sometimes for more than one hour. 
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The 30 interviews were mostly carried out in the spring of 2010 (Appendix A, 
Table 17). Interviewees lived in Massachusetts, New Hampshire or Maine at the time of 
Amendments 5 and 7. They were asked to recollect their life at the time of the emergency 
actions. Twenty-five interviews were face-to-face and five were completed over the 
phone. Five were conducted in Portuguese. Most of them were tape-recorded unless a 
participant asked otherwise. The interviews were partially transcribed for the use of the 
research but are not available for review. 
The interviews were semi-structured and the interview guide (Appendix C) was 
approved by the University of New Hampshire Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects in Research (Appendix D). The confidentiality of the 
interviews was left to the discretion of the interviewee. On the consent from, each 
interviewee had the choice of disclosing their name or not (Appendix E). Upon their 
agreement, their name would have been disclosed while citing their story in the 
dissertation, presentation, and publications. If they decided not to disclose their name, 
only their occupation would have been mentioned (e.g., fishermen, manager). If they 
chose confidentiality, the recording of their interview was kept private and the hard-copy 
transcript or computer files remained protected. Most participants did not want to have 
their name disclosed, and, thus, to maintain unity in citations, I decided not to include any 
names. 
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Participants could also choose to archive the recording of their interview in the 
database Voices from the Fisheries of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's National Marine Fisheries Service . The purpose of this database is to 
collect and archive audio and video-recorded oral history interviews related to 
commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishing in the United States and its territories. 
The database is housed on NOAA/NMFS servers and is accessible to the public through a 
website. These oral histories and related materials serve as a record of the Nation's 
commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisheries and as a scholarly and educational 
resource for NOAA and the general public. 
List of Variables 
The list of variables is divided into two sections: the social processes and the 
social impacts. Linking processes and causality of grounded theory with Vanclay's social 
processes and impacts was inevitably complex but going back to their respective 
definitions, Corbin and Strauss define processes as sequences of linked interacting events 
evolving over time (2008). On the other hand, Vanclay sees processes as human and 
institutional activities which can be measured objectively and independently from their 
context (2002a). Both together produce the following definition, used in the taxonomy: a 
process is a sequence of linked interacting events which evolve over time and result from 
human and institutional activities, and which can be measured objectively and 
independently from their context. 
8
 Website: http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/voicesfromthefisheries/ 
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Experienced or perceived social impacts need to be differentiated from social 
processes. As Vanclay mentioned (2002a), social impacts are defined in function of 
relevance or importance to people and represent a change actually experienced by 
humans in either a corporeal or cognitive sense. The following list is not intended to be a 
checklist; it should be thought of as a menu of possibilities that can be consulted in the 
study of a particular situation to inform the investigation. It can also be used as a starting 
place for interviews. These variables are ingredients used in making the causal diagram. 
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1) List of social process variables pertaining to fishery management 
Demographic processes: These processes relate to a combination of biological properties 
of human populations, social constructions and movements. 
• Population 
o Size, sex/gender, age, immigration/emigration, residency, resettlement, 
dispossession, rural to urban migration or urban to rural migration 
• Ethnicity of community 
o Language 
o Native-American 
o Perception of origin 
o Other self-identification such as fishing community 
Economic processes: These economic processes are those affecting the way individuals 
and/or coastal communities make a living. The processes vary as a function of their size 
and location. Rural fishing communities have different processes than the ones located in 
more urban areas. 
• Natural resource dependency 
• Economic sectors and diversification 
• Fishing sector diversification: vessel types, processors, species harvested and 
processed, market and auction 
• Economic health of the region 
o Access to fish auctions/markets 
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o Price of fish 
• Source and distribution of income and mean income per capita are social factors 
that may well differentiate communities experiencing different effects 
Environmental processes: These processes are those affecting the availability and 
diversity of resources. They also include the built environment and changes in land use 
patterns that affect coastal development. 
• Patterns of resource use 
o Fish availability due to biological/oceanographic/climate processes 
o Community dependence on resource use 
• Gentrification of coastal areas: rise in property taxes; commercial fishing harbor 
gentrified for tourism; loss of infrastructure (ice distributor, bait and tackle shops, 
docks, etc.) 
o Technological process 
o Science that improves our understanding of environment 
o New technology that increases catch efficiency 
Institutional and legal processes: These processes affect the efficiency and effectiveness 
of formal political organizations, legislation, government agencies, non-governmental 
organizations responsible for the supply of non-material resources and services (e.g., 
expertise, information, security, participation) on which people depend. 
• Litigation participation 
o Individual and group lawsuits 
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o Target of lawsuits 
o Duration of lawsuits 
• Institutionalization 
o Increase in regulation and increase in complexity 
o Integrity and accessibility of the public sector 
o Mismanagement 
o Political pressure 
o Loss of autonomy at the local sector 
• Regulation enforcement 
o Non-compliance 
Emancipatory and empowerment processes: These processes influence the ability of a 
community to organize and implement a response to changes by contributing to the 
decision-making that affects their life. Emergence or presence of leadership refers to 
individuals or organizations that step forward and take responsibility during crises. Some 
organizations, such as fishermen's associations, have various functions in empowerment 
and emancipatory processes by informing, overseeing, and advocating for fishermen's 
interests. This includes the ability of a community to have access to information and to 
communicate it to its residents in a manner considered reliable, trustworthy, and timely, 
which in turn allows residents to respond and prevent some of the damaging impacts. 
• Democratization 
o Increased influence in political decision making (lobbying, NGOs) 
• Marginalization and exclusion 
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o Various groups have reduced or no access to services or participation 
• Leadership 
o Presence and availability of community-based resources 
o Presence and availability of institutional resources 
o Role of multiplex social ties in community leadership 
o Role of multiplex ties in affecting community conflict and cooperation 
• Information/communication resources 
o Existence of media (magazines, newspapers) 
o Existence of local, regular meeting groups (church, association) 
o Public opinion 
• Emergent organizations 
o Volunteer or government organization formed to respond to crisis 
o Stated functions of emergent organizations, including advocacy, litigation, 
information dissemination, oversight 
o Post-crises persistence of organizations and their role in community 
Sociological processes: These factors affect the availability of social support and the 
overall ability of the community to respond to changes. Social solidarity and 'close-knit' 
patterns of association and interactions are aspects of the ways that people live together. 
Deviant social behaviors are important to consider as they can have serious impacts on 
social and economic well-being of the community, family and individuals (e.g., substance 
use, gambling) and can cause division in the community. Often, deviant behaviors reflect 
a sense of desperation in disaffected individuals or groups. 
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• Community cohesiveness 
o History of prior actions of community support in crises 
o Organizational focus for community support 
o Participation in regional organizations 
o Increased social capital and social networks 
• Kinship 
o Kinship-based economic activities 
o Role of kinship in buffering event-related effects 
• Social disintegration 
o The loss of social capital 
o The dissolving of social, cultural and kinship networks 
o The abandonment and lack of relevance of traditional cultural practices 
• Deviant social behavior 
o Non-compliance to regulations 
o Irresponsible behavior towards natural resources 
o Drug and alcohol use 
• Social exclusions 
o Increased differences or perceived differences between various groups 
o Stigmatization of fishermen as a group 
o Fishing group conflicts (e.g., big vs. small fleet; gear types; target species) 
• Risk taking behavior related to fishing activities that lead to safety issues 
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Cultural processes: These processes affect the system of beliefs, values, and worldviews 
that are used to interpret and assign meaning to places, events, objects, relationships and 
social conditions. The level of homogeneity influences how change is understood and 
evaluated within the community and how impacts themselves are defined and 
experienced. Risk perception is an important cultural factor of what constitutes 
acceptable risk and what is considered a threat (degree and kind of threat). 
• Homogeneity/heterogeneity of values/traditions/languages among community 
members 
o Values and meaning regarding the significance and use of natural 
resources 
o Values and meaning regarding the definition and importance of the 
"fisherman's way of life" 
o Increased difference of groups based on cultural values, traditions, 
languages, etc. 
o Persistence of traditional cultural practices 
• Risk perception 
o Threat to the "fisherman's way of life" (being your own boss, personal 
meaning of and connection to the ocean, family tradition of being a 
fishermen) 
o Assessment of risk types (economic, safety, community's future) 
o Assessment of potential damages (degree of damage, long/short term) 
o Assessment of potential recovery 
• Natural resources orientation 
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o Environmental stewardship, including enjoyment of and sense of 
responsibility for the environment 
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2) List of social impact variables pertaining to fishery management 
Health: Health indicators are likely to be important from a social perspective. Listed here 
are some examples, in non-medical terms. 
• Physical health 
o Death (self, family or community member) 
o Fitness 
o Handicap 
• Mental Health 
o Substance and alcohol use 
o Feelings of anger, stress, anxiety, depression, hopelessness, nostalgic 
melancholy, powerlessness, embarrassment, apprehension , fear, etc. 
o Aspiration for a future life for self and children (education, father-son 
fishermen, American dream) 
o Autonomy 
o Stigmatization and deviance labeling 
o Life satisfaction 
Quality of the living environment: This category relates to the livability of the built and 
natural environment in which people live and work. The variables refer to the biophysical 
environment in perceived and actual dimensions, both at a given point in time and with 
changes over time. 
• Quality of the living environment (actual and perceived) 
82 
o Ecological damage 
o Pollution 
• Character of the place 
o Environmental amenity value/aesthetic quality (actual and perceived) 
• Personal safety and hazard exposure (actual and perceived) 
• Infrastructure 
o Social infrastructure (hospitals, counseling services, police, education) 
o Physical infrastructure (e.g., roads, water supply, sewage, harbor, gear 
storage) 
• Health of ocean and availability of natural resources (actual and perceived) 
Economic impacts and material wellbeing: These variables relate to the wealth and 
prosperity of community as a whole as well as of its individual citizens. 
• Employment/unemployment 
o Income 
o Work load (e.g., duties, hours/days) 
o Debt load 
o Economic dependency individual/family on fishing 
o Loss of/change in life style (standard of living) 
• Availability of trained personnel 
o Recruitment of crew members 
• Availability of seafood products for consumers 
• Replacement cost of environmental functions (decline in fish stock) 
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Cultural impacts: Cultural impacts are measured as changes in the meanings people 
attribute to concepts of home and environment, such as their ritual systems and language. 
• Sense of place and community 
o Ancestral association with community and locale 
o Historical/religious interest in locale 
o Existence of special places 
• Change in cultural values and integrity 
• Loss of native language or local dialect 
Family and community impacts: Changes to families and communities can cause 
disruption of personal relationships, family structure and social networks, especially if 
they seem to be imposed from outside the family/community. Changes in the community 
can affect residents' perception of community cohesion and their sense of belonging. 
• Alteration of family structure 
o Stability, divorce, presence of father at home 
o Domestic violence/disturbance 
• Community cohesion (actual and perceived) 
o Social network 
• Sense of place and community 
o Sense of belonging and attachment to place 
o Value of community as 'home' 
o Integration of lifestyle and place 
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• Social differentiation and equity 
• Social tension and violence 
Institutional, legal, political and equity impacts: The range of impacts affects the capacity 
of organizations, institutions and regulatory agencies to cope with the workload. Strong 
commercial and political interests may change the outcome of decisions, especially if the 
system does not foster public participation and solidarity. 
• Functioning of government agencies 
o Management of common resources 
o Integrity of government 
o Adequacy of regulation for problems 
o Efficiency/efficacy of public participation mechanisms 
o Integration of public comments into decision making 
o Workload for organizations/agencies 
• Political 
o Locally perceived interests 
o Unity of locally perceived interests 
o Locally perceived conflicts of interest 
o Loss of influence in decision making (e.g., court ruling decision) 
• Legal 
o Local financial resources to provide for legal representation 
• Access to scientific expertise for fishing regulation 
o Partnership between fishermen and scientists 
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o Trust level in science 
• Participation in decision making 
o Integration of local knowledge 
o Political disengagement 
o Trust level in government 
• Impact on equity 
• Complexity of regulation 
o Overwhelming regulation 
Gender relations: The gender gap factors into the distribution of the workload between 
men and women at sea, on the waterfront, and in relation to household maintenance and 
childrearing. Traditional fishing communities have been patriarchal, with strong gendered 
divisions of labor. As women increasingly enter the workforce, and as they assume 
leadership roles within coastal communities, this changes the structure of authority. 
• Gendered division of household labor 
• Political emancipation of women 
o Formation and participation in fishermen's wives associations 
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Causal Model Diagram 
The created list of social impact variables for fishery management integrates into 
a simple causal model diagram two elements discussed in previous sections: the 
distinction between processes and impacts, and the phenomenon of causality. This 
approach preserves the original intent for social variables used in SIA, maintains 
grounded theory's inductive reasoning from observations, and incorporates the basic 
fundamentals of causation analysis. It reveals the dynamic qualities of a multi-faceted 
social system. By documenting and illustrating causality, this approach is oriented toward 
identifying management interventions for the on-going process of managing renewable 
resources, which makes the approach adaptable as a planning tool. 
One objective of the research was to develop a way of thinking about the socially 
disruptive effects of overfishing and regulations while accounting for the constraints 
faced by SIA practitioners, the usefulness to regulators and clarity to the fishermen and 
public. To do so, I used a causal model diagram to graphically and interactively 
demonstrate how fisheries-related decision makers can successfully infer the causality of 
a proposed regulation, given that the data they observe are so sparse and limited. This 
causal model was previously developed for investigating the human dimension of oil 
spills and spill response (Lord, Tuler, Webler, & Dow, 2009; Tuler, Lord, Webler, & 
Dow, 2009; Webler & Lord, 2010: see appendix E). There it was used to clarify how 
different stressors (in that case oil spill and response actions) change the experience of 
87 
individuals, groups, and institutions or other social entities. Three challenges were 
identified with the use of such model: 
• discerning important processes and impacts from less important ones 
• simplifying the causal chains without losing critical information 
• and highlighting possible and likely dynamic responses 
There are some strategies available to address these challenges. First, it is 
necessary to break down the complexity into meaningful pieces by identifying important 
and related groups of impacts while maintaining a contextual social and environmental 
perspective. Discerning causality can be a difficult task if complexity is not reduced. To 
be helpful, the causal diagrams need to be reduced to minimal themes that still capture 
the key causal relationships. 
Figure 3. Example of basic causal model of social processes and impacts of oil spill on 
shellfishing industry (adapted from Webler, 2010) 
Stressors 
^ • ' k areas ) 
( ) Stressor (^~~^) Process 
Societal impacts and processes 
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quality of life 
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The best approach is to start with the simplest causal diagram that includes the 
essentials of the problem (Figure 3). Usually, if qualities, elements and relations are 
missing, the plausibility of the causal chain is discredited; there is an important 
distinction between omitting fundamental aspects and omitting incidental ones. While the 
distinction is not always obvious, relying on the context and on aspects' functional form 
can provide insight into causation. It is important to mention that the diagram by itself is 
not sufficient to illustrate causality; the model needs to be accompanied by a narration of 
the event detailing the context and its attributes. The notion of vulnerability is also 
described, as it supplements explanation of causality and context. Once the fundamental 
causal chain is built, additional layers that capture other important dynamics can be added 
(Figure 4). Knowing the specific properties of an event, knowing the plausibility of 
causality, and knowing their functional form provide information that make it possible to 
simplify the causal relationships among new variables, even given very little data 
(Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009). 
Causal diagrams can be made for any group in the fishing industry. These 
diagrams depict the dynamics among stressors, intermediary processes, and impacts. For 
the most part, regulators can make these diagrams by using the list of variables and 
drawing on both primary data and timely existing data (e.g., newspapers, written 
comments). 
However, this method has shortcomings. First, some variables are costly and 
difficult to measure accurately (e.g., aspiration for future life, environmental amenity 
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value , and aesthetic quality), but acknowledging the presence of these variables along 
with generally easily-measured variables can support the causal hypothesis. Second, the 
causal diagram represents only a segment of a complex web of interactions. 
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Figure 4, Example of causal model of social processes and impacts of oil spill on shellfisliiug industiy (adapted 
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Simplification of the causal chains might lead to a point where critical 
information is missing. Moreover, characterizing the causal relationship can become the 
subject of much debate, especially if perspectives are not equally represented. Changes in 
fishing regulations are frequently contested and can produce conflicting interpretations of 
causes, consequences and underlying conditions. To that effect, this approach might have 
utility in mapping alternate visions of events. It can uncover biases if it is applied to all 
components of the fishing industry (e.g., fishermen and their families, support industries, 
regulators, US Coast Guard). The causal model depicts, in a simple way, how a stressor, 
such as overfishing, stock depletion or changes in regulation, can lead to impacts directly 
and indirectly, and where it is possible to intervene to lessen consequences. 
Other relevant approaches to the social dimension of fishery management 
In recent years, many studies of New England fishing communities, such as the 
Atlas project (St. Martin & Hall-Arber, 2007, 2008), Atlantic Herring Fishery Map (Pinto 
Da Silva & Fulcher, 2005), Community Panel Projects (Hall-Arber, 2007; Hall-Arber, 
Bergeron, & McCay, 2006), Atlantic Herring Networks (Hall-Arber & Mrakovcich, 
2008; Hartley, 2010; Hartley & Glass, 2010), Well-being model (Pollnac & Poggie, 
2006) and Rapid Vulnerability Assessment (Clay & Olson, 2008; Tuler, Webler, & 
Polsky, 2008a, 2008b; Tuler, Webler, & Polsky, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c), have added a new 
layer to theoretical discussion of fishing communities. Some present practical approaches 
to data gathering while others aim to document fishing communities. At a broad level, 
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these research efforts share the similar general objective of improving the use of social 
sciences and data collection approaches for SIA in fishery management as described in 
this dissertation. 
Rapid Vulnerability Assessment 
Rapid Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) presents an applicable model to data 
collection. In the context of fishery management, the vulnerability standpoint makes 
sense as "fishing communities are particularly vulnerable to the combination of natural 
and technological disasters because fishing utilizes resources in a natural environment 
under little human control" (Clay & Olson, 2008, p. 144). Tuler, Webler and Polsky 
(2008b) developed a rapid and practical framework to help identify variables for routine 
data gathering of social, economic and cultural information regarding the vulnerabilities 
of fishing communities' sub-groups that could be used in management. This method is of 
interest to me because it has similitude with SIA and the approach developed in this 
research. The main point of distinction between them lies in their capacity to predict 
impacts. 
To concisely summarize the approach, it intends to "document the causal linkages 
between the stressor of regulator change and downstream consequences by using 
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concepts and understandings of vulnerability9 in coupled human-environment systems" 
(Tuler, Webler et al., 2008b, p. 10). 
Vulnerability comprises the inherent characteristics of social systems; the key 
elements are exposure, sensitivity and resilience (Adger, 2006; Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 
2003). Exposure refers to the presence of threat or a stress, and who or what is at risk. 
Sensitivity rests on circumstances of timing, dependency to resources, scale and cycles. 
Finally, resilience is the ability of the social system to respond to and recover from 
stresses, which includes "those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb 
impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive processes that facilitate 
the ability of the social system to re-organize, change, and learn in response to a threat" 
(Cutter et al., 2008, p. 599). Both vulnerability and its antithesis, resilience, are 
determined by the environment, society, culture, demography, individual decision-
making, institutions, the economy and technology (Dow, 1992; R. Kasperson & J. 
Kasperson, 2001). Unlike impact assessments, vulnerability assessments focus on factors 
that promote adaptation, coping and mitigation. One key element of this concept is 
causality: the relationship or a process between an event and its effect through a system, 
where subsequent events are consequences of the first. Causal pathways illustrate the 
sequenced link of stressors, processes and impacts in the broader context of social and 
9
 The notion of vulnerability emerged as one of the central organizing notions for research on global 
environmental change and risk-hazard mitigation (J. Kasperson & R. Kasperson, 2005; Turner et al., 2003). 
Vulnerability's theoretical underpinnings and practical applications have numerous frameworks and 
conceptual models (Adger, 2006; Eakin & Luers, 2006; Fiissel, 2007; G. C. Gallopin, 2006; Gallopin, 
2006; McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008; Polsky, Neff, & Yarnal, 2007). It covers complex, multidisciplinary 
fields of study including development and poverty, public health, climate change and security studies, 
engineering, geography, and political ecology, and natural hazards, technical disasters and risk 
management. 
environmental systems characteristics (e.g., society, culture, demography, etc.) 
(Hohenemser et al., 1985; Wisner et al , 2004). 
Figure 5. Example of Diagramming Tool for the Causal Structure of Vulnerability 
Commercial fisheries' sensitivities (lower boxes) and adaptive responses (upper boxes) to 
injuries and fatalities (adaptation from Tuler, Webler et al., 2008b) 
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In their study, Tuler and colleagues assess the vulnerabilities of fishing 
communities and their resilience to stress and the perturbations that arise from different 
policy options, scales, timing, and political and biological contexts (Tuler, Webler et al., 
2008b). They look at the interactive social and environmental system dynamics to 
understand how groups or individuals experience different levels of exposure to negative 
events, different levels of sensitivity to loss and different abilities to cope with change. 
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To better understand these connections, the authors used a Diagramming Tool for the 
Causal Structure of Vulnerability (DTCSV). This Java program graphically displays 
scenarios of causal chains based on a database of nodes and links. This tool aims to 
visually illustrate the causal linkages among regulations, social and economic dynamics, 
and people's characteristics and resilience actions to these changes (Figure 5). It is 
accompanied by a 'vulnerability scoping diagram' which summarizes the important 
variables connecting regulations and impacts, as well as the ways to measure them 
(Figure 6). The two diagrams are complemented with narrative descriptions and tables of 
variables that should be further investigated. 
RVA has the potential to suggest a set of variables that can be measured with the 
precision required by decision-makers. However, the method is limited to identifying 
variables for routine data gathering. The authors caution at several occasions about the 
complexity and limited capacity of the method: "is not a decision tool or way to 
systematically compare differences between proposed actions/plans" (Tuler, Webler et 
al., 2008b, p. 35). Therefore, it might be an appropriate tool to conduct baseline studies 
on which impact predictions can be made about proposed options. 
Nevertheless, RVA was criticized for being foreign to SIA guidelines, 
practitioners and managers. Although the method is systematic and efficient, it is based 
on complex theoretical framework which might hinder the soundness of its application. 
"It may take some time [...] for managers and others to learn enough about the model to 
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be able to comprehend it without having to read lengthy text explaining what is being 
illustrated" (Hall-Arber, Pomeroy, & Conway, 2009, p. 312). 
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Figure 6. Example of'vulnerability scoping diagram' summarizing the variables connecting 
regulations and impacts, and ways to measure them (Tuler et al. 2008b) 
Therefore, the assessment must be carried out by experienced personnel. It needs 
to be conducted on-site in the fishing community, and this takes resources. Moreover, 
since the framework is designed to inform managers and not to make predictions, an SIA 
is still required. These are reasonable concerns but taking into consideration the 
complexity of the social systems and the resources available to assess them, this practical 
and useful method is successful in identifying important variables for routine social data 
gathering for fishery management. 
THIRD CHAPTER 
CASE STUDY: AMENDMENT 5 AND 7 TO THE NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN 
In the decades following the passage of the Magnuson Act, the New England 
groundfish fisheries went from being fully exploited to overexploited. A combination of 
factors, including new technology, changes in species abundance, increased marketing 
for popular and new species, major policy changes and a fluctuating economy, 
contributed to this overfishing. In the 1990s, the most productive stocks collapsed one 
after the other. Emergency action - Amendment 5 - passed in 1994. The goal was to 
reduce the burden on cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder stocks by 50% over five years. 
Only two years later, Amendment 7 broadened and reinforced regulations enacted under 
Amendment 5. These two amendments were severely restrictive and enacted within a 
short period of time. However, according to many authors writing on the fate of the New 
England groundfishing industry, problems arose well before the collapse of major stock 
(Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008; Crestin, 2000; Dewar, 1983; C. Dyer & Poggie, 2000; 
Hennessey & Healey, 2000). 
In order to understand the significance of Amendments 5 and 7, it is important to 
review the evolving dynamics of fish stock decline, regulation increase and social 
response from the passage of Magnuson Act (Appendix G discusses management actions 
before the Magnuson Act (1950-1976). This section provides a concise history of 
management of New England groundfish stocks from the first groundfish plan in 1977 
the aftermath of Amendments 5 and 7. In an attempt to trace the causal path of impacts, 
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this section looks at contextual conditions and large-scale impacts and processes. This 
contextual background on regulation provides important information regarding 
community and individual sensitivities to the successive chain of management actions 
which, in turn, provides insight into the causal pathway and emergence of small-scale 
impacts discussed in the fourth section. 
This section is divided into three periods. The first part provides the context of the 
events that led to the emergency actions. It covers the First Groundfish Plan10 
implemented from 1977 to 1982, the Interim Groundfish Plan in place from 1982 to 
1986, and Amendments 1 to 4 to the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan 
from 1986 to 1993. The main sources used to document these two periods include books, 
articles, fishery stock reports (e.g., Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008; Dewar, 1983; Doeringer, 
Moss, & Terkla, 1986; Fogarty & Murawski, 1998; Hennessey & Healey, 2000; Jin, 
Thunberg, Kite-Powell, & Blake, 2002; Mayo, Fogarty, & Serchuk, 1992; Mayo & 
Terceiro, 2005; Murawski, 1993; NOAA, 1979; Wang & Rosenberg, 1997; Weber, 
2002). The second period covers Amendments 5 and 7 as well as a short summary of 
Amendments 8-10 (1998-2000), as Amendments 8-10 were the downstream effects of 
Amendment 5 and 7. For example, Amendment 8 addressed gear issues that arose from 
successive changes of regulations between 1994-95 (Amend 8). The analysis stops at 
Amendment 13, which revised th DAS program by creating four groups of permits. I 
consider this amendment to present a new cycle of impacts. 
There is no consensus on the name of the first plan: Mayo et al. (1992) name it the Atlantic Groundfish Plan, Wang 
and Rosenberg (1997) use First Groundfish Fishery Management Plan, Hennessey and Healey (2000) call it 
Emergency Plan, while it is referred to as "comprehensive" or "initial" groundfish plan in the introduction of the 
Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan (Original Plan, 1986). 
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The second section documents books, reports and per-reviews journals and 
official documents: this plan, its amendments and framework adjustments. The complete 
Multispecies Plan is available on the New England Fishery Management Council 
(http://www.nefrnc.org/index.html); the reports from the Northeast Regional Stock 
Assessment Workshop (SAW reports) are available on NMFS website 
(http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/); and reports from the following entities are 
available through their respective websites: Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
National Research Council research (NRC), reports to Congress, NOAA's reports of the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA plans of actions, USCG enforcement strategic 
plans. 
From 1976 to 1993 
First Groundfish Plan: 1977 to 1982 
The Council developed the First Groundfish Plan, which regulated cod, haddock, 
and yellowtail flounder fisheries, from March 1977 to March 1982. The Plan continued 
catch quotas with a small provision for stock recovery. "When this failed to achieve the 
desired equitable distribution of fish, trip limits by species were imposed, then weekly 
landing limits, then quotas by vessel class," for a total of 120 modifications over the 5-
year period (Healey & Hennessey, 1998, p.l 11). However, quotas were regularly 
exceeded well beyond the limit, forcing the fisheries to close frequently and for long 
periods of time (Wang & Rosenberg, 1997). Moreover, quotas were broadly unpopular 
and catch data was plagued by fraudulent records offish landing (Acheson, 1984; Dewar, 
1983; Hennessey & Healey, 2000). With the foreign fleet away, the entry of new boats 
into the industry was inevitable and this alone would have eventually busted quotas 
sooner or later. For the first three years, the number of boats, fishermen and landing value 
increased by about 30%H; the landing value went from $95 million in 1976 to $178 
million in 1982, representing a growth of 47% in 6 years (Doeringer et al., 1986). This 
increase in fishing effort almost doubled that of the previous time period. However, 
favorable oceanographic conditions and abundant classes (1979, 1980, 1981) were 
sufficient to maintain the stock stable (Mayo et al , 1992; Mayo & Terceiro, 2005). At the 
same time, industry-led lobbying pushed to substitute quotas for indirect control 
measures such as minimum mesh and fish sizes and seasonal closures. The Council 
responded with preparing the interim groundfish Plan that was adopted in 1982. 
Table 7. Chronology of the First Groundfish Plan (1977-1982) 
(Based on Acheson, 1984; Anthony, 1990; Mayo et al., 1992; Wang and Rosenberg, 1997; Crestin, 2000; Hennessey 
and Healey, 2000; Hartley and Robertson, 2006; Apollonio and Dykstra, 2008) 
1977: Implementation of the First Groundfish Plan, including initial Optimal Yield (OY) 
• Cod fishery closed in June because the annual quota was exceeded 
• Haddock and yellowtail fishery closed in July because the annual quota was exceeded 
• Emergency regulations implemented: increased OY for cod, haddock and yellowtail. 
• Quarterly quotas by species imposed 
As a consequence, during the 18 months, cheating, bycatch 
• Council used its closure power repeatedly 
1978: First Groundfish Plan in effect 
• Emergency increase in OYs extended 
• Emergency amendment: quota increased for haddock and cod, and decreased for yellowtail 
• Cod: daily trip limits imposed 
• Cod and haddock: weekly landing limits imposed 
• Quotas by vessel class imposed 
• No-discard rule imposed 
• New fishing year set: Oct. 1 -Sept. 30 
1979: First Groundfish Plan in effect 
• Weekly landing limits in effect 
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 For the years 1977 and 1979 respectively, the number of boats increased from 929 to 1,339; fishermen; 3,893 to 















Fishing closures canceled; new trip limits set based on new stock assessments 
Increased OYs for cod and haddock;o combining quotas on a single trip 
New fishing year OYs set same at 1978-79 
Interim Plan development begins 
First Groundfish Plan in effect 
Yellowtail incidental catches increase 
Closure not enforced 
First Groundfish Plan in effect 
Yellowtail landing limit west of 69° increased 
Council submitted interim Plan in the fall 
1979, 1980, 1981 were good year classes 
First Groundfish Plan until April 
Quotas lifted in March 
Interim Groundfish Plan: 1982 to 1986 
The Interim Groundfish Plan regulated cod, haddock, and yellowtail 
flounder fisheries from April 1982 to September 1986 (see Table 8). This plan intended 
to eliminate management problems associated with catch quotas. It was supposed to be a 
provide a three-year span to allow the Council the opportunity to design a more 
comprehensive plan (Crestin, 2000). Therefore, quotas were abandoned and replaced by 
indirect effort controls such as fish size and gear restrictions and area closures. The Plan 
was not sufficient to prevent stock decline and did not lead to stock rebuilding (Apollonio 
& Dykstra, 2008). Indeed, the groundfish stock plummeted, reaching new lows in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Fogarty & Murawski, 1998), while the number of large boats 
tripled (Jin et al , 2002). 
The expansion of the domestic fishing fleet is not only attributable to the 
exclusion of the foreign fleet built was also fueled by favorable economic conditions and 
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an increase in seafood demand through much of the late 1970s and mid-1980s (Jin et al., 
2002). This expansion was abetted by federal subsidies which promoted the development 
of the national fishing industry (Appendix H; for more details on loans and programs, see 
Dewar, 1983). In 1976, there were two significant federal programs in place to provide 
direction and funding for fisheries development. The Capital Construction Fund (CCF) 
allowed deferment of profits from fishing vessel operations to grow, pre-tax, for the 
renovation or new construction of a vessel. The funds accumulated were to be withdrawn 
within a 10-year period and were subject to severe tax penalties for non-qualified 
withdrawals. The Fishing Vessel Obligation Guarantee (FOG) provided government-
guaranteed loans at lower interest rates and for longer pay-back periods to upgrade or 
build boats (NOAA, 1979). Moreover, a 10% tax credit for the years 1980-86 
incentivized all kind of investors, not only fishermen, to buy vessels. In the first decade 
after the passage of the Magnuson Act, the number of all fishing vessels in New England 
increased from 825 in 1977 to 1,423 in 1983 (Anthony, 1990); between 1977 and 1983, 
the number of otter trawler fishing trips increased 76% overall. The size of the fleet also 
changed: small fleets decreased whilst the number of large vessels increased five-fold, 
and the expansion of the fishing and processing industry grew by two-thirds as well, 
fostering shore-side development (Anthony, 1990; Weber, 2002). 
Table 8. Chronology of the Interim Groundfish Plan (1982-1986) 
(Based on Mayo et al., 1992; Anthony, 1993; Wang and Rosenberg, 1997; Crestin, 2000; Hennessey and Healey, 
2000; Mayo and Terceiro, 2005; Hartley and Robertson, 2006; Apollonio and Dykstra, 2008) 
1982: Interim Groundfish Plan implemented in April on emergency basis 
• Petition for emergency implementation of interim Plan approved in January and implemented 
in April 
• Implementation of minimum mesh size for cod, minimum fish sizes and area closures (Oct) 
• Change of fishing year: March 1 to February 28 
• Development of first Multispecies Plan begins 
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• Meanwhile, the fishing fleet grows 
• Seasonal closure in the Gulf of Maine (to become Area I and II) 
1983: Interim Groundfish Plan in effect 
• Minimum cod end mesh increased 
• Development of Multispecies Plan continued 
1984: Interim Groundfish Plan in effect 
• Final definition of cod end imposed (Jan) 
• Hague line decision: US vessels now restricted to 75% of Georges Bank 
• NMFS holds public hearing on proposed srngle-mesh-aboard rule (no rule resulted) 
• Continued development of Multispecies Plan 
• Gloucester's fishing boycott (Mar) 
1985: Secretarial Amendment extending the Interim Groundfish Plan (Oct) 
• Draft of the Multispecies Plan ready for review 
• Council holds public hearings on draft Multispecies Plan (Feb) 
• Council submits Multispecies Plan for NOAA approval (Aug) 
1986: Interim Groundfish Plan in effect until September, then Multispecies Plan implemented 
• NMFS rejects the Multispecies Plan (Jan) 
• Council re-submits Multispecies Plan (Apr) 
• NMFS partial approval to Multispecies Plan (Aug); main features: more species with minimum 
size limits, larger closed areas, larger minimum mesh size and exempted fisheries 
• Multispecies Plan implemented in September 
Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan: 1986 to 1984 
The Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan (hereafter: the Plan) was 
adopted in September 1986 and it is still in effect today (2011). The Plan expanded to 
include 10 species of groundfish: cod, haddock, pollock, redfish, yellowtail flounder, 
winter flounder, American plaice, witch flounder, white hake, and windowpane flounder 
(Original Plan, 1986). At first, the Plan carried over similar management measures from 
the previous one, and the fishery remained open-access with unrestrictive requirements 
for vessel permits (Wang & Rosenberg, 1997). Despite the well-known enforcement 
problems of the interim plan, no direct control on catch or fishing effort was included 
(Hennessey & Healey, 2000). However, the Plan established a Technical Monitoring 
104 
Group (TMG) which periodically assessed the performance of the Plan and reported to 
the Council. 
Amendments 1 to 3 fine-tuned the existing plan and added more groundfish 
species to be regulated (see table 9 for details). In 1988, the TMG reported to the Council 
that principal groundfish species stocks were at the lowest levels ever recorded. The 
report criticized the Plan, alleging that the regulations in place were unlikely to be 
effective because of industry non-compliance and plan unenforceability. In July of 1989, 
NMFS published overfishing guidelines requiring the development of a measurable 
definition of overfishing for each managed fish stock. The guideline also stipulated that, 
if a stock were overfished, the Council was to establish a rebuilding program. The time 
schedule was left to the discretion of the Council upon approval by the Secretary of 
Commerce without any deadlines (50 CFR 602.11(c)(6)(iii)). According to the definition, 
three principal species, cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder, were overexploited. The 
Council submitted Amendment 4 acknowledging that overfishing was taking place but 
omitting provisions to cease overfishing or to rebuild the stocks (Wang & Rosenberg, 
1997). The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) advised the Council and NMFS that 
Amendment 4 violated the Magnuson Act's national standards (Shelley, Atkinson, 
Dorsey, & Brooks, 1995). Nevertheless, most of Amendment 4 was approved and 
implemented May 31, 1991. According to Dorsey, Amendment 4 was a useful 
acknowledgment to get from the Council because it established accountability for the 
failure of preventing overfishing required in the 602 guidelines (1994). 
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Following the approval of Amendment 4, the CLF and Massachusetts Audubon 
Society sued the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of NMFS, and the Regional NMFS 
Director for implementing an amendment that did not prevent overfishing of groundfish 
(Shelley et al., 1995). A consent decree was reached in August 1991, establishing a 
judicially-supervised schedule whereby cod and yellowtail flounder mortality was to be 
reduced by 50% within 5 years, and haddock within 10 years (Shelley et al., 1995).The 
litigation was considerably unpopular amongst fishermen, and industry interest groups 
challenged the ruling in court. The lawsuit also triggered protest from members of 
Congress. Within a month of the suit's filing, Congressman Gerry Studds of 
Massachusetts submitted a proposal which included a new Plan rebuilding timetable. The 
proposal was widely criticized and was reduced to fostering improved enforcement and 
promoting underutilized species (Weber, 2002). Despite many political attempts to 
propose alternative solutions, the terms of the decree were addressed in the first draft of 
Amendment 5 released in March 1992. 
From the creation of the Northeast Multispecies Plan in 1986 to the 
implementation of Amendment 5 in 1994, the principal groundfish stocks declined to 
historical lows and were at the point of collapse (Anthony, 1990, 1993; NFSC, 1994a, 
1994b). Yet, by 1994, the fisheries were still virtually unregulated and open-access 
(Shelley et al., 1995). Various factors contributed to ecological and social disruption 
within fisheries management during the period 1986-1993 and had serious repercussions 
the following years. 
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Noncompliance. From 1982 to 1988, incidence of mesh size, closed area entrance, 
and fish size violations rose steadily (Sutinen, Rieser, & Gauvin, 1990). Sutinen uses a 
Violation Activity Index to account for changes in fishing and surveillance effort. The 
study shows that there was a 32-fold increase in fish size violation from 1983 to 1987, 
and from 1987 to 1988 this more than doubled. The number of violations of closed areas 
peaked in 1983, 1986 and 1988 following an increase in the number of NMFS agents, 
which doubled once in 1986 and doubled again in 1988. Mesh regulation was virtually 
unenforceable; therefore the number of violations is approximate. However, all other data 
suggest that it kept increasing as well. Enforceability was a problem in the previous Plan 
and remained a main issue in this Plan. The choice of indirect management measures was 
one cause for the rise in violation rate (Hennessey & Healey, 2000). Other factors, such 
as changes in fish stocks and economic climate, reinforced the incentives to violate 
regulations. According to Sutinen, these two changes played a dominant role in the 
deterioration of compliance over the years (1990). 
Increase in catch power. As mentioned earlier, the fleet changed from smaller 
boats to larger, more efficient vessels equipped with electronics, nets, and powerful 
engines. Anthony noted that "this meant that a day at sea in the late 1980s was much 
more effective for catching fish than ever before" (1993, p.l 1). The number of fishing 
trips also increased by 80-100% from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (Edwards & 
Murawski, 1993). As a result, landings decreased steadily after 1983 as an abundance of 
stock also declined to hit rock bottom in 1996. However, the decline in landings created 
an incentive for fishermen to fish longer and harder. 
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Overcapitalization of the industry. Overcapitalization of the industry resulted in 
an overcapacity of the fleet, especially in 1980s (Alverson, 2002; Buck, 1995a; Federal 
Fisheries Investment Task Force [Force], 1999; Hoagland, Kite-Powell, & Schumacher, 
1996). In New England, open-access fisheries and subsidies contributed to expansion of 
the fishing effort and capacity, making it more appealing for individuals or corporations 
to invest in the industry (Force, 1999). A report to NOAA on federal fisheries investment 
found that subsidies in the New England groundfish industry in the 1980s and early 
1990s allowed more entry into fishing, expansion of facilities, and a gain in the net profit 
margin for fishing businesses. The demand for seafood grew along with the processing 
capacity and the price of fish, generating short term profits for fishermen. In addition, 
"annual gains in consumers' and producers' surpluses in markets beyond the harvesting 
sector were estimated to be about $20 million greater than could be sustained by the 
resources" (Edwards & Murawski, 1993, p. 447). Processors who owned fishing vessels 
sought to promote the productivity of their investment not only in vessels but also in 
processing facilities (Force, 1999). 
Several comments were made about the possible impacts of assistance programs 
on individual decisions to invest in additional fishing capacity (Force, 1999, see appendix 
H for more details on assistance programs). One reason was the financial penalties for 
unqualified withdrawals from the Capital Construction Fund (CCF) if used within 10 
years of the financial agreement. The industry had an excess fishing capacity yet more 
vessels were built or improved as many fishermen were running into their deadline to use 
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their funds (Force, 1999). There is no direct evidence that the Fishing Vessel Obligation 
Guarantee Program (FOG) either contributed to or limited capital investments in 
fisheries. As mentioned in the NOAA report on federal fisheries investments, "FOG 
provided a more favorable financial basis for qualified fishermen to do so" (Force, 1999, 
p. 102). Together with investment tax laws and policies fostering the expansion of 
domestic fisheries within the EEZ, the CCF and FOG considerably increased investments 
and fleet capacity (Force, 1999). 
According to Weber (2002), this influx of capital was part of two broader changes 
in the years since the 1970s. The abundance cycle of fisheries went from being exploited 
locally to regionally because of the increase in boat size, horsepower and number of 
boats; fishing grounds got crowded. Second, loans, grants and tax credits fostered 
investments in vessels and processing industry. Gear technology evolved and fishing 
vessels used more equipment, reducing the requisite skill level required of fishermen in 
the past. The skill level of fishermen was therefore substituted by capital: with open 
access fisheries, anyone with financial resources could buy a boat equipped with the 
latest technology and be relatively successful at fishing (Hall-Arber et al., 2001). 
Science and its credibility. Since the First Groundfish Plan, the fishing industry 
had been suspicious of the credibility of NMFS' stock assessments. The 1979, 1980, 
1981 abundant classes of groundfish did not reflect what fishermen experienced 
(Anthony, 1990). They claimed that the stocks were in great abundance and regulation 
was too restrictive. Again, the strong year class of cod and yellowtail flounder from 1987 
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observed in 1990 and 1991 went against the validity of the assessment and raised 
fishermens' suspicion about the trustworthiness of NMFS scientists (Fogarty & 
Murawski, 1998). Moreover, since fishermen were given few opportunities to participate 
and share their knowledge, which was considered by scientists as irrelevant and 
anecdotal, they rejected the science underlying the restrictions (Hartley & Robertson, 
2006). As noted by Hennessey (2000), this "attitude [...] continued to strengthen and 
[...] had a corrosive effect on groundfish management in New England for the next 20 
years" (p. 196) 
Politics. During the Bush administration (1989-92), National Oceans Services and 
NMFS's budget, which represented 46% of the total NOAA budget, dropped by 22% for 
the fiscal year 198912 (Unsoeld, 1993). As NMFS financial resources sharply declined, 
management and enforcement also crumbled, fueling fishing industry criticism. Collins 
(1994) argued that NMFS was isolated within Commerce with little support from the 
Secretary's office or NOAA. On one hand, the agency attempted to withstand the 
aggressive lobbying effort from the New England congressional delegation acquainted 
with the outraged fishing industry to either postpone the Plan or approve the least 
restrictive Plan on the grounds of socioeconomic necessity. On the other hand, USCG 
recommended also rejecting the Plan for its unenforceability. NMFS still partially 
approved the new Multispecies Plan, which had insufficient provisions to prevent 
overfishing. This situation further deteriorated NMFS's relationships with fishermen and 
the Secretary of Commerce, and was interpreted by conservationists as 'crookedness.' 
12
 A bill was brought to the House, for fiscal year 1994, that would have restored some of the past losses in 
oceans programs but was defeated by an overwhelming vote of 70-356 (Unsoeld, 1993). 
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"Some conservationists alleg[ed] that the New England Council and NMFS had been 
'captured' by the fishing interests they were supposed to regulate" (Collins, 1994, p. 6) 
Along the same lines, Weber (2002) noted that these circumstances influenced the 
choice and development of management options. The approach to management was 
based on socio-economic and political pressures representing some of the Council 
members' own narrow interests rather than biological data, which were, in the long run, 
in the interest of the resource. Since the Magnuson Act allowed councils to take into 
consideration socioeconomic factors when setting quotas, they were regularly set well 
above biological sustainability. The debacle in the New England fishing industry showed 
the weaknesses of the Magnuson Act system and attracted the attention of Congress. The 
more troubling flaw exposed was "the ability of the New England Fishery Management 
Council to ignore scientific advice and to allow, even defend, overfishing in order to meet 
short-term economic and social demands" (Weber, 2002, p. 177). This charge was also 
echoed by Crockett (2005) and Doobs, who mentioned that "had the industry and the 
council reacted sooner and more firmly to the center's warning, the crash on Georges 
could have been averted" (Dobbs, 2000, p. 67)13. This loophole became one of the major 
issues addressed when Congress amended the Magnuson Act in 1996. 
Apollonio (2008) made the opposite statement saying that the Council did not ignore scientific advice. 
He explains the management failure by blaming the limitation of science and its little predictive value, as 
well as the imprecision of stock assessments. 
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Table 9. Chronology of the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan (1986-2000) 
Unless specified, the month refers to the implementation of Amendment or framework adjustment. 
(Based on the original plan and its 16 amendments and 44 framework adjustments ;(Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008; 
Crestin, 2000; Hartley & Robertson, 2006; Hennessey & Healey, 2000; R. K. Mayo & Terceiro, 2005; Meserve, 
2006) 
1986: Multispecies Plan (Sep) 
1987: Amendment 1 (Oct) 
• Cod end redefined for enforcement 
• Minimum mesh area for yellowtail 
• Small part of haddock area closed 
• Increased mesh size 
1988: Amendment 1 in effect 
• TMG report criticizes Plan 
• Council holds public hearings on proposed Amendment 2 
• Council submit Amendment 2 for NMFS approval; main features: bycatch limit in exempted 
fisheries, yellowtail minimum size increased, large-mesh-only area on Nantucket shoals, 
recreational size limits matched commercial, trawler excluded from Area II 
1989 Amendment 2 (Feb) 
• 602 Overfishing Guidelines: each fishery management plan has to define overfishing and, if 
overfishing occurring, establish a program for rebuilding stock over a period of time specified 
by the Council and acceptable to the Secretary of Commerce, (but no deadline specified) 
• Council admitted in November meeting that stocks of cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder 
were overfished 
• Amendment 3 (Dec): established Flexible Area Action System to enable management agencies 
to respond in a timely manner to protect large concentrations of juvenile, sublegal and spawning 
fish 
1990: Amendment 3 
• First draft of Amendment 4 including a definition of overfishing 
• Massachusetts Offshore Groundfish Task Force submitted report critical of Multispecies Plan 
documenting the effect of overfishing high-valued species on the composition of stock in 
December 
1991: Amendment 4 partially approved by NMFS 
• Amendment 4 (Jun) 
• Conservation law foundation (CLF) sued Secretary of Commerce over failure to conserve 
groundfish stocks 
• Consent decree reached in CLF suit, August 28: Reduce mortality of cod and yellowtail by 50% 
within 5 years, and within 10 years for haddock 
• Development of Amendment 5 to satisfy consent decree began 
1992: Amendment 4 in effect 
• Continued development of Amendment 5 
1993: Amendment 4 in effect 
• Amendment 5 completed (Mar); main features: moratorium on new fishing permits, days-at-sea 
(DAS) limits imposed to reduce fishing effort, minimum mesh size and closed areas expanded, 
fishing mortality to be reduced 10% per year for 5 year (50% reduction), Framework 
Adjustment provision enacted 
• Collapse of haddock and yellowtail flounder, according to December report 
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1994: Emergency rules and Amendment 5 in effect 
• Amendment 5 partially approved (except for haddock) January 1 (Mar) 
• January 3, 1994, the Secretary of Commerce issued an emergency rule to protect haddock: 500-
pound catch limit and 6-month closure of 17% of Georges Bank 
• March 18, 1994: first fishery disaster: $86.8 million: $63 million aid package; $25 million for 
vessel buyback program 
• Framework Adjustment 1: implemented the effort-reduction program on a full-year basis (May) 
• Framework Adjustment 4: reduced the bycatch of harbor porpoise in the Gulf of Maine sink 
gillnet fishery (May) 
• Secretary passed Secretarial Amendment 6 to protect haddock: 500-lb possession limit (Jun) 
• NMFS scientists special advisory report: yellowtail flounder and haddock stocks have collapsed 
and Amendment 5 insufficient to allow recovery (Aug) 
• Framework Adjustment 3: limited the landing of regulated species by vessels fishing using 
small mesh (Aug) 
• Beginning of crafting Amendment 7 after September meeting 
• Emergency action: closure to groundfish gear of 17% of George Bank: areas I and II, Nantucket 
Lightship (Dec) 
1995: Emergency rules and Amendment 5 
• Framework Adjustment 9: implemented on a permanent the emergency rule (closures) and other 
modifications and additions. (Apr) 
• Framework Adjustment 11: modified demarcation line used to monitor vessel activity (Aug) 
• August: more $26 millions in disaster fund 
• Public hearings in September on Amendment 7 
• Framework Adjustment 12: expanded time and area of closures to reduce the bycatch of harbor 
porpoise in the Gulf of Maine sink gillnet fishery (Nov) 
• Framework Adjustment 7: eliminated the requirement that permit applicants own title to a 
fishing vessel at the time they initially apply for limited access/moratorium permits (Dec) 
1996: Amendment 5 and Amendment 7 (Jul) 
• Framework Adjustment 14: further reduced bycatch of harbor porpoise using additional 
measures (Mar) 
• Amendment 7 (Jul): established TACs, Multispecies Monitoring Committee and accelerated 
DAS reduction, though year-round closure remained the same; added seasonal closures and 
haddock possession limit: 1000 lb for vessels in DAS program, restriction on party /charter and 
recreational vessels 
• Framework Adjustment 15: further reduced bycatch of harbor porpoise using additional 
measures (Sep) 
• Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), and Amendment to Magnuson Act addressed overfishing, 
bycatch, and habitat degradation (Oct) 
• Framework Adjustment 19: adjusted the Mid-Coast Area closure in the Gulf of Maine (Dec) 
• December report says that cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder stocks not meeting mortality 
objectives 
1997: Amendment 7 - 8 (Feb) 
• Framework Adjustment 17: restored unused DAS from May and June, 1996 to the prorated 96-
97 DAS allocations (Jan) 
• Amendment 8: instituted measures to minimize gear conflict (Feb) 
• Framework Adjustment 22: closed the Great South Channel and Cape Cod Bay right whale 
critical habitat areas seasonally to fixed gear (Mar) 
• Framework Adjustment 16: reduced the bycatch of harbor porpoise by addressing the small 
mesh pelagic gillnets used in bait fisheries in the Gulf of Maine (Apr) 
» Framework Adjustment 20: adopted to achieve Amendment 7 mortality objectives in 1997 by 
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implementing a variety of measures, primarily to protect Gulf of Maine cod (May) 
Development of Amendment 9 to meet SFA requirements 
Report in August said that haddock and yellowtail stocks were still low but increasing but cod 
was on the verge of collapse. 
December report said that measure for cod to be implemented in Framework Adjustment 24 
were not sufficient. 
1998: Amendment8 
Framework Adjustment 18: allowed pelagic mid-water trawling for herring and mackerel in 
groundfish closed areas (Feb) 
Framework Adjustment 24: adjusted Gulf of Maine cod trip limits, allowed vessels to carryover 
10 DAS, and provided exemptions for vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulated Area (Apr) 
Framework Adjustment 25: established Gulf of Maine closed areas, trip limits, and other 
measures to reduce fishing effort on Gulf of Maine cod (May) 
Council submitted Amendment 9 for NMFS approval (Sep) 
1999: Amendment 10(may)- 11 (May)- 9 (Nov) 
Lawsuit American Oceans Campaign v. William M. Daley issued; addressed in Amendment 
Framework Adjustment 26: implemented additional seasonal closures in February and April to 
provide additional protection for spawning cod (Jan) 
Framework Adjustment 28: made Multispecies Plan measures consistent with the Harbor 
Porpoise Take Reduction Plan implemented in Dec-98 (Mar) 
Amendment 10: made upgrading and vessel replacement provision consistent with those in 
other New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Plans 
Amendment 11: addressed Sustainable Fisheries Act requirements for designating Essential 
Fish Habitat for all the species managed under each plan 
Framework Adjustment 27: implemented additional measures such as closed areas, trip limits, 
and gear restrictions to reduce or maintain fishing mortality rates of five critical stocks below 
rebuilding targets established by Amendment 7 (May) 
Framework adjustment 29: temporarily opened portions of the groundfish closed areas to 
controlled access scallop fishing (Jun) 
Interim rule: GOM cod daily trip limit revised (100 lb/500 lb max) DAS running clock revised-
cod overage limit to 1 day (Jul) 
Framework Adjustment 30: intended to reduce the fishing mortality rate for Georges Bank cod 
by 22% from the 1997/1998 levels (Jul) 
Amendment 9: added Atlantic halibut to the Plan, included measures to rebuild halibut and 
winter flounder and included new overfishing definitions and set Optimum Yield for 12 
groundfish species to bring Plan into complete compliance with the Sustainable Fisheries Act 
(Nov) 
2000: Amendment 9 
• Framework Adjustment 31: modified the management measures of the Gulf of Maine cod 
fishery and Georges Bank cod trip limit system in the 1999-2000 fishing year (Jan) 
• Framework Adjustment 33: adopted reduction or maintenance mortality rates for the five 
critical stocks below the fishing mortality rebuilding targets established by Amendment 7 (Jun) 
• Conservation Law Foundation lawsuit for failing to institute rules consistent with the new 
Magnuson-Act of 1996 
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From 1994-2000 
Jeffrey s Ledge 
Jm eaile Protection Area 
Amendment 5 and emergency actions 
Amendment 5 was partially approved in January 1994 and became operative in 
March of that same year. It was designed to satisfy court deadlines and aimed to 
eliminate overfishing of cod, yellowtail flounder, and haddock. The target was a 50% 
reduction in fishing mortality within 5-7 years. Therefore, the Council established a 50% 
effort reduction program initiated to achieve this objective, which added to the exiting 
measures 
• a moratorium on the issuance of additional vessel permits during the stock 
rebuilding period 
• the introduction of an effort-reduction program in 
which the days-at-sea (DAS) spent fishing for 
groundfish would be limited. Allocations of DAS 
could be individual or fleet-wide and were based on 
historical vessel performance or previous catch 
records or logbooks. The initial vessel DAS allocation 
was to gradually decrease by 10% each year down to 
50% of the initial allocation in five years 
• a 'framework adjustment' system by which the 
Council could modify, add or remove regulations based on fishing mortality 
objectives in order to meet the Plan objectives 
Figure 7 Juvenile 
protection area under 
Amendment 5 (NSGP, 
2007) 
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• mandatory reporting of landings and effort data; effort monitoring was to be 
accomplished by either electronic vessel tracking systems (VTS) or a magnetic-
strip card reporting system 
• expanded closed areas and established a juvenile cod protection area on Jeffrey's 
Ledge and required extensive new regulations including mesh sizes and fish size 
limits (Figure 7). 
• inclusion of all 13 groundfish stocks of cod, haddock, pollock, yellowtail 
flounder, winter flounder, witch flounder, windowpane flounder, American 
plaice, redfish, white hake, red hake, silver hake, and ocean pout (Amend 5). 
Those measures were expected to only prevent further increases in fishing 
capacity and were not designed to rebuild the stocks; they were too little and arrived too 
late to prevent the collapse of haddock and yellowtail flounder in December 1993 (NFSC, 
1993a, 1993b, 1994a). With the exception of haddock trip limits and a winter flounder 
mesh exemption in state waters, the Commerce Secretary approved Amendment 5. On 
January 3, 1994, the Secretary of Commerce issued an emergency ruling to protect 
haddock, imposing 500-pound catch limit and tripling the size of the closure area on 
Georges Bank. In April, the Council submitted a revision to the disapproved part of 
Amendment 5 related to haddock. The Council proposed an alternative 750-pound 
possession limit for haddock, which was rejected by the Secretary on May 4. Therefore, 
the Secretary passed Secretarial Amendment 6. This Secretarial Amendment was "a 
'place holder' should the Council fail to submit, in a timely manner, a revised 
Amendment package to address haddock protection measures" (Amend 6, p.5). Starting 
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in June 1994, this Amendment made permanent the 500-pound haddock possession limit 
enacted by the January emergency rule. Between 1989, when the Council acknowledged 
overfishing was occurring, and the passage of Amendment 6 in 1994, commercial 
landings of haddock declined from about 3 million pounds (1,430 metric tons) to 480,607 
pounds (218 metric tons) representing a 85% decrease (Mayo & Terceiro, 2005). 
In August 1994, five months after the implementation of Amendment 5, a report 
showed that it could not eliminate overfishing and rebuilt stock; haddock and yellowtail 
flounder had collapsed and cod was in "imminent danger" of collapsing (NFSC, 1994a). 
The scientific advice was to reduce fishing mortality to near zero. In September, the 
Council started crafting Amendment 7. 
The groundfish collapse and subsequent regulatory actions engendered 
unemployment. The federal government provided $86 million in grants for assistance 
programs of all sort to help with distressed communities and stock recovery for the years 
1994 to 1996 (Read & Buck, 1997; Upton, 2010; NOAA, 2010). The aid package totaled 
$63 million; the remaining $25 million was used for the vessel buyback program. The 
disaster assistance provided by the Department of Commerce included employment for 
fishermen (i.e., training, new business opportunities, aquaculture, marketing, and by-
catch reduction), a demonstration buyback program, and loan and debt refinancing 
(Upton, 2010). 
Conjointly with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor (National 
Emergency Grants) funded family assistance centers across New England. The centers 
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provided counseling for fishermen, their families, and other fishing workers in order to 
transition into new careers or to help establish a part-time to full-time business that could 
offset the time their boats were land-based during fishing closures. They alternatively 
sought to help fishermen acquire the certifications required to obtain other marine-related 
employment (Clay et al., 2008). The retraining program created 149 jobs for fishermen 
and trained 589 others (Read & Buck, 1997). 
Table 10. Number of vessels and Northeast Multispecies fishing 















Buyback cost funding 




The buyback program funded the purchase of fishing permits, fishing vessels, and 
related gear from fishermen, thereby reducing fishing capacity. The program took place 
in three phases: the project pilot in 1994, introduction of the full program in 1995, and a 
permit buyout in 2002 (see Table 10). The program was funded under the authority of the 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1994 and the Interjurisdictional 
Fisheries Act. The first two phases of the program were allocated $25 million and were 
successful in purchasing 79 fishing vessels and 542 permits (GAO, 2001; NOAA, 2004). 
The vessels were subsequently scrapped, sunk or transferred to activities other than 
fishing. However, in practice, the New England program did not achieve its intended 
benefits (GAO, 1999, 2000, 2001). Although the buyback eliminated some fishing 
capacity, the program had no provisions to prevent fishermen from using latent permits; 
that is, individuals holding permits but not having a vessel or not fishing regularly for 
groundfish. Although 79 vessels were removed, 62 previously inactive vessels began 
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catching groundfish after the buyback (GAO, 2001). The reduction in fishing capacity 
was also offset by vessel owners who participated in the buyback program but used the 
buyback funds to purchase a new vessel and re-enter the fishery (GAO, 2000). The third 
phase was designed to reduce the number of latent permits, but critics maintain that this 
action was also ineffective at reducing active capacity (NOAA, 2004). 
Amendment 7 
After the stock assessment 
report of August 1994, which 
confirmed the collapse of the yellowtail 
flounder and haddock, scientists 
announced that cod stock was at its 
lowest level of abundance and yet was 
being fished at a record-high rate of 
exploitation. Moreover, the status of 
other stocks in the Multispecies 
complex were also considered overexploited and/or at low levels of abundance (NFSC, 
1994a). It was recognized that the current management measures (Amendment 5) were 
not effective in reversing these trends. At the September 1994 meeting, the Council 
recommended the immediate development of Amendment 7. Although the process was 
moving forward quickly, there were several months ahead for the development, review, 
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In response to the very serious condition of the groundfish stocks, the Secretary of 
Commerce used its emergency authority to close year-round areas totaling about 17,000 
km (Murawski, Brown, Lai, Rago, & Hendrickson, 2000). Effective on December 12, 
1994, Areas I and II on Georges Bank and the Nantucket Lightship area in southern New 
England (See Figure 8) excluded all gears capable of retaining groundfish: trawls, gill 
nets, hook gear, and scallop dredges. The closed areas were designated in part on the 
basis of their natural characteristics and patterns of occurrence of juvenile groundfish. 
Sediment type, seasonal bottom temperature conditions and depth 
are the primary factors that structure complex finfish assemblages in the 
region. On the basis of their preferences about these factors, some species 
occupy the closed areas year-round such as yellowtail, windowpane, and 
winter flounders, little and winter skate; and others occupy them 
seasonally like cod, pollock, haddock and silver hake (Murawski et al., 
2000, p. 780). 
Because the maximum time allowed for Secretarial emergency action was only 
180 days, the agency urged the Council to initiate a Framework Adjustment (9) to 
implement the emergency measures as a permanent part of the fishery regulations. 
Framework Adjustment 9 was submitted in January 1995 and approved in March. In 
addition to the closures, it provided some protective measures for groundfish stocks and 
allowed transit through closed areas by groundfish vessels provided the gear was not 
available for immediate use (FW 9). 
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At the June 28-29, 1995 meeting, after nine months of deliberation, the Council 
agreed on various alternatives to rebuild the stocks. From September 19 to 29, 1995, the 
Council held nine public hearings in Gloucester, Hyannis and Fairhaven, MA; South 
Kingston, RI; Toms River, NJ; Riverhead, NY; Portsmouth, NH; and Ellsworth and 
Portland, ME (Amed 7). From October 1995 to January 1996, the Council and 
Groundfish Committee developed Amendment 7 based on the same management system, 
extending the existing measures of Amendment 5. It was approved in January 1996 and 
took effect on July 1, 1996, five months after the implementation of FW 9. The primary 
purpose of Amendment 7 was not only to reduce cod, haddock and yellowtail mortality to 
as close to zero but to decisively rebuild these stocks and prevent other groundfish stocks 
from being overfished. It added to the existing measures. 
• the elimination of most of the exemptions to the DAS effort-reduction program 
and acceleration of the 5-year schedule of Amendment 5 to 3 years 
• the establishment of total allowable catch targets (TACs); the Council set annual 
quotas for specific stocks (cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder) and aggregate 
TACs for the combined stocks of the other regulated species. If a target TAC was 
reached in any period (year or otherwise), the Council could restrict catches in the 
next period. 
• the establishment of a Multispecies Monitoring Committee (MSMC) consisting of 
industry representatives and assessment scientists from NMFS, states and the 
Council; the role of the MSMC was to monitor DAS and TAC utilization to make 





~ Mass Bay Closure 
support for the Groundfish Committee in the 
development of such amendments relative to the 
Plan's objectives. 
• the closure of Area I, Area II and the Nantucket 
Lightship remained in effect. 
• the addition of seasonal closures (rolling closures) 
in the Gulf of Maine, which were defined in 
Framework Adjustment 12 and 14; Framework 
Adjustment 12 expanded the Mid-coast Closure to 
include Jeffrey Ledge and closed it sink gillnetters during November and 
December (see Figure 9). 
• the placement of restrictions on party/charter and recreational catches 
• and the modification of permit categories and elimination of most open-access 
categories such as small groundfish otter trawl and gillnet vessels that could retain 
any regulated species 
Figure 9. Mid-coast Closure 
including Jeffrey's Ledge under 
Amendment 7 (Source: NSGP, 
2007) 
When developing Amendment 7, the Council considered larger area closures in 
the Gulf of Maine. However, the issues were so "complicated and controversial" that they 
were postponed for further discussion to not delay the rest of the amendment. Area 
closures were subsequently revised with Framework Adjustment 19, submitted on 
September 16, 1996, which modified the time and area of the Mid-Coast Closure (Figure 
10). The purpose of the action was to address "concerns about the distribution of 
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Figure 10 Mid-coast Closure 
including Jeffrey's Ledge under 
Framework Adjustment 19 
(Source NSGP, 2007) 
economic impacts of the existing closure which 
disproportionally affect[ed] small inshore vessels" 
(FW19,p. 1). 
Gear conflicts were unintended consequences 
that arose from these restrictive measures. The large 
closed areas, the limited DAS and the scarcity offish 
displaced fishermen from their traditional fishing 
grounds. Inshore closed areas were also established to 
offset the growing fishing effort close to shore. Before DAS regulation, vessels that used 
to fish offshore sought to maximize their DAS fishing time by reducing steaming time 
and staying in inshore waters. This, consequently, put significant pressure on inshore 
stocks which, often, were also spawning grounds. It also increased competition between 
the fleet that traditionally fished inshore waters and the newcomers. Gear conflicts were 
addressed by Amendment 8, which put in place a mechanism to facilitate the use of the 
Framework Adjustment process to address such issues. The Amendment took effect in 
February 1997. 
By December 1996, the status of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder stocks was 
not meeting mortality objectives. The MSMC suggested a reduction in DAS, and this 
was adopted in Framework Adjustment 20, implemented May 1, 1997. By mid-1997, the 
Advisory Report for the 24th Stock Assessment Workshop reported that haddock and 
yellowtail stocks were low but increasing (NFSC, 1997a). However, cod was still on the 
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edge of collapse and "measures should be enacted immediately to minimize all directed 
fishing and bycatch of this stock" (FW 24, p. 2). In July, the Council requested the 
Secretary of Commerce to implement emergency action. The motion was denied on the 
basis that the situation did not qualify as an emergency, and Framework Adjustment 24 
was already under development (FW 24). It was submitted in September 5, 1997 and took 
effect in May 1998. 
Following the passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), which amended 
(and renamed) the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 
Congress added national standards for fisheries management and mandated the National 
Academy of Sciences to conduct a peer-reviewed assessment of the New England 
groundfish stocks. The report identified overfished stocks on which the Council has one 
year to submit a Plan to stop overfishing (NRC, 1998). Those issues were addressed in 
Amendment 9. 
In December 1997, the stock assessment reported (NFSC, 1997b) that the 
measures currently in effect and the one to be implemented tinder Framework 24 were 
falling short of the necessary reductions to meet Plan objectives for cod. To achieve the 
goal set by Amendment 7, the fishing mortality had to be reduced by 48 percent from the 
1997 levels. In January 1998, the Council prepared a second annual Plan and adjustment 
and implemented Framework 25 in May. The framework created the Western Gulf of 
Maine Closure Area by redefining the boundaries of what used to be the Mid-Coast 




Framework 25 closed the area year-round for a period of three years (Figure 11). 
Stellwagen Bank and Jeffrey's Ledge had been documented 
as productive groundfish grounds, and therefore in need of 
protection (FW9). Due to the proximity to shore, the 
closure of this area was highly controversial, causing 
tension and distress in the fishing community. It was also 
disruptive for the Coast Guard, which appealed for simpler 
regulation. They claimed that the regulations were 
unenforceable as written (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008; 
Meserve, 2006). 
Figure 11 WGMAC under 
Framework Adjustment 25 
(Source: NSGP, 2007) 
Despite the stringent measures, the Gulf of Maine cod stock steadily declined and, 
in 1998 was "in state of collapse" (FW26, p. 16). Excess catch and discard were largely 
contributing to the persistent overfishing. Under this system, the Council was 
unsuccessful in restricting cod landings to below the target TAC. There are various 
factors contributing to the escalating complexity of management problems in New 
England, as described below. 
Trade-offs between stock recovery and socio-economic well-being. There were 
trade-offs between rebuilding efforts and political pressures to maintain a profitable 
fishing industry. The recovery of groundfish stock and promotion for conservation of 
threatened species had conflicted with short-term economic and social concerns. 
Fishermen alleged not being able to maintain profitability with such reduced fishing 
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effort (Brodziak et al., 2004). Most of the time, restrictive management measures were 
met with great opposition from most of the industry (Hennessey & Healey, 2000). The 
Council, under political pressure from the industry to meet their needs, ignored scientific 
information until the situation became unmanageable (Brodziak et al., 2004; Meserve, 
2006; Weber, 2002). Composed of industry members, the Council, also advocated for 
less restrictive measures than originally proposed, which were ineffective and relied on 
unenforceable, indirect methods (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008; Eagle et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the measures repetitively fell short of National Standards 1. 
The choice of management tools. In response to the failure of the quota system 
used by the First Groundfish Plan, the Council opted to regulate fishing effort by 
restricting where, when, how, and for how long fishermen could fish. The choice of 
restrictive methods to reduce fishing mortality was influenced by political pressure for 
economic and social factor prioritization (Brodziak et al., 2004). In addition to the 
indirect methods (e.g., mesh sizes, fish lengths, etc.), Amendment 7 introduced target 
TACs. In contrast to hard TACs, which have a closure provision when the target TAC is 
filled, target-TAC-only provision actions restrict catch for the next period (i.e., year). 
Moreover, it does not count excess against the following year's target TACs. 
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2004, p 536) 
From 1996 to 2004, cod landings continually exceeded the TAC by a considerable 
margin and recruitment was at very low levels (Figure 12). For example, fishermen 
harvested 232%, 163% and 213% of the cod TAC in 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively 
(NOAA, 2007) This excess does not include discards and recreationally-caught cod. 
These data were included in the TAC in 2006 Only in 2004 were the landings were 
below the targeted TACs (Figure 13) (Meserve, 2006), and this was because of the degree 
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TACs paired with DAS and closures essentially created a derby fishery in which 
fishermen raced to catch a finite amount offish (NRC, 1999). When fishing is regulated 
by shortening the length of the season, the place to fish and the size of landing, the year's 
catch can be taken in a matter of weeks. "These conditions induce a race for fish, which, 
in turn, results in overcapitalization and a temporal compression ("pulse") of landings 
[lowering prices]" (Hackett, Krachey, Brown, & Hankin, 2005, p. 48). Economic profits 
were also not necessarily greater at the start of the season despite the fact that the stocks 
were more abundant and landing higher. As the available stocks steadily deteriorated, the 
price offish went up as the landing went the opposite. To some extent, it forced 
fishermen to augment the effort that went into catching the same (or a smaller) amounts 
offish (Latanich, 2007). Moreover, the DAS system is in itself an individual race to get 
as much fish as possible in the 24-hour timeframe. Derby fishing is also not without its 
hazards and safety concerns. The closed areas, the limited season and timeframe may add 
pressure to fishermen, who may decide to fish despite inclement weather (NRC, 1999). 
Consequently, if cod TACs were regularly exceeded, it was not caused by DAS 
overage, which was consistently below allocated DAS (Figure 14) (Brodziak et al., 
2004). Rather, it was because of a lack of reliable and efficient management information 
systems for monitoring catch. Cod landing data were analyzed and available every 
month, but it was two or three months behind of the period for which landings data was 
compiled (Meserve, 2006). Taking into consideration the large number of vessels fishing 
for cod and concentrating their fishing effort at the beginning of the season, as well as the 
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time lag to process data, TACs were frequently, understandably, exceeded in the middle 
of the season (Meserve, 2006). 
The Council came to the conclusion in 2006-2007 that indirect methods were an 
imprecise way of controlling fishing effort because the relationship between the 
regulation and its outcome corresponded to the fishermen's ability to adapt, the changes 
in technology and fleet dynamics (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008). 
Noncompliance. As with the previous Plan and Amendments, compliance 
remained an issue under Amendment 7. The inherent problems of enforcing DAS, 
closures and target TACs were repetitively appealed by USCG (Apollonio & Dykstra, 
2008; Meserve, 2006). The 2004-2014 USCG enforcement strategic plan points out that 
the New England Multispecies Plan accounted for one of the two fisheries, with the 
highest number of violations in 2004 (USCG, 2005). According to the agency, the 
increasing complexity of regulation explicates the poor compliance in the North Atlantic. 
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Following Amendment 7 
Since the implementation of Amendment 5 in 1994, the aggregate biomass of 
New England groundfish stocks almost tripled from 1994 to 2000. The exception was cod 
which continued to decline, dropping by over 20% from 2002 to 2004 (NFSC, 2005). 
One reason for the low recovery rate was discarding, an unintended consequence of 
regulation. Gulf of Maine Cod ratios of overall discard/kept remained substantially 
greater after 1999 compared to 1991-1998 ratios (Mayo, Shepherd, O'Brian, Col, & 
Traver, 2009). According to Mayo, 1999 discard estimate was one of the highest in the 
data series (1989-2007) and is likely due to the imposition of very low trip limits. 
The Council therefore spent the next several years adopting further measures. 
Amendment 9 (1998) added Atlantic Halibut to the managed groundfish species. As 
required by the 1996 modifications to the Magnuson Act (Sustainable Fishery Act), it 
also included a new definition of overfishing. In spite of these amendments, however, the 
Plan failed to achieve complete compliance and two lawsuits were brought against 
NMFS. In 1999, the American Oceans Campaign took legal action, alleging that the 
agency failed to prepare a proper impact statement and overlooked the destructive impact 
of fishing practices and gear on corals, fish habitat, and benthic life. In 2001, the CLF 
sued NMFS on the basis that Amendment 9 did not comply with the Magnuson-Act of 
1996. The secretary answered with interim actions which established DAS baseline. This 
reference point was calculated based on the highest number of DAS a vessel fished 
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during any single fishing year among the 1996 through 2000. From that baseline, there 
was a reduction of 20% of DAS effective in May 2002. 
From 1994 to 2004, the Plan was amended 8 times and there were 40 framework 
adjustments. Litigation more than doubled, exposing the complexity of regulation 
providing more opportunities for legal actions, which in turn resulted in further 
complexities. Many factors accounted for the complexity of fishing regulation including 
paperwork burden, difficult terminology, time delays, and complex fishery. But the lack 
of coherence between federal laws and the resulting litigation was a fundamental issue 
that profoundly impacted both the institutions and the decision-making process. 
Conflicting mandates in federal laws. One problem is the conflicting mandates 
between federal laws governing uses of marine resources (Brodziak et al., 2004). 
Fisheries management is subject to five major, independent pieces of legislation: the 
Magnuson Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, the 
National Environmental Policy Act and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. These acts have 
different provisions and different requirements that, in some cases, overlap or work to 
create loopholes. The problem is exacerbated by a lack of coordination between NMFS 
and other agencies responsible for implementing the five acts (Brodziak et al., 2004). 
There are also conflicting mandates within the Magnuson Act and the ten 
National Standards. Brodziak argues that National Standards are not specific enough 
(2004). For example, National Standard 1 mandates a balance between conservation 
measures preventing overfishing and optimum yield. 
131 
By itself, this standard can create conflicts because the nature and 
ranking of the ecological, economic, and social factors that determine 
optimum yield are not specified. When it is combined with other 
requirements such as National Standard 5 (which addresses economic 
efficiency), National Standard 9 (which requires minimization of by-
catch), and in particular, National Standard 8 (which requires the needs of 
fishing communities to be taken into account), the balance between 
objectives may be difficult to achieve" (Brodziak et al, 2004, p. 530). 
The lack of clarity can lead to a range of interpretations, which can be challenged 
in court. 
Lawsuits. The numerous amendments to the Magnuson Act combined with the 
addition of new requirements and standards amplified the Council's burden for plan 
developments, thus increasing the opportunities for litigation. After the first CLF lawsuit 
in 1991, there was a shift in management from action to reaction. It added a new player to 
the decision making process: the federal court. From 1999 to 2004, the number of legal 
actions escalated from two to five. One of the reasons for legal remedy resides in the 
limited accountability of the Council under the Magnuson Act. Brodziak mentioned that 
"although the [Council] is more influential in determining what is or is not implemented, 
NMFS is directly responsible and ends up being sued. The [Council] therefore has little 
incentive to move from the status quo to a new regime of sustainable fishing capacity and 
effort, except by court mandate" (Brodziak et al., 2004, p. 536). 
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Apollonio noted that lawsuits had a positive impact on the stock recovery: "it is a 
curious fact that [...] there have been encouraging increases generally since 1995 in some 
stocks of groundfish, so also there has been a parallel increase in the number of legal 
action against its management plans" (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008, p. 70). However, he 
concluded by saying that if each legal action is followed by a new amendment, a more 
complex regulation will be, in turn, followed by further legal actions. 
Conclusion 
The fishing industry has evolved from being virtually unregulated to becoming 
one of the most regulated industries in the country, in less than 30 years. Over the years, 
however, the goal of the Magnuson Act has remained fairly constant: "to promote 
domestic commercial and recreational fishing under sound conservation and management 
principles" (MSA sec.2 16 USC § 1801 (b)(3). In New England, the path to achieving 
these goals has been onerous for every party involved. The lack of tools and political will 
has been one of the principal institutional problems encountered in the regulation of 
fisheries (Dobbs, 2000). The creation of Councils was, in some ways, a management 
experiment; the system was intended to foster the integration of lessons learned through 
amendments (and later framework adjustments) in order respond to the dynamic nature of 
the fisheries. The fishery management plans were supposed to be reactive to changing 
stocks and to unforeseen consequences of the management plans themselves. However, 
the time-consuming complexities paired with political pressure, first from the industry 
and then from Congress, conservationists, federal courts and federal agencies, was to 
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teach the Council that the ever-increasing measures of subsequent amendments made it 
very difficult to learn from mistakes and make revisions in a timely fashion (Apollonio & 
Dykstra, 2008). The trade-offs between stock recovery and socioeconomic well-being, as 
well as the choice of management tools, were influenced by political pressure, quality 
and availability of scientific knowledge, economic forces and legal mandates. As 
identified in this section, the large-scale consequences of such a system are part of a 
spiraling reaction that responds to the stronger forces - institutional and societal - and 
individuals reacting to this system. The next section analyzes the smaller scale impacts of 
overfishing and regulation of stakeholders. 
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FOURTH CHAPTER 
ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS TO STAKEHOLDERS 
Between 1990 and 2000, the original Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management 
Plan has changed 43 times: it has undergone 7 amendments and 31 framework 
adjustments. As depicted by the interviewees, the impacts of these ongoing changes have 
been substantial to everyone involved with fishingThis section presents the impact 
analysis of overfishing and associated management actions to stakeholders groups: 
fishermen, fishermen's wives and family, the support industry, US Coast Guard 
personnel, regulators (NMFS, Council members and staff), 
environmentalist/conservationists, and the general public. The investigation is based on 
stakeholder interviews, public comments and written press. The objective of the analysis 
is to explore to what extent a causal approach to SIA reveals how impacts emerge and 
how they are perceived by stakeholders. A second goal is to use the causal model 
diagrams and the list of social impact variables described earlier in the methodology to 
understand the interplay between facts, perceptions and response actions. 
The purpose of this section is not to replace the community profiles (e.g., Clay et 
al., 2008) or numerous reports that have been written on the groundfishing industry over 
the years (e.g., Griffith & Dyer, 1996; Hall-Arber, 1993; Hall-Arber et al., 2006; Hall-
Arber et al., 2001). It does not aim either to replace the vulnerability assessment recently 
conducted by SERI (e.g., Tuler, Webler et al., 2008a; Tuler et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
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It is not a post ex-facto SIA of amendments 5 & 7. It rather complements what have been 
previously done. 
Fishermen 
The New England groundfishing fleet is very diverse in terms of size, fishing 
gear, ethnicity, ownership and location. These multiple facets make its study complex. 
This analysis aims to capture generalities common to all subgroups as opposed to look at 
each subgroup individually. Exploring subgroups would go beyond the main goal of the 
study. I interviewed fourteen fishermen from the states of Maine, New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts. All the interviewees agreed that the most important shifts in the industry 
occurred in the 1990s. First, participants noticed a transition in the quality and number of 
new fishermen entering the industry. Second, they recognized an important change in 
fishing practices. This had two effects: it positively affected the fishermen's adaptation to 
change but negatively impacted their interactions and their perception of acceptable 
fishing practice, compliance, business, and conservation ethics. 
Besides overfishing, four major stressors were identified to be at the source of 
these shifts: the accumulation and growing complexity of regulation; the political 
decision process and the confusing use of science; the type of management tools and their 
inequities; and the overcapitalization of the fishing industry. These stresses are entangled 
and to some extent feed each other. The predominant impacts include low recruitment 
rates and an exodus of fishermen, as well as fewer fishing opportunities and distrust in 
government. The strategies adopted by fishermen to cope with these changes depend on 
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their sensitivities. Education level, age, financial situation, and social networks are some 
of the many factors influencing fishermen's vulnerability to the different stressors (Tuler 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, each group within the industry (e.g., captain-owners or crew 
members, draggers or gillnetters, foreigners or locals, those located in a rural or urban 
community) reacts uniquely. The causal chain of impacts generated by these different 
combinations of sensitivity and resilience can be infinite. Coping actions may include, 
but are not limited to, finding alternative employment (employment tied to the industry or 
reorientation), switching to new gears or new species, exploring new fishing grounds, 
getting a loan, changing behavior towards natural resources (noncompliance, risky 
behavior, unethical fishing practices), finding a niche market, temporarily or permanently 
leaving the industry (selling or leasing boats and/or days), and engaging in cooperative 
research. Some consequences range from financial struggle, to increased positive and 
negative mental health impacts, social tension, to positive or negative alterations to one's 
perception of integrity, personal growth, education, or to ecological damage. 
Low recruitment and high departure: diminishing based profession 
The groundfishing fleet was largely composed of owner-operators, as opposed to 
Canadian fleets which are owned by larger companies. Traditionally, fishing was a 
family business where it was expected that boys would grow to eventually take part. 
Since there is no official training to become a fisherman, the skills were acquired by 
observation and participation in common tasks such as sorting fish by species and size, 
judging catch size, setting and retrieving gears, etc (Hall-Arber et al., 2001). Navigational 
information and fishing ground locations were transmitted from father to son (or between 
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other close relatives, Hall-Arber, 1993). This knowledge, controlled by the captain, 
provided some advantages and may be why it was easier for sons of captain-owners to 
purchase or inherit a vessel and become captains than it was for sons of crew members 
(Hall-Arber, 1993). At the time, the lucrative benefits and the freedom and independence 
related to fishing were appealing to youngsters: fishermen's sons and others alike. Many 
foreign fishermen, bringing a fishing tradition from their country of origin, came with the 
aspiration that their family remains in the fishing business. It was very common for 
Portuguese or Italian fishermen to introduce their sons to gear repairs and functioning 
early. These boys were brought up with the expectation that they would eventually fish 
with the family; daughters were expected to marry fishermen. In 1993, when Hall-Arber 
conducted the SIA for Amendment 5, she began to notice a change in these traditions 
(Hall-Arber, 1993). Because of the moratorium on the permit issuance, well-established 
occupational networks and high start-up costs inhibiting new entrants to the fishery, 
reduced day-at-sea, increased closed areas and restricted mesh size, they became less and 
less attracted to the profession. In the 1990s, youngsters were still entering the industry; 
however parents were not expecting their sons to work in the industry. For example, 
Portuguese participants from New Bedford, MA counseled their children not to enter the 
industry. Furthermore, none of those I interviewed worked with family members and all 
their sons and daughters pursued other professions. However some of their Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts worked full-time or part-time with sons or nephews. The process of 
dissuading recruits started early in the 1990s and the consequences are felt today. A 
participant discusses the reasons why there are few recruits, not only in Maine but also in 
the southern states. 
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You don't recruit people. You looked at the average age of 
fishermen in the state of Maine and its 55 years old. [...] There is a reason 
why young people don't want to get involved and it's because it is such a 
highly regulated business. Now, to get in, it takes an investment of half a 
million dollars that you may or may not get back to buy a quota and even 
if you buy an old boat. We don't have any young people involved in the 
groundfish business. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
Participants noticed that the major shift in boat ownership which occurred during 
the 1980s as consequences on the fleet a decade later. Many investors whose primary 
occupations were not fishing took advantage of government subsidies to buy vessels. 
The government said we needed to build up the fleet and invested 
heavily and gave huge tax breaks to corporations, to doctors and lawyers 
to be able to buy fishing boats to [increase] fishing power. They built a 
hell of a fleet and then we lost fishing ground. So what happened to that 
fleet? [...] It depleted the stock so rapidly that you could see it coming. 
[Georges Bank was closed because of stock depletion] And where'd the 
boats go? Well they went to the gulf of Maine and southern New England 
and kick the hell of the low stock. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
The availability of loans contributed largely to overfishing. It made money 
available to fishermen to increase their fishing capacity while the regulation effort was 
trying to do the opposite. Not only did it have financial consequences but it also affected 
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social differentiation and equity. As observed by Hall-Arber, these 'outsiders' had no 
social capital or networks in the local fishing communities and thus didn't have the 
responsibility or reciprocal exchange that marked fishing families and communities. She 
concluded that "as competition for groundfish resources increased, the breakdown and 
loss of capital (human, social, cultural, and biophysical) also increased both within and 
between fishing dependent communities"(Hall-Arber et al., 2001, p. 16). 
Alternative employment and leaving the fisheries. Finding alternative 
employment was one option for partially or entirely leaving the industry. For the years 
1994 to 1996, the Department of Commerce provided disaster assistance of all sorts to 
help with distressed communities, including supports such as Fishing Family Assistance 
Center, grants (e.g., Saltonstall-Kennedy program, buyback program), re-education, job 
training, retraining, cooperative research, and aquaculture opportunities. While some 
fishermen turned to other livelihoods, others took advantage of business or grant 
opportunities to creatively adapt their vessels to other uses: some converted their vessel 
into a floating marine laboratory for use by scientists for cooperative research; others 
used their boat to collect samples for environmental agencies (Anonymous, 1996). 
Personal growth and education were positive consequences of finding alternative 
employment and/or leaving the industry. Some fishermen (and their wives) were 
resourceful at finding ways to deal with the situation and the pressure by taking 
advantage of retraining programs. Fishermen's wives were key players in this process, 
often working in order to give the household the means to go back to school. Working as 
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a team, the couples found strategies to help one another to cope with the situation. This 
partnership is best illustrated by the fishermen themselves. 
I gave it a lot of thought. The only way I could get retrained was 
by having my wife take some of the weight off me. Except for keeping my 
books, she hadn't worked since we were married except for part-time jobs 
[. .] So I told her, "Get whatever you can from the assistance center. Go 
to school. Pick a good field, and we'll see what happens." After a crash 
course in basic computing, [she] landed a job managing the office at a 
local elementary school. That gave [me] the financial breathing room [I] 
needed to begin a three-night-a-week course in computer repair and 
computer networks (Matza, 1995). 
Another coping action was to sell boats and permits. Fishermen opting for this 
option were more sensitive to the impact of regulation because they faced an unfavorable 
market for permits and used boats as it was saturated with other fishermen trying to leave 
the industry. Some fishermen qualified for the buyback program, which was limited in 
terms of funding. Still, a total of 79 vessels and 787 permits were bought.14 Others 
decided to buy others' fishing permits or upgrade their vessel with new gears and 
equipment, but not all fishermen had the capital and credit to do so. Fishermen on the 
verge of retiring were particularly sensitive to such investment because the used vessel 
market was saturated. Some found a way out of the fisheries and retired early. However, 
premature retirement has its own set of issues; retirement satisfaction may depend on the 
14
 The success of buyback programs is questionable since many participants simply used the cash to get 
better boats or fisheries permits (GAO, 2000). For more on buyback programs, see: GAO, 1999; GAO, 
2000; GAO, 2001; NOAA, 2004. 
financial situation, retirement benefits (Social Security and Medicare), present and future 
health condition, personal efficacy and capacity to adjust to new condition. 
Boat owners had the option of hiring a crew to run the boat while working a full-
time or part-time job related or unrelated to fishing. Others simply sold their boats and 
permits altogether, retrained, and found employment elsewhere. The causal chain of 
leaving the fishery led to a perception of reduced quality of life and diminished aspiration 
for a future life for themselves and future generations, as illustrated by one man. 
I am 53 years old and ever since I first set a foot on a boat, I loved 
it. I never wanted to do anything else. I still would like to be groundfishing 
but because of poor management and what happened [overfishing], I am 
out of that business. That is no longer available to me, my kids, my 
grandkids. It will probably end fishing with my generation. And that is 
sad. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
Leaving the fishery also brought a decline in mental health, characterized by 
frustration and resentment. The predominant view of the fourteen fishermen interviewed 
is summarized by the statement: "I don't fish anymore. The lingering effect of all those 
rules is an overwhelming sense of anger. I am very disappointed. I worked very hard." 
(Personal communication, spring 2010) Leaving the industry was also leaving a 
community. Over time, there was a decrease in number of fishermen and fishermen's 
wives associations and their members (Griffith & Dyer, 1996; Hall-Arber et al., 2001). 
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They experienced a loss in their feeling of belonging to a group that shared the same 
occupation and way of life. 
Overall, individuals' characteristics are important in understanding the sensitivity 
and resilience that influenced the severity of the impact. Some fishermen interviewed 
reluctantly made the choice to leave fishing. Giving up fishing affected the 
responsibilities borne by small business owners, including the layoff of crew members 
and book keepers, the end of business with shore services, and the cost of legal 
procedures to close a business. Giving up fishing also meant to grieve being one's own 
boss and being a business owner; the impacts went beyond economic and legal aspects to 
include sorrow, ambivalence with regard to future life, and anger. Others just did not 
have much choice. Laid off crew members may not have found an alternative crew 
position in their region. The impacts of anticipating job loss, layoffs, and lack of future 
employment opportunity are external circumstances, Such an experience was likely to 
heighten feelings of uncertainty about job security, increased psychological distress, 
depression, and health problems. On a positive note, some fishermen embraced a new 
career and life style. They perceive their exit from the fisheries as a point of new 
departure. 
Loss of opportunity: type of management tools and their inequities 
Groundfishing is a widespread activity along the coast of five states, and the 
agglomeration of ground fishermen is unevenly distributed with a higher concentration in 
the south than in the north. National Standard 4 requires that "conservation and 
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management measures shall not discriminate between residents of different States [and 
must be] fair and equitable to all such fishermen" (MSA sec.301 16 USC § 1851 
(a)(4)(A). When the stock drastically declined and regulation tightened, many 
commercial fishermen competing for scarce fishery resources perceived restrictions as 
unfair. The main issues of inequality were related to vessel size, DAS allocation, type of 
gear and access to fishing grounds. 
During the interviews, most of the 14 fishermen said they were primarily 
impacted by closures and DAS (Figure 15). It restrained their possibilities to conduct 
their fishing business when and where they wanted. Over the long run, they admitted that 
the effectiveness of closure for stock rebuilding lessened the inequities and perceived 
negative impacts. But, they all agreed that DAS was an unfair management tool that 
privileged the southern fleets (NH and MA) and off-shore vessels. They claimed that the 
systems' loopholes opened the door for dishonest owners to gain more DAS. 
Originally, everybody were supposed to have fixed DAS which 
was the maximum, and yet the off-shore fleet went to the Council, hired 
their lobbyists, and made the case that 'wait a minute, we have bigger bills, 
we catch more fish, we go farther offshore.' Fair, and so that is how they 
got individual DAS. But then, you could be tied up next to a person right 
at the same pier with same size boat, and one person could have 190 days 
of a fleet allocation, and a guys right beside him could have 240 individual 
DAS because he cheated because he found grocery slips from him and his 
wife. There were a lot of ways to prove or at least lie to say you have 
[more expenses] and more days at sea. Again, people who were honest 
[...] were put at a total disadvantage. (Personal communication, spring 
2010) 
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Figure 15, Social processes and impacts to fishermen ofdays-at-sea 
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Fishermen from Maine perceived that they were more severely impacted by the 
cumulative effects of DAS allocations and closures than their counterparts from New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts. An interviewee explained that Maine is farther away from 
fishing grounds than the southern states. Leaving from Portland, Maine, it takes an 
average of an hour and a half to get to the very first fishing ground. If the clock that 
counts the DAS starts ticking when the boat leaves the dock, and it takes the same 
amount of time steaming back, 12% of the day is used, reducing the maximum profit 
possible for every hour at sea. This had consequences for fishing practices: 
At that time, there were still many families-owned, generational 
fishermen, and we all knew there were a lot of fish on the shore, and there 
was an unwritten rule that if you had a big boat, you didn't fish on the 
beach. We owned a 90 foot boat and I can't think of a time that we fished 
within 40 mile of the shore, ever. It just wasn't done. But now I am on a 
clock and now I need to maximize my profit and I have so many days on 
the clock. Why wouldn't I stop on the beach and catch the fish that is the 
closest to shore. [..] In mid-nineties or so, you would be steaming out of 
Portland Harbor and there were just as many lights off shore as there was 
back on shore because every boat on the fleet stopped on the beach and 
started fishing instead of going off shore. That became the cumulative 
effect. 1996 was over and they got the landing data and it [said] 'Oh my 
God, look! 10 million pounds offish were caught just outside of Portland 
Harbor'. That is when they started talking about rolling closures and 
closing big areas. And they only looked at where the fish were caught, not 
who caught them. So, all these big guys caught a ship load offish and the 
government said 'Oh well, we have to close these areas'. So once again, 
the gap between a 90-100 foot boat could steam up passed that closed area 
whereas a small boat, they couldn't get outside those closed areas, so they 
had to stay tied at the dock for 30 days because there was no place to fish. 
There are many examples of that where there were absolute, pointed unfair 
rules made that rewarded the people who could continued to catch the 
most. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
Because of DAS, fishermen started to use limited fishing time more efficiently by 
fishing close to inshore productive grounds. Because fishermen were less willing to 
spend time to fish elsewhere, they caught non-target species which increased their discard 
rate. This issue of localized stock depletion below recovery thresholds was addressed 
with closures. These inequities between lager and smaller boats were also reflected in the 
mesh size increase for the inshore waters fleet. Small boats were limited to within 50 or 
60 miles offshore and had to fish with lager mesh sizes, while larger boats could afford to 
put both mesh sizes on the boat and fish inshore as well as offshore. Larger boats had 
more opportunities. The small boat fishermen considered that they were put at 
disadvantage by unfair regulation. 
Taking into consideration the miles of coastline and sea territory to be managed as 
well as the diversity of activities, the one-size-fits-all regulation may turn out to be 
inequitable. Each group had different sensitivities to regulation such as location, boat size 
and type of gear, affecting fishermen's perception of fairness. At a community level, the 
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consequences of the perceived inequalities include segregation amongst the fleet and 
among states. On a small scale such as Portland, Maine, there was division between 
vessel sizes which, in turn, changed the way of fishing. Trespassing unofficial rules such 
as fishing inshore with larger vessel caused disruption of social networks and anger with 
and distrust of other fishermen, affecting the perception of community cohesion. At the 
individual level, these changes affected the ability to make a profit and increased stress 
levels and frustration towards peers and government. 
Changing fisheries. Fishermen adjusted to restrictions, in particular DAS, by 
exploring similar fisheries by using the same gears and modifying gears and vessels. One 
could fish more days and stay profitable by leasing or buying DAS of the same or other 
species. Many fishermen fished for species they once threw away, such as monkfish and 
dogfish. One of the unintended impacts of changing fisheries was to pressure the newly 
targeted species. For example, due to new participants entering this fishery, monkfish 
landings peaked in 1997 and reached their highest value in 1999 (Council, 2011). To end 
overfishing, the Council submitted a FMP for monkfish that took effect in November 
1999. In another example, fishermen moved from net-based fisheries (groundfishing) to 
trap-based fisheries (lobstering). In Maine, where the lobster industry was economically 
predominant, many groundfishermen switched to lobstering or illegally dragged for 
lobster, thus pressuring the lobster population. (Griffith & Dyer, 1996). 
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Fishermen that once fished for groundfish and then changed to a different species 
had to invest in equipment to face new regulation for the given stocks. On one hand, 
these constant changes eroded the satisfaction of fishing, increased stress levels and 
profitability, and changed perceptions of future. This was described by a participant. 
You know when you start fishing, you had pride in it. But it's not 
fun anymore; it really isn't. It's like every year it's a new pain in the ass to 
go through the regulation. Every time you found your other niche in the 
1990s forward. You move; you rearrange your boat; you did all these 
different things to stay profitable. And you stay profitable. But each time 
you did it, it's within 2 or 3 years. It's like, you open a door, you find a 
niche; you get to work in it. And it was almost like some of it was 
pointless. Oh no, wait a minute here. Now we have to pay attention to that. 
It gets tougher every year to make a living. (Personal communication, 
spring 2010) 
On the other hand, it positively impacted resilient fishermen that adapted their 
fishing practices to the new regulation. Many participants experienced new challenges 
and felt rewarded by improving fishing practices. A participant talked about how he 
changed fishing to remain profitable while being ethical. 
When Amendment 5 went through, my folk and I owned a 54-foot 
boat and we were able to go back and forth between inshore and offshore 
and we could move up and down the coast. At first it was a struggle but 
one of the things that me and my friend did was the beginning of a 
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different kind of thinking. We went from having mindset that we have to 
go out and fill the boat with fish and we really fish for dollars. [With new 
regulations], we chose our catch. We may have a good catch with 5,000 
pounds offish and make $10,000 instead of trying to fill up the boat all the 
time. We were able to be rather successful because we cut our expenses, 
we fished efficiently. We did good until 2005 or 2006. (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
Another participant supported this point of view. Business-wise, he is convinced 
that it was possible to keep fishing, provided fishermen adapt. He perceived the 
regulations as a challenge and as opening new possibilities. According to him, the 
fishermen who left the industry could not keep up with the restrictions and did not want 
to change their destructive ways of fishing. 
At the community level, changing fisheries reduced the accessibility and type of 
infrastructure (changing from groundfishing to lobstering) as well as the availability of 
fishing-related services. Depending on the age and health of individuals as well as their 
financial capacity (access to loans) and tolerance to inconsistent income, fishermen 
adapted to changes by modifying their boat and gear, leasing more days, or hiring fewer 
crew members. Adaptation implied a possible increase of debt load or increase in work 
load, thus modifying the lifestyle. The downstream effects according to the interviewees 
included a change in stress level, apprehension, discouragement, frustration and anger, 
but also feeling of challenge, enthusiasm, reward and satisfaction. 
151 
Exploring new fishing grounds. According to the documentation and 
interviewees, fishermen explored new fishing grounds when rolling, temporary and 
permanent closures came into effect (Figure 16). The Western Gulf of Maine Closure 
Area was seasonally closed to groundfishing in 1994. The closure was implemented to 
reduce fishing pressure on the Gulf of Maine cod stock. Fishermen had to relocate to 
another port, fish farther out at sea or fish between the shore and the closed area. From 
the fishermen's perspective, they experienced one or more of the following direct 
consequences: reduced perceived quality of life, reduced job satisfaction, adoption of 
risky behavior, distrust in government, reduced psychological and physical health or 
reduced standard of living. 
First, fishermen had to look for alternative fishing grounds. The closure divided 
the fishing industry between small and large vessels. Offshore boats had to fish farther 
out to sea. Also, the depletion of the stock made them fish not only farther out but also 
for longer periods of time, considerably increasing operating costs and decreasing the 
profitability of fishing trips. Inshore boats crowded the region between the coast and the 
closure, increasing tensions between fishermen. Therefore, some fishermen relocated 
their boats to a different port, increasing commuting time. For example, a New 
Hampshire fisherman I interviewed nicely summarized the problem. 
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Fipue 16, Social processes and impacts of fishing closure 
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Before, they [fishermen] conducted their fishing operations 12 
months a year out of their port. They didn't travel. They were small boats, 
day trips. You couldn't do it [fish around the close area] on a day trip, so 
you need to relocate the fleet out of Gloucester for a period of time. They 
had to commute to the boat that was tied up in Gloucester. It started to 
change the dimension of people. People wouldn't do this before. They fish 
out of this place most of the year. We never put our boat somewhere else. 
We never traveled or did that type of thing. But it was closed so our 
reaction was to go somewhere where there were opportunities. Those type 
of things started to change the dimension of how we gonna operate and 
how we gonna survive. They [the boats] couldn't sit there and not fish. 
They had to have some kind of activities and we went offshore. When the 
closure came around I started to change my fishing practices. I traveled 
farther offshore to places that roar. And I acclimated to that and that is 
what I had to do to make the count. (Personal communication, spring 
2010) 
The search for fish combined with the area closure limited freedom regarding 
where to fish. It increased tension among fishermen and exacerbated non-compliance as 
everyone felt they were losing. The ones obeying the law had smaller catches and 
reduced income, thus losing credibility as 'effective captains;' they lost prestige in the 
eyes of other fishermen (Hennessey & Healey, 2000). Additionally, fishermen in general 
felt the fallout from the media who were portraying them as the 'bad guys' depleting the 
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fish stocks. This quote from the written comments for amendment 7 represents some of 
the public opinion also found in newspapers. "The commercial fishing industry has 
selfishly put themselves in their present predicament and although we can appreciate their 
present suffering, they have only themselves to blame." (Written comment Amendment 
7) 
All these factors reduced the pride of being a vessel operator and business owner. 
As mentioned earlier, the closure was also another piece of regulation added to a very 
complex management regime. This newspaper quoted a fisherman saying, "The 
complexity of the plans the council is considering overwhelmed fishermen. I found that 
most people, I think, gave up" (Anonymous, 1995, p. 11 A). Some fishermen experienced 
difficulties in understanding the dense jargon of bureaucracy and the implications of 
regulations on their business and fishing practices (Hartley & Robertson, 2006). 
To make ends meet, some fishermen deferred boat maintenance and replacement. 
For others, closures encouraged small boats to risk going offshore to work: "I'm going to 
take my 46-foot boat and go beat my brain out offshore. I shouldn't be doing it, but I got 
four kids to feed" (Richardson, 1998, p. A5). Some fished alone, while some fished in 
poor weather conditions, making potentially perilous decisions and putting the crew at 
risk (Hall-Arber & Mrakovcich, 2008). 
Fishermen felt they were victims of the management system. The fishing 
community attended public hearings on the closure and, as mentioned by one 
interviewee: 
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It seemed that it fell on deaf ears. No matter how many letters you 
sent there, no matter how many people were doing the same thing, and 
how many times you spoke at the public hearings, nothing ever changed. 
Whatever was proposed was going through no matter what. [...] I just felt I 
was going through the motion of writing a letter or going to a meeting 
knowing that it wasn't gonna make a difference anyways. (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
This quote also exemplifies the sensitivity of the community to regulation and its 
participatory process. The ongoing changes, the misunderstanding of regulation, and the 
cumulative socioeconomic impact experienced by the fishing communities progressively 
divided fishermen and managers (Hartley & Robertson, 2006; Holland, Pinto da Silva, & 
Wiersma, 2010; For more on distrust, see Kaplan, 1999). 
Fishermen experienced high levels of stress and anxiety associated with peer 
interaction, complex regulation and its enforcement, low catches and uncertainty about 
the future. Some fishermen felt powerless and hopeless over "changes they [did] not 
understand, [were] unable to easily accept: that they must [adapt] to survive" (Gloucester 
Fishermen and Families Assistance Center [GFFAC], 1995: 2). Others felt extreme 
mental anguish and even anger. This newspaper quote relates the anger at one of the 
public meetings. 
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Councilors sat in silence as more shouting fishermen with breaking 
voices and glistening eyes stepped forward out of the audience. One man 
stormed out of the room, kicking over chairs and swearing at councilors. 
[One] walked up to the table and pointed at the panel members, "none of 
you guys are going to have to worry about getting a paycheck. You people 
are so evil. You should be ashamed of yourself' (Richardson, 1998, p. 
A5). 
Tighter regulation also changed fishermen's aspirations for a flourishing future 
for self, family and community, as mentioned by a fisherman's wife. "Our dream was to 
own a boat. We were going to call it the Captain Chancey - after my husband's 
grandfather. That was our dream. Buy a boat. Have a son. Have Ronny hand it 
down,"[she] said, her voice strained by emotion. "We can't do that anymore. It's just not a 
reasonable expectation" (Hayward, 1998, p.l). 
Fishermen going farther out at sea or relocating to other ports experienced higher 
operating costs and reduced income. Some fishermen left the industry and temporarily 
suffered economic hardship resulting from this transition. Others took advantage of 
employment retraining programs, while still others sold their boats and permits 
altogether. The family budget diminished in response to immediate reduction in income 
combined with uncertainty about future income (GFFAC, 1995; NEFMC, 1996, written 
comments). 
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Not all fishermen were impacted or coped the same way. The closure did not 
uniformly affect fishermen due to different home port locations along the coast. Some 
fishermen, located next to the closure, faced a congested fishing area. Others decided to 
travel farther away, reducing profitability but also encroaching on other fishermen's 
waters, and the ones located farthest from the closure had to share fishing grounds with 
the newcomers. Individuals' characteristics are important factors determining the severity 
of the impact. For example, a fisherman in his 50s, with a high debt load and living in a 
community that offers few employment alternatives, would have been more sensitive to 
regulation and less resilient to change. Over time, the non-compliance to regulation 
transformed into job dissatisfaction and mental health issues. 
Distrust in the political process and use of science in decision making 
For decades, many fishermen have been highly suspicious of the science 
supporting management decisions. There are external reasons (e.g., computerization of 
stock assessment) and negative precedents (e.g., poor communication) that exacerbate 
their distrust in science (Figure 17). The passage of the Magnuson Act provided 
important funding for expanding NMFS research capacity. This encouraged the 
development and use of computerized advanced statistical analysis. The use of statistical 
modeling fundamentally impacted the way fishermen perceived the decline of stock as 
well as impacted their participation in cooperative research and willingness to rebuild 
stocks. The stock assessment models were accurately showing a declining biomass that 
was not necessarily immediately perceived by fishermen. As explained by Hartley and 
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Robertson, "there was a 1-2-year lag time before the stock declines were evident in the 
commercial landings data [...]. Fishermen's on-the-water experience was not 
immediately confirming the scientists' predictions and thus contributed to the industries 
suspicions and disbelief (2006, p. 582). 
As stock assessments became more sophisticated, they also became less 
comprehensible to non-scientists. The standardized sampling protocols set aside direct 
collaboration with fishermen, breaking a tradition established by the Bureau of 
Commercial Fisheries (1903) and its predecessor, the United States Fish Commission 
(1871)( Dobbs, 2000). Until 1970s, fishermen and scientists worked together. The 'new 
science' reduced the opportunities for integrating fishermen's knowledge, which slowly 
became irrelevant to statistical modeling. Scientists perceived fishermen's knowledge as 
anecdotal and unnecessary to stock assessment. This transition came along with failures 
Table 11. Management and fisheries information - a fisher's perspective 
(Griffith and Dyer, 1996, p. 210) 
Interviewer: "Do you think that fishermen have knowledge about the resources that are 
important to the fishery itself?" 
Fisher: "Nobody knows better than the fishermen, nobody, without a doubt. For the amount of 
time that we put out there, there's nobody that has a better idea of what's happening within the 
fisheries than the fishermen themselves." 
Interviewer: "And do you think that information is actually utilized?" 
Fisher: "I don't know how much because I know a lot of it's based on their own survey. The 
National Marine Service conducts their own surveys and all their numbers come from their own 
surveys:probably more so than using information they get from the fishermen because of the 
politics involved, because everybody's trying to work things to their own advantage." 
Interviewer: "So is there mistrust you think, as far as the processes are involved?" 
Fisher: "Oh yeah. Absolutely. I guess that a lot of times the information the National Marine 
Fisheries Services uses for their surveys is really off track because of the limited amount of time 
and their methods -just not enough there to come up with accurate numbers to base 
management on. And then with the politics that come into play between the different use groups 
and the different fishermen, things get distorted that way. So I guess, yeah, there is mistrust in 
the whole process." 
in the communication process leading to tension between the government and the fishing 
industry. This 1995 quote represents a fisherman's perspective with regard to interaction 
with scientists. 
The first communication faux-pas occurred in 1978 with the First Groundfish 
Plan. In 1977, NMFS recommended no allocation of quota for haddock, arguing that the 
stock was low and needed to be rebuilt. By contrast, fishermen were experiencing larger 
catch than the previous year. Later, NMFS admitted that the 1975 class of haddock was 
particularly productive which explained their abundance in 1977. These fish were not 
allocated to harvest but were to be invested in stock rebuilding. This information was 
apparently omitted (Hennessey & Healey, 2000). As noted by Hennessey, "this admission 
raised suspicion about the trustworthiness of NMFS scientists in the eyes the fishermen— 
an attitude that would continue to strengthen and that would have a corrosive effect on 
groundfish management in New England for the next 20 years" (Hennessey & Healey, 
2000, p. 196). 
Since this event, management actions have been regularly punctured with 
misinterpretation from the fishermen or gaffes from the government which increased 
fishermen's sensitivity to regulations. Most of the fishermen I interviewed interpreted the 
constant change in regulation as a proof that the science was inaccurate. In 2002, an 
incident popularly labeled "Trawlgate" triggered even more suspicion for and anger with 
scientists and managers (Daley & Cook, 2003). The scandal began when a group 
fishermen involved in a stock assessment survey noticed a number of problems with the 
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fishing gear on the research vessel Albatross IV. Regulators had been notified of these 
problems three years prior to the calibration survey but, due to lack of funding, they were 
unable to get the gear inspected (Daley & Cook, 2003). There was some questioning 
whether the data collected the previous years were still valid. One interviewee 
commented on the event. 
My livelihood is at stake here, you guys. Your agenda, is you 
know they said wow this is giving Woods Hole a big black eye. They were 
told three years ago about it and did nothing about it. And here they are 
interested in preserving that [data] and that's the wrong thing at the 
moment. That was the wrong thing to try to do. The right thing to do was 
well, you know, we blew it, we screwed the continuity of it; let's get it 
right'. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
It was found that the resulting data were not detectably different from similar data 
collected during other years, yet suspicions remained. The main complaint was about the 
way the matter was handled by the agency: "Of course the spin the federal fisheries 
agency is putting on this is that if the tainted surveys are not significantly different from 
other surveys, then all's right with the world and the scientists can get back to business as 
usual" (Garden State Seafood Association, 2002). Fishermen perceived that the 
governing authorities and scientists took the matter lightly. "They can make mistakes 
with no consequences while, if I fish one inch in a closed area, I get fined. That is the 
principle behind it that bothers me." (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
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One consequence was that fishermen experienced weakening morale and 
increasing social dissonance from non-compliance. This example falls in line with a 
survey conducted in 2004 where legitimacy of the management system was one 
important factor leading to lower rates of compliance (Shaw & Sutinen, 2006). 
As the stock declined, scientists and managers alike were pressured by an 
increasing demand for information. The urgency of the situation and the time constraints 
fostered neither cooperative research nor effective communication about how data was 
collected, analyzed and used in recommendations. Unfortunately, tentative co-
management techniques were used as methods of last resort maintaining the adversarial 
atmosphere (Kaplan & McCay, 2004). Thus, fishermen continued to complain about the 
stock survey data compiled by NMFS and scientists, citing under-counting of the number 
offish in the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank. According to the fishermen's perspective, 
regulators "dismissed these complaints as self-serving attempts to undermine the 
legitimacy of the harvest restrictions forcing them off the water" (Van Zile, 2003). On the 
other hand, many scientists felt that the Council dismissed scientific advice in favor of 
the industry. The industry was loath to restrictions and the "Council was coming from a 
position where politically they didn't want to do anything that would change fishing 
practices" (Vaughan Anthony cited by Latane, 1995). 
Suspicions about scientific accuracy had a direct impact on their motivation to 
participate in stock recovery efforts. Many fishermen did not believe in the poor state of 
the fisheries in the first place, since it was not always consistent with their own 
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experience. This was particularly true in the 1990s as regulation progressively tightened 
and coastal communities experienced socioeconomic hardship (Dobbs, 2000). Over the 
years, poor communication, mistakes, lack of co-management and other cooperative 
strategies further exacerbated fishermen's sensitivity to the science supporting 
management decisions. Various participants (11 out of 14, see appendix A) felt that 
managers, Council members and scientists did not realize the human impact of the 
regulations they created. Coupled with depletion of stocks and the socioeconomic 
difficulties, these factors contributed to the development of real or perceived negative 
relationships between fishermen, scientists and managers. This tainted situation resulted 
in low morale for all stakeholders, which in turn seriously impeded the management 
process. The resentment also led to non-compliance with regulations that were seen as 
unsound. More than 30 years after the First Groundfish Plan, fishermen still lack trust in 
the science supporting management decisions. In a recent survey of groundfish permit 
holders, 61% of respondents strongly disagreed with the accuracy of the science behind 
management (Holland et al., 2010). 
Overall, the impacts of regulation on fishing practices were not evenly distributed 
among the five states. The richness of New England fisheries came from its complexity 
and diversity. From the participants' perspective, conservation and management 
measures were not fair and equitable to all fishermen. All participants revealed that their 
level of stress related to regulation sharply increased with Amendment 5. For some 
fishermen, uncertainty about the future of the resource and difficulty understanding 
complex regulation morphed into financial worry, changes in job satisfaction, changes in 
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personal relationship, and deteriorating mental and physical health condition. For others, 
it was an opportunity to feel rewarded by improving fishing practices and increasing 
profitability. 
Recreational fishermen 
The recreational fishing sector was underrepresented on the Council as well as in 
public comment sessions. However, approximately 40% of the letters received for 
Amendment 7 were from recreation sector, making this group the most represented in the 
written comments 15 
17%-
Figure 18. Number of letters received per sectors for 
Amendment 7 (percentage) 
17% 
-40% 
• Recreation sector 
(Fishermen, associations, 
charter/party boats) 40% 
• Commercial sector 
(Fishermen, associations, 
support industry) 26% 
• General public 17% 
• Others 17% 
15
 The percentage does not take into account letters using a template. 
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From the written comments and the newspaper articles, I found that the 
fishermen's major complaint was the inequity of restrictions between the two sectors. In 
their letters, they expressed their approval for maintaining the status quo for recreation 
regulations. They felt that commercial fishermen should bear most of the restrictions as 
they perceived them responsible for the collapse of the groundfish fisheries. Many also 
highlighted that bycatch contributed to stock depletion. From all the letters written for 
Amendment 7, they were the only group addressing this issue (Figure 18). "We on these 
party boats practice conservation. Also, these fish caught on hook and line and 
undersized are carefully released to the ocean. The commercial boats shovel more dead 
and dying fish overboard in one day than the entire recreational party boat fleet does in a 
season." (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
Recreational fishing represents quality leisure time spent with friends and family. 
Many mentioned that fishing was a long-standing activity between father and son. 
Overall, they lamented lost fishing opportunities. They feared that they would have to go 
fish in another region other than New England. The downstream effect of such action 
would have impacted a web of local businesses that relied on recreational fishing. Despite 
my attempts to contact the sport fishermen that sent in comments to Amendment 7,1 was 
not able to conduct a formal interview. The three fishermen with whom I got in contact 
told me they were not impacted by the regulation other than getting a permit. 
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Fishermen's wives and family members 
Commercial fishing is a demanding activity that requires a strong commitment 
going beyond financial reward to identification as a fisherman. The "way of life" implies 
a particular organization of the family that creates independent lives for men, women and 
children to meet the needs of the fishing enterprise and domestic household. Studies on 
fishing families and communities have confirmed that family arrangement involves 
separate lives, with sea-based fishermen dominating work life and their shore-based 
wives dominating family life. This dynamic is characterized by wives economically 
dependent on husbands who, in turn, have limited participation in the family (Binkley, 
2002; Griffith & Dyer, 1996; Hall-Arber, 1993; Mederer, 1996, 1997; Yodanis, 2000). 
According to Mederer (1996,1997), this arrangement provided a very satisfying lifestyle 
until overfishing manifested and subsequent regulations were enacted. To cope with the 
changing situation, some women started providing a second income. Others got involved 
in proactive associations, assumed leadership roles within coastal communities or entered 
the industry themselves. These changes may have been accompanied by personal and 
career accomplishments, including a sense of achievement, autonomy, job satisfaction, 
increased status/prestige, a sense of challenge, or personal control. A consequence was a 
change in workload between men at sea and women at work in relation to household 
maintenance and child caring. It also had an impact on financial and other dominating 
forces within family dynamic. Three studies conducted in 1993, 1995 and 1996 
mentioned that the changes in the fishing industry profoundly altered the family's life and 
identity (Griffith & Dyer; Hall-Arber; Mederer; Smith, 1995). 
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ChanRe in household finances: second income 
Fishermen's wives involved in the family business complained that more 
restrictive regulation changed their workload. Dealing with regulatory agencies was 
added to the task of taking care of the land-side business as they became a conduit of 
information to keep their husband up to date with new regulations. They also conveyed 
the fishermen's point of view to the agencies. 
When [she] became a fisherman's wife 42 years ago, she knew all 
about her marital duties as "shore captain" of the family business — pay 
the bills, do the books, file the taxes, buy supplies, stand by the radio for 
those middle of the night emergencies. She didn't know the job description 
would grow to include going toe-to-toe with bureaucrats, testifying before 
Congress, wading through a turgescent sea of confounding, nearly 
incomprehensible government regulations" (Kyle, 1995b). 
Other fishermen's wives, aware of the changes in the industry, decided to look for 
other employment. Anticipation of hardship encouraged women to get out of the home 
and into the work force as a way, for example, to maintain the boat, provide health 
insurance for the household or to have personal satisfaction and income. A fisherman 
talking about his wife mentioned that: "My wife had to get ajob. I was the sole supporter 
of the family since we married in 1970.1 believe my wife went working in 1997. [...] We 
needed the money." (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
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A fisherman's wife tells that she sought employment when she realized the 
seriousness of the coming changes: 
It's really become apparent that the change was swift and there was 
a determination to reduce not only the amount of fish caught but the 
number of people catching fish: the number of boats employed in the 
industry. [...] We didn't see it [the impacts] until the 1990. The effect 
wasn't that bad initially. When we had our son, it's when I really started to 
pay attention to what was really going on because it wasn't just the two of 
us anymore. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
The transition from stay-at-home mom to working mother was perceived as a 
dangerous development threatening the traditional fishing family culture. "A fisherman's 
wife has always been a single parent. [...] The fisherman is out so long; the mother acts as 
father too and is solely responsible for everything when the father is out. Now I'd say 90 
percent of those people have gone to work. That's a big change and we don't know where 
it will take us" (Angela Sanfilippo cited by Hayward, 1998, p. 1). 
According to the participants, women that were fully engaged in paid employment 
continued to have primary responsibility for the "second shift:" the house work. A study 
that compared non-fishermen's wives to fishermen's wives showed that the latter "were 
substantially unenthusiastic about their husbands' occupational choice and suggested that 
these females may exercise a dissuasive influence upon the intergenerational perpetuation 
of fishing as a way of life" (Dixon, Lowery, Sabella, & Hepburn, 1984, p. 33). Women at 
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work challenged family organization as couples needed to rethink notions of family time, 
autonomy, commitment and equity. 
Change in community cohesion: the role of associations 
Changes to the fishing industry caused disruption of personal relationships, family 
structure and social networks, especially when perceived to be imposed from outside the 
family/community. These changes, however, could be positive and encourage the women 
to seek employment, education or volunteer opportunities through associations. For 
example, the Gloucester Fishermen's Wives Association played an active role in the 
community. It was creative at constructively adapting to the fishing crisis presented by 
Amendments 5 and 7. The Association was involved in the Gloucester Fishermen and 
Family Assistance Center, which by 2000 had trained 305 fishermen and eligible 
workers, 137 of whom found employment (Hall-Arber et al., 2001). Other organizations, 
such as the Maine Fishermen's Wives Association, utilized their proficient members to 
make the regulation terminology accessible not only to fishermen but also to other 
members of the community that have economical interests in the industry. 
The wives [members of the Maine Fishermen's Wives Association] 
up and down the coast have always had a network for sharing information, 
but we decided we had to get organized when people so far away (NMFS) 
started running our lives. [...] Wives and mothers are supposed to be 
nurturing. We're also intelligent and fair." [The president of the 
association] groans under the ponderous weight of federal regulations past, 
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present and pending. She admits that the toughest part of the job is 
translating the dense jargon of the bureaucracy into plain English. "We put 
a lot of time into making this comprehendible. I don't know how we do it, 
other than to say we have some very talented members who can do just 
about anything (Kyle, 1995b). 
In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, the association's mission came to include a 
channel of information on regulation as well as assistance to families and fishermen. 
Some wives embraced these challenges; others traded their membership or role as 
fishermen's wives for professional occupations. Women's professional ambitions 
impacted their participation in traditional fishing activities. This shift in behavior was 
perceived by four fishermen as detrimental to traditional fishing family culture, 
communities and social network. One participant said: 
There was always this unique tie between the co-op and the 
Fishermen's Wives Association. Because most of the people belong to the 
Cooperative, their wives were members of the Wives group. And there 
was this turning point where there was a group of women, a lot of them 
have been successful and it's no different than corporate America where, 
because they made more money or because they been out a little longer or 
they didn't belong to the same social circle, they didn't embrace the life of 
being a fishermen's wife. [...] Eventually, the Fishermen's Wife 
Association turned away from us and stopped supporting us. [...] That 
disrupted entire communities; there were brothers and sisters who fought 
over stuff like that. It was a huge social problem. (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
Some fishermen's wives or daughters entered the fishing industry by owning 
vessels or fishing related businesses. The fishing industry is unquestionably dominated by 
men (Binkley, 2002; Nadel-Klein, 1988; Nadel-Klein & Davis, 1988), and thus these 
women crossed gender boundaries into men's jobs. From all the potential participants 
that I contacted, only one female business owner agreed to be part of the study, limiting 
my understanding of the potential impacts on women. She mentioned that, at first, it was 
difficult to enter a non-traditional occupation. She needed to demonstrate that she was as 
good as the men. However, a fisherman shared his personal perspective on the 
involvement of women in the fishing industry. 
I am not down on women but that was another thing that happened 
where men always were in the fishing business and there was a period of 
time where there was an influx of women who went to represent their 
business or owned vessels. They changed the game. It was alright for them 
to be rude and miserable bitches. But if a guy spoke to them like that, they 
played the girl game and said: "you know you cannot talk to me that way. 
You are so rude." But they were very effective. They got pretty much 
everything they wanted and, again, it is part of where I have such anger 
because they were only out for themselves. They weren't out for the 
greater population. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
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Although many fishermen perceived various members (men) of the industry as 
selfish and manipulative, participants attributed these characteristics to women in 
particular. This quote from one participant illustrates women's ways of acting and 
negotiating, which is, according to him, different than men's. This opinion was also 
shared by other fishermen in two different states (Appendix A). Two other participants 
felt that women invaded the men's fishing business. 
Finally, the changes in fishing practices impacted fishing families. The unique 
"way of life" which included separation of family and work spaces was at once a source 
of great pride but also an obstacle when it came time to adapt. The fishing families were 
particularly vulnerable because of the commitment that fishing requires (e.g., long hours, 
protracted lack of contact with family and relatives) and also because of external 
economical pressure (e.g., higher cost of living) and societal values (e.g., professional 
achievement, standard of living). The families that maintained their "family strategy" of 
separate lives while transitioning through regulation (fishermen adapting to regulation or 
leaving the industry) were less vulnerable to management actions. The interviews as well 
as the studies cited above show a shift in traditional gender-defined division of labor. The 
men faced a different situation at home because women who were employed, business-
owners, or involved in community services had less time to devote to family and 
household. Moreover, men who had restricted DAS spent more time at home, yet women 
seemed to assume most of the household responsibilities. Some studies show that 
changing these established patterns of family life and family roles is difficult (Mederer, 
1996, 1997). To cope with the changes, some wives supported their husbands' 
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commitment to be a fisherman by being involved in associations and community projects. 
Certain women adapted to the new circumstances and sought employment to maintain the 
standard of living. Others that did not want to compromise their ambitions, interests and 
concerns chose a satisfying career inside or outside the fishing industry. Nowadays, 
women in fishing communities are far from the traditional representation of fishermen's 
wives waiting for the return of their husband while taking care of the children, the house 
and family business, as many coastal communities have experienced intense pressures 
from economic activities associated with tourism. The symbolic representation of the 
fishermen's wife is now mostly used to market fishing communities and attract tourists. 
Owners and employees of the support industry 
Fishing-related support and distribution services are comprised of many sectors, 
including processing plants, brokers, wholesalers, transportation, retailers, repair 
businesses, and related supply. They have the important function of moving seafood 
products from the producing sectors to the consumers. With the decline in fish stock and 
subsequent regulations, fishermen had less demand for such services. Thus, the 
processing industry focused on underutilized species and export. Many plants that did not 
close their doors experienced employee relocation, therefore being forced to tap into a 
pool of unqualified workers. Distributers facing inconsistent supply coped by importing 
fish from elsewhere, either from abroad or other states. This, in turn, impacted 
cooperatives and seafood auctions. Finally, fishermen even started doing maintenance 
themselves rather than using shore services. 
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Low workforce quality: processing industry 
In 1980, there were 5,700 workers in the processing sector in Massachusetts. In 
the subsequent twelve years, processing workers decreased by half to 2,700 in 1992 
(Hall-Arber et al., 2001). The price offish rose significantly in the early 1990s and the 
higher prices meant that processors did not need as much fish to remain viable. But as the 
regulation reduced the fishing effort, the processor ended up short of fish supply in the 
end. Many business owners saw the crisis as a long-term situation and coped with the 
local fish shortage by adopting permanent business changes, such as importing foreign 
seafood. For example, by 1996, Gorton's Seafood of Gloucester exclusively processed 
frozen foreign product in lieu of local fish (Griffith & Dyer, 1996). On the other hand, 
some companies chose to process underutilized species for European exports. Monkfish 
is a delicacy in France and smoked dogfish is highly reputed in Germany. In England, 
dogfish is widely used in the traditional 'fish and chips,' while the local market demand 
has been minimal. Some plants upgraded their processing equipment and replaced 
workers with automated systems, reducing their operational costs, while others relocated 
to larger ports, downsized or simply closed down. 
The reliability and excellence of the workforce has been an important factor in 
business planning. All participants I interviewed mentioned that from the late 1980s to 
late 1990s, the quality of employees was a fundamental part of the declining processing 
industry. Processing plants got into the cycle of losing experienced employees and 
training new ones. Inexperienced workers were involved in a higher number of accidents 
(e.g., cuts) and presented a high rate of absenteeism. To escape this cycle, some plants 
175 
opted for automated equipment that required high school-level academic skills, and 
which offered better salaries and benefits. Others opted for hiring ethnic workers. One 
participant talked about the difficulties of having a stable workforce. 
In Portland Maine in the late 1980s, there was very few good 
trained [employees]; and if they were trained, and knew how to cut, they 
usually had ajob already. There were still five or six plants which were 
drawing out from the pool of people, as well as all the groundfish nets. 
Americans were hard to hire. They would work two days a week and then 
disappear. Drug problems, you name it. That was a very unstable 
workforce. This is why we went from Maine and came down here 
[Portsmouth, NH]. I had an ethnic workforce here and in New Bedford. A 
stable workforce. The whole family would work in a plant. Portland had a 
very tough workforce. Not so much the ethnic rather than local, Anglo-
Saxon that worked the waterfront just tended to be a very difficult crowd. 
Those years were difficult. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
Another business owner from New Bedford, MA also mentioned having problems 
finding reliably trained employees. Starting in the mid-1990s, he started hiring Asians 
highly experienced at cutting and making filets. He added that, because of their skill, the 
number of accidents was reduced considerably. 
The processing industry was sensitive to the fluctuation of local fish supply. 
However, the industry was resilient to this problem as they had options like processing 
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alternative species, processing imports or exports, or replacing employees with automated 
systems. However, companies lacking the financial conditions to invest in more 
equipment or lacking the skills to expand business operations oversea where forced to 
close, relocate or downsize. One might presume that the layoffs resulting from these 
closures increased the availability of skilled employees on the labor market but, contrary 
to this assumption, the participants mentioned that it was difficult to find qualified New 
Englanders who were reliable workers. To adjust, companies hired an ethnic work force. 
It is not rare that new immigrants experience difficulties in finding employment because 
of poor language skills and/or education level and equivalencies, so this had some 
positive impact on the overall communities as it offered employment opportunities to 
minority groups that were less likely to find jobs. 
Change of seafood market: importation 
Another important sector of the support services is the distribution and marketing 
of seafood products. Fishermen's cooperatives were once viable organizations that 
provided a wide range of services to members, such as docking facilities and marketing 
fish to processing and freezing plants as well as representatives who would provide 
information and updates on new regulations. Some cooperatives have been around for as 
long as 60 years (e.g., Point Judith Fisherman's Cooperative founded in 1948). 
Cooperatives played an important role in social and occupational networks of local 
fishermen. This was a place where fishermen could gather and find mutual aid. 
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In the early 1980s, cooperatives grew in number and size, accepting new members 
and moving into larger facilities. But when the landings drastically decreased at the end 
of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, many co-ops started experiencing financial struggle. 
The number of members slowly declined, dividing the operating costs amongst the 
remaining fishermen. There was no incentive for new fishermen to join at that point. By 
1995, the scarcity of the fish and the pressure from imports of foreign seafood 
contributed to the closure of many cooperatives. A participant summarized the seafood 
market shift occurring in the 1990s. 
There are so many sources now for fish and seafood from around 
the world that come to this country. Here is one of our biggest buyers to 
whom I sold probably 50 % of our fish in the early 1990s. I would go and 
meet with them a few times a year and one day the owner said to me, 
"You know there is come a time when I am not going to buy any of your 
fish." I looked at him and said "Why?" I didn't understand until more and 
more regulation came into effect. And that one time when the codfish 
quota went to 30 pounds a day for boats, we didn't sell them hardly any 
fish at all for probably 6 or 7 years. They outsourced things from Iceland, 
Norway, somewhere where they can have regular supply offish. And the 
cod is also much more controlled than it is here. But the big companies are 
selling contracts for fillet to institutions that they can count on which have 
a steady supply of product and they know what the price is. So I see now 
what he was talking about back then. And he added, "If there were a 
chance that they let you guys go fishing again, it's not because you catch 
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those fish that it means you gonna find a home for them very easily." I 
said "Wow." (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
By 1995, there were too many facilities for the few remaining boats. In order to 
keep business afloat and keep servicing local ports, some cooperatives merged and 
consolidated equipment and services. Thus the commercial fishing infrastructure slowly 
diminished in amplitude and importance. The major change in seafood market occurred 
in the 1990s when it went from locally supplied seafood to imports. Similar to the 
processing industries, the distribution and marketing businesses were sensitive to the 
supply offish. Distributors needed a constant supply of product that local fishermen 
could not meet. And even now that fish stocks are back, distributors do not buy locally 
because, first, they already have a steady supply of fish, and, second, they have contracts 
to honor. 
Profitability and poor maintenance: diminishing shore services 
By the time of the passage of Amendment 5 in 1994, the age and condition of the 
fleet was declining. The fishermen that took advantage of the subsidies to acquire a new 
or newer boat at the end of the 1970s early 1980s then owned a 10 to 15 year-old vessel 
in need of repair. The decrease in the number of boats, DAS and landing was 
accompanied by the decline of repair services. Although there are no recent data16 on the 
number of boat repair shops in New England, we can suppose that their numbers 
correlate with the decline in the number of vessels. This was anticipated as the Council 
16
 The latest data on the numbers of repair and supply facilities was compiled in 2001 by Madeleine Hall-
Arber (to be confirmed by the committee) 
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was crafting Amendment 7. One business owner wrote to the council in 1995 before 
closing his facility two years later. "Failure to allow fishing in these areas will only cause 
more hardship to these vessels, which will further limit their ability for repair and 
maintenance. This lack of care and maintenance will naturally be felt by all shoreside 
shops and support facilities, making it impossible for many of us to continue to operate." 
(Personal communication, spring 2010) 
First, fishermen began to do the work themselves; because of the decline in 
landings and profitability, boat owners were not seeking repair services like before. 
Second, only the most urgent repairs were fixed, ignoring others that could have been 
hazardous with extended trips at sea (Griffith & Dyer, 1996). Moreover, for some boat 
owners, the maintenance was done to cover up flaws in order to have higher insurance 
coverage. It was common for insurance companies to conduct inspections to determine 
the seaworthiness, risk, and value of vessels before re-insurance. A participant reported 
that he left the industry at a time where repairs started to become camouflage for 
insurance companies. "Often, they [boat owners] would cut corners to save money. And 
vessels need to be dry docked for hull repairs and painting every 10 to 15 years. They 
wouldn't do it. They would delay it as much as they could. They would paint over rust. 
The boat looked good but everything was rusted." (Personal communication, spring 
2010) 
Repair facilities that depend on fishing vessels are sensitive to fish supply. A 
participant mentioned that welders and shore engineers were more resilient because they 
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could find alternative work in other industrial sectors, while business owners were tied to 
their companies. 
Overall, the processing industry and distribution and marketing of seafood were 
directly affected by the low and inconsistent supply of fish. Other shore-side businesses 
like repair shops, suppliers (fuel, grocery), and financial institutions were indirectly 
impacted by the low stock. They were directly impacted when the fishermen changed 
their fishing practices due to regulation. All these businesses had to be creative and 
diversify their services, import product from elsewhere, and/or rely on other local 
customers in other to survive. 
US Coast Guard personnel 
The protection of the living marine resources within the EEZ, including the 
enforcement of the fishery management plans fisheries, falls to the US Coast Guard and 
NOAA's Office of Law Enforcement, known as NMFS fisheries enforcement. US Coast 
Guard are responsible for ensuring compliance with regulations, providing input to 
develop viable enforcement schemes to support fisheries management plans, giving 
recommendations on safety and equipment, and assisting in case of emergency. NMFS 
covers enforcement for programs including DAS, vessel monitoring, trip limits, record 
keeping, reporting, observers and sectors. In the 1990s, the traditional focus of NMFS 
fisheries enforcement was onshore at the dock, utilizing a mix of both special agents who 
conducted long-term investigative work and fishery patrol officers who handled more 
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routine enforcement duties. With its cutter and aircraft fleet, USCG concentrated on 
surveillance and inspections of fishing operations at sea. 
The fish stock depletion and the constant change in regulation put a stress on both 
agencies. Overall, the impacts on USCG personnel were rather negative. The USCG 
participants that I interviewed experienced poor interagency collaboration with NMFS 
enforcement, safety issues related to enforcement, and frustration toward the political 
process and inadequacy of regulation. They pointed out the unenforceability of 
regulation, its complexity, and the lack of resources to enforce it as the three main social 
processes contributing to negative impacts on USCG personnel. 
Safety issues and low compliance: unenforceability of regulation 
On many occasions, USCG did not recommend even approved amendments to the 
Multispecies fisheries management plan based on their unenforceability (Hennessey & 
Healey, 2000). Written comments for Amendment 7 stipulated that mesh size regulation 
was virtually unenforceable. It was well known that some fishermen used liners 
(additional netting) to reduce the mesh size of the net. Phil Coates, chairman of the New 
England Fishery Management Council's groundfish committee commented on the 
effectiveness of regulation: "We know people will take maximum advantage of the days 
they have, they'll do their damnedest to get the biggest bang for the buck by making 
adjustments in gear. Now, the groundfish fishery is in an even bigger crisis. We may 
need days-at-sea and additional emergency actions to achieve rebuilding" (Kyle, 1995a). 
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These evasive tactics were detectable only by a visual inspection of the net, which 
implied that USCG needed to board the vessel and carefully inspect the nets. 
Catch limits per trip were enforced only at the dock when landing. For example, 
USCG could board a ship on his third day at sea when the catch limit was met but the 
USCG could not do anything because the catch limit per trip rule was applied only when 
the fish was landed. This therefore promoted undesired activities such as discard, 
transfers at sea and clandestine landing. 
Without the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to provide greater regulatory 
structure, closed areas and DAS were enforced only partially. Closed areas presented 
some challenges because they were not closed to all fisheries. Therefore, all vessels 
regardless of their activities - fishing for groundfish or participating in another fishery -
required visual identification by patrol units to determine compliance (USCG written 
comment for Amendment 7). Consequently, for safety reasons, there was enforcement 
only during the day when the weather allowed it. This decision was at the discretion of 
the officer. 
It's dangerous. [...] The safety hazard about going into a closed 
area in the fog or at night to identify a vessel that won't contact you on the 
radio is pretty significant. [...] If you want to close an area, close it to 
everybody. It is unsafe and there is a lot of stress and anxiety to enforce 
rules at night. It was unsafe. I did that once and I am not to do it again. 
(Personal communication, spring 2010) 
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DAS were reported by the fishermen with telephone notification using the call-in 
system. The reports were collected by NMFS and monitored by the New England 
Regional Office Fisheries Monitoring and Analysis Section. Although the call-in system 
"seem[ed] to be working as a mechanism for monitoring DAS," (FW25, p. 14), the data 
analysis process was slow and inefficient. As mentioned by one participant: "I found out 
that they [NMFS] weren't checking the back and forth and the other things. I found out 
this when we did some dock side checking and found out fishermen were running the 
clock even docked." (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
His explanation was that fishermen kept the clock running to give the impression 
that they used all their days fearing of getting cut even more DAS. 
The participants had the impression that there were no regulations established by 
the government or the council that fishermen could not break or get around. According to 
them, the way regulations were designed and the Council's laissez-faire attitude about 
their flaws not only allowed non-compliance but also limited detection, apprehension and 
prosecution. This was echoed by a study on the Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan 
compliance done in 1990 (Sutinen et al., 1990). The authors argued that the compliance 
measure. 
May have been affected by the industry's interpretation of actions 
that were taken or were delayed significantly before taken. The failure of 
the management process to remedy problems with particular management 
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regulations expeditiously, especially when stocks felt to critically low 
level, may have signaled to the less compliance-prone members of the 
industry that the managers were not serious about enforcing the mesh size 
and closes area system" (Sutinen et al., 1990, p. 362). 
Despite the numerous USCG recommendations to the Council and NMFS on 
regulations' loopholes and complexities, the plan kept using indirect control methods that 
hindered at-sea enforcement. Participants pointed out two causes leading to impacts: 
ambiguities of regulation and lack of political engagement."So for the USCG it was very 
frustrating. It was always gray. Fishermen could get around it. There was never a real air 
tight regulation and no matter how hard we tried to make them air tight there was not the 
political will to regulate fishermen that strictly." (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
Another participant added: "The frustrating thing was to watch the Council make 
choices that we knew would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. And we mentioned 
those and they made the choice anyway". (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
Figure 19 summarizes the factors identified as contributing to severity of impacts 
experienced by the USCG personnel when Amendment 5 failed to reduce overfishing. 
The pre-existing conditions were the complexity of regulation, non-compliance and 
enforceability difficulties. The participants perceived the lack of political will to enforce 
regulations as a serious obstacle to improving regulations and ending overfishing. They 
also perceived that the exclusion of USCG recommendations in the choices of regulation 
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methods perpetuated the already malfunctioning political process. The use of DAS, mesh 
size and closures, which were proven to be problematic, also caused safety issues. 
Overall, the new Amendment 7 increased the complexity of regulation which affected its 
adequacy to the non-compliance problem and the quality of enforcement. These had a 
direct impact on the personnel, who felt frustrated and powerless. 
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The causes leading to impacts experienced by the USCG were recurrent. They 
were the consequences of a chain of institutional impacts and processes which unfolded 
over a long period of time. However, the frequent personnel turn-over mitigated the 
possible chronic impact on individuals. On the other hand, problems within the institution 
may take time to settle if no one stays there long enough to address them. 
Discordant interagency relationships: USCG and NMFS enforcement 
The USCG relationship with NMFS enforcement was also a source of 
dissatisfaction. Some of these concerns arose from institutional management operations. 
As pointed out by Sutinen (1990), NMFS enforcement experienced increases in court 
case challenges based on the validity of the substantive regulation as well as based on the 
methods used to detect and prove violation. There were two factors compounding each 
other that lead to poorly documented case evidence (Randall, 2004). First, because of a 
frequent turn-over of USCG personnel, many officers were inexperienced and unfamiliar 
with the New England fishing regulations. Second, the regulation was extremely complex 
and often required direct observations of a prohibited act to count as a violation. For an 
inexperienced boarding officer, it was difficult to distinguish permitted activities from 
illegal practices. As a result, these inadequacies were transferred to poor case reports, 
considerably delaying case processing time, which, in turn, exacerbated animosities 
between the two agencies. One USCG participant illustrated the situation. 
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The paperwork was a real pain. Enforcement attorneys often 
questioned the paperwork that we submitted and threw a case out because 
they didn't like the paperwork documenting the case. [...] There were a lot 
of frictions between us and the fisheries service. We would meet with 
special agents in charge and enforcement attorneys every about six 
months. Our conversation would usually turn into an argument. Why does 
it take so long to process a case? If you were a boarding officer and you 
filed violation, you wanted to find out what happened to the guy. It was 
not unusual for these cases to take a year or two years to resolve. So quite 
often the boarding officer would be long gone [because he was reassigned 
elsewhere]. The feedback would go back to the ship but he would be gone. 
So that was not much of a motivator. (Personal communication, spring 
2010) 
Another institutional difference between NMFS enforcement and UGCG resided 
in the type of duties. While USCG inspectors have enforcement authority for many 
regulations and laws, they are not federal agents like their NMFS counterparts. According 
to one participant, this disconnection affected cooperation and effectiveness of 
enforcement. 
The other problem we had was that all the NMFS special agents 
wanted to do investigation. They didn't want to go down and walk the 
dock and see who is coming in and who is coming out. They wanted to be 
in the investigation. They wanted to spend three years investigating a deal 
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and give the dealer a million dollar fine. Then what happened with stock 
and all the boat that got away with illegal catches they didn't fine? 
The pursuit of career opportunities within an agency can be detrimental to its 
mission. In this case it caused friction with colleagues and deteriorated work 
environment. On a broader scale, it weakened enforcement efforts to detect and prosecute 
violators. Consequently, failure to enforce restrictions where and when needed produced 
even greater non-compliance and more friction. 
Although this is not a resulting impact of overfishing and regulation, one 
participant mentioned the positive job satisfaction of working with fishermen. Because 
they wear two different hats, rescue and enforcement, they had the opportunity to be 
appreciated by the fishing community. 
The nice thing about CG was the balance between enforcement and 
safety. No matter what were the fishermen's attitudes toward the 
enforcement, they still wanted the USCG to be around in case something 
happened to them or they needed to be towed or someone would lose a 
finger. It made you feel good; it made the CG and the industry feel good 
about being there. [...] We worked together. It was not like the relationship 
with NMFS enforcement. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
For the interviewees, they felt that they shared the hazards of working on the 
ocean with the fishermen. They felt respect for fishermen because they make a living 
from the sea in a heavily regulated industry. They found that working for the USCG was 
extremely satisfying and rewarding. They perceived fisheries enforcement interesting and 
challenging. This positive aspect of job offset many of the negative institutional impacts. 
Overall, regulation was unenforceable for unobvious reasons (enforceability 
depending on the experience of officer). To some extent, frequent personnel turnover also 
required more formation. USCG needed more political influence on Council decisions. 
Interagency conflicts reduced efficiency of prosecution and the system needed more 
transparency to reduce delays. Data needed to be systematically monitored and compiled. 
On a larger scale, USCG personnel did not have a variety of options to cope with 
the frustrating situation mentioned previously. The institutional structure is restrictive and 
does not allow for innovation. In fact, this rigidity can be another source of frustration for 
those who try to challenge the system. The ineffectiveness of enforcement and the 
powerlessness of officers contributed to more infractions and more overfishing practices. 
Participants agreed that the relationship between USCG, NMFS enforcement and the 
Council was dysfunctional to a point that it affected the design of regulation and its 
enforcement, thus impacting the functioning of the whole fishery management. 
Regulators: Impacts to council and NMFS personnel, and council members 
In the 1990s, there were two major stressors that impacted governmental and 
decision making bodies. One was the council structure itself and the fishery management 
plan process. Another was the industry approach toward regulations. The council, 
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dominated by the fishing industry, lacked a diversity of perspectives17. Many members 
who supported and/or represented the commercial fishing interests had conflicts of 
interest (Eagle et al., 2003). Therefore, the probability of effective conservation was 
reduced by the fact that the council bore the responsibility for making both conservation 
and allocation decisions. Moreover, NMFS, who had the authority to oversee the 
council's decisions, had the limited power to disapprove all or parts of plans and 
management measures only if it was conflicting with the Magnuson Act and other 
provisions of federal law. The fundamental problems with conflicting conservation and 
allocation decisions directly impacted the work of the council staff, NMFS personnel and 
council members. They experienced pressure, verbal abuse, threats, high level of stress, 
increased workload, cynicism and disillusion about the system and process. 
Unfortunately, only two participants (often) were able to mention positive aspects 
regarding their occupation. 
Increase in workload: constant amendment of regulation 
The New England Fisheries Management Council counts eighteen voting 
members: the NMFS regional administrator, five state officials with marine fishery 
management responsibility (Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and 
Connecticut), and twelve members nominated by the governors of each coastal state and 
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce for three-year terms. They may serve a 
maximum of three consecutive terms. In addition, four non-voting members represent the 
17
 In 1998, for a total of 11 appointed New England council members, eight represented the commercial 
fishing sector, two represented recreational interests and one lobbied for another cause. (NMFS, 2001, 
Report to Congress on Apportionment of Membership on the Regional Fishery Management Councils) 
192 
USCG, US Fish and Wildlife Service, US Department of State, and the Atlantic States 
Marine Fisheries Commission. The voting members are chosen by function of their 
leadership in promoting stewardship of the marine fishery resources; if they are 
commercial fishermen or represent the industry; if they participate or represent the 
recreational fishermen; if they are knowledgeable and experienced nominees by reason of 
occupational or experience, scientific expertise, or training in field related to the fishery 
resources (e.g., conservationists of natural resources, consumers, teachers, journalists, 
writers, consultants, or are practicing law; 50 CFR § 600.215). Each Council member 
serves on one or more Oversight Committees related to a specific fishery or management 
issue (e.g., groundfish, monkfish, VMS/enforcement, research steering). The groundfish 
Oversight Committee reviews the plan and develops amendments or framework 
adjustments. The committees receives recommendations and assistance in developing 
management plan measures from Advisory Panels made up mostly of members from the 
commercial and recreational fishing sector, scientists, and environmentalists. The Council 
is also assisted by Plan Development Teams made up of scientists, managers and other 
experts. Council staff meets regularly with oversight committees and generally chairs 
each Plan Development Team. They provide analysis of species-related information and 
develop issue papers, alternatives, and other documents as appropriate for the 
development of FMP. 
The FMP process involves four phases consisting of many steps, including 
planning, drafting, document preparation, public review and final document preparation, 
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secretarial review, and proposed and final regulations1 . The amount of time taken by the 
Council to prepare documents related to Phase I and II is discretionary. Phase III (public 
and informal agency review) and Phase IV (formal Secretarial review) have fixed 
schedules as dictated by other applicable laws, hearings and public comment schedules, 
and MSA requirements. The approval or disapproval goes through a ninety day period 
(including sixty days for public comments and thirty days for review of those comments) 
which is often is too short to permit a thorough and adequate review (Eagle et al., 2003). 
The deadlines and preparation of a significant amount of documentation put a 
considerable pressure to get plans amended. 
In the time span often years (1990 to 2000), the Northeast Multispecies Fisheries 
Management Plan was amended eight times and adjusted twenty-four times. Each 
amendment and framework adjustment became increasingly complex, and further 
impacted those who crafted them. During interviews, one Council staff member 
mentioned that the constant urgency for new modification increased everyone's stress 
level and workload. He experienced a sense of inefficacy and the widespread employee 
pessimism got to a point where it began to affect his quality of life. "It was difficult. It 
was stressful for me. Not that I was a decision maker. For me the stress was more 
regarding the work load. It really wasn't easy. People here got upset." (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
According to him, most staff well-being and job appreciation were affected to 
different degrees by chronic overload, stress caused by change-related chaos, cynicism, 
18
 A detail account of the FMP/amendment and NEPA processes can be found in Reviewing Environmental 
Impact Statements for Fishery Management Plans (EPA, 2005) 
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conflicts and tensions causing affective distress. Although it might not have been the case 
for the participants I interviewed, there are studies showing that long work hours and 
overload negatively affect marital and father-adolescent relationships as well (Crouter, 
Bumpus, Head, & McHale, 2001). 
Although the topic was not broached during the interview with NMFS personnel, 
I can assume that an increase in workload was also a reality. Between 1989-1992, the 
budget for Oceans, Coasts, and NMFS (which represent 46% of the total NOAA budget) 
dropped by 22% (Unsoeld, 1993). NMFS financial resources sharply declined resulting in 
a backlog of research, cuts in resource management, and decreased monitoring needs 
(Unsoeld, 1993). Organizational changes due to reduced financial resources probably 
resulted in overtime and overwork, and their related psychological and physical health 
conditions (Brett & Stroh, 2003). Additionally, fear of job loss may have amplified the 
likelihood of workplace incivility. 
Council members were not spared by the work increase related to continuing 
modifications. Some members embraced the learning of science, laws and management 
actions. Many fishermen worked on the council and aimed to benefit the industry, yet the 
job satisfaction decreased overtime because of the difficult situation."There are always 
been fishermen who tried to understand and work with the system.[...] They worked for 
the council for 5-6 years and ended in frustration". (Personal communication, spring 
2010) 
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According to members' perceptions, some fishermen were reluctant to learn about 
management and were content to just vote. They felt it was too complicated and were 
only concerned with the resulting restriction without understanding the decision making 
process. Overall, participants' major complaint was the number of time-consuming 
meetings where they felt accomplishments were very few, thus necessitating more 
meetings. They felt that their peers did not acknowledge the work invested in 
understanding of complicated fishery science and regulation. They all agreed that being 
on the council was unrewarding. 
Psychological and physical health issues: discord amongst stakeholder groups 
The fact that the industry did not want to be regulated created discord among 
stakeholder groups. The management measures to allocate resources were mainly 
proposed by the industry, but there was no consensus as to what those measures should 
have been because the commercial industry was divided in many groups with conflicting 
points of view. The debate also involved recreation and conservation interest groups 
sitting on the Council, increasing the complexity of negotiations resulting in a labyrinth 
of regulation. 
All of the complications are because you are trying to 
accommodate the hook fishermen that fish every Thursday. I know a guy 
that fishes on this little corner of the bank and we don't want to restrict that 
guy. The recreational guys say they have to have an opportunity. Boats 
under 40 feet must have an opportunity; big boat must have an 
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opportunity. You are creating this incredible morass of regulation because 
you are doing a negotiation [amongst many interest groups]. You got 
every fisherman groups, in every state who want a little advantage for 
themselves, the recreational group who are trying to get more advantage 
for themselves. It is all about allocations between groups: who gets it. 
Nobody cares about what the actual quota is. It is much harder to divide a 
pie if the pie is smaller. It is hard to get people to agree. (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
Each group had conflicting opinions about how allocations should be distributed. 
Voting council members represented the fishing industry, as opposed to non-voting 
members who were the first to be impacted by discord. They were the decision makers 
and they had to bear the consequences of voting or not on restrictive measures. This 
responsibility reduced satisfaction of sitting on the Council, especially during time of 
crisis. 
Oh, dreadful. Too many threats. One of the most thankless jobs in 
the world. You go in there thinking that you will be helping the fishing 
industry and then you realize that at some point it's impossible. There is so 
many inherit conflicts within the job that you try to do: applying the 
Magnuson Act, the standards, and the NEPA, and the fisheries 
management. There is inherit conflicts between the Magnusson and the 
fishing industry and it would end up in a series of arguments. You would 
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end up having a fight with them [...] That is not my idea of fun. (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
Council members were seen negatively by the fishermen. Here is an example of a 
negative letter sent from a recreational fisherman: "If you and your committee close the 
fishery to recreational fishing and party boats, I will do everything in my power to see 
that you, personally, and every member of the committee, along with every politician 
agreeing with your actions will suffer the consequences of your actions." (Written 
comment for amendment 7) 
The impacts of being in a chronically stressful position affected their everyday 
wellbeing. In one particular case, a Council member came from a close-knit community: 
the Italian community in Gloucester, MA that traditionally fished together. He 
experienced pressure and stress from his community that other members were not 
exposed to. 
[Joe Brancaleone] was on the council with me and he had a much 
worse time than I did. He is Sicilian and the Brancaleones was one of the 
biggest fishing families in Gloucester. He was on the council for a while. 
[...] It tore the family apart a little bit where here is Joe [interviewee 
pointing at his left] and there his cousin [pointing at his right]. [...] People 
in Gloucester wouldn't talk to him anymore because he was involved in 
closing access to the fisheries and effort control. (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
In this case, the Council member's loyalty to the profession was questioned and 
he was being stigmatized as the "bad guy." It impacted his social life and family 
relationship. Two other former members that were committed to conservation 
experienced similar impacts. "[I was] trying to get the fishermen to understand that 
conservation was something we needed to embrace. You can imagine that I got my ass 
kicked off all over the coast. People thought I sold out to the environmentalists and I was 
fucking for a government job." (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
It is important to mention that most voting council members representing the 
fishing industry did not experience such stigmatization. However, they all agreed that 
people's anger, hopelessness and anxiety made them perceive or experience social 
tension, discouragement, annoyance, apprehension, and in some cases fear. On a broader 
scale, these personal impacts harmed the council members' perception of participation in 
the decision process. As a result, the former members I interviewed have lost their 
interest for the council over the years and do not attend meetings anymore. 
Discord amongst stakeholder groups also negatively impacted NMFS personnel. 
Staff was regularly in contact over the phone with fishermen, political leaders or their 
staff, fishermen's associations, environmental groups, etc. People that negatively 
perceived the decision making process, in which the Council and the agency listen and 
respond in an open and transparent fashion to differing interests, as being unfair and 
inefficient tend to questioned the integrity of the governmental institution. They also 
distrust its representatives. The confusing and difficult situation created tensions which 
increased NMFS personnel stress level. 
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The staff that were answering the phone day after day after day; 
they were stressed. They have been told by some people that they were 
nasty and because if they think they can intimidate you they will use that 
as an advantage. Everybody is looking at some advantage. [...] People got 
mad at the kids sitting in front of the desk, answering the phone and taking 
down comments or helping draft regulations. They are doing their job. 
They do what they are supposed to do. [...] It happened more often than it 
should. (Personal communication, spring 2010) 
However, this aspect was also part of the job description. "You expect everybody 
to be mad at you and thinking otherwise would be naive" (Personal communication, 
spring 2010). As a result, the staff position turnover rate was higher than the management 
positions. Younger staff would either find alternative employment or seek new positions 
within NMFS or NOAA. Hypothetically, external and internal turnover would have both 
positive and negative impacts on the organization. For example, it could have increased 
morale from the change of task. Employees could have been promoted to higher 
positions. On the other hand, employees that were not skilled, interested, motivated, or 
who reached their 'Peter principle' level of incompetence19 could have been promoted in 
higher position (Lazear, 2004; Peter & Hull, 1969; Pluchino, Rapisarda, & Garofalo, 
2010). The loss of personnel could have also disrupted ongoing projects. In the context 
that there was constant urgency for new modifications, relentless tidal shifts in change of 
both staff and managers could have affected almost every level of the organization. Over 
19
 Peter principle can be summarized as follows: 'Every new member in a hierarchical organization climbs 
the hierarchy until he/she reaches his/her level of maximum incompetence' (Peter and Hull, 1969). 
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time it could have made the organizational change harder to manage, which in turn may 
have affected the consistency of regulation. 
Although none of the interviewees mentioned health-related problems, I can 
extrapolate that some staff, managers and council members were experiencing health 
issues. People that work in a stressful environment with overloaded duties are vulnerable 
to psychological and physical health problems. Recent studies show correlation between 
work-related stress and gastrointestinal malfunction, impaired sleep, musculoskeletal 
pain, cardiovascular diseases, overweight, high level of cholesterol and systolic blood 
pressure (Greubel & Kecklund, 2011; Hies, Dimotakis, & De Pater, 2010; Parkes, 1990; 
Ybema, Smulders, & Bongers, 2010). Stressful jobs, conflicts and overwork are causes 
that can lead to absenteeism, affective distress, depressive symptoms, burnout and fatigue 
(Billings & Moos, 1981; Dimotakis, Scott, & Koopman, 2010; Hies, Dimotakis et al., 
2010; flies, Johnson, Judge, & Keeney, 2010; Parkes, 1990; Phelan et al., 2009; Tennant, 
2001; Ybema et al., 2010). Overall, these factors impact productivity and quality of work 
(Karasek & Theorell, 1994). People that experience these symptoms are more susceptible 
to coping with stress by smoking, having poor nutritional habits (eating fast food), and 
having less leisure time and less physical activity, which directly contribute to a diminish 
sense of well-being. 
Environmental/conservationist groups 
Several environmental groups have long-standing marine fisheries involvement. 
In the late 1980s, traditional consumer and environmental groups were politically 
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involved but exercised low impact on policy formulation and agendas. As opposed to 
fishermen that have strong interests in short-term outcomes that directly affect their 
livelihood, environmental and conservation groups have longer-term objectives of 
conservation and sustainable ecosystems. Unfortunately, I have little understanding of 
how regulations impacted organizations and their personnel. The nine potential 
participants contacted to learn more about this declined to make any comments, refused 
to participate or simply did not return my calls. From the information gathered in the 
written public comments, literature, newspapers, I found one point of interest: the 
involvement of environmental and conservation groups in the litigation of political 
decisions. 
In the 1990s, environmentalists and conservationists were not well represented on 
the Council. As of 1997, no activist was sitting on the Council (Niiler, 1997). Therefore 
they sought cooperative efforts as a way to bridge the industry with the agency and 
Council. On one hand, they wanted to sensitize the agency to the industry's perspectives. 
On the other hand, they wanted to gain more support for conservation measures from 
commercial and recreational fishermen. They provided expertise and experience through 
their cooperative programs between NMFS and its constituents. However, "one of the 
environmentalists' biggest complaints was the lack of response and feedback at the 
national and regional levels. They feel they often notify NMFS of problems, but 
eventually are compelled to use litigation as a last resort to solve them" (NAPA, 2002, p. 
116). 
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Politic before issues: judicial intervention in policy 
The conflicting goals of the Magnusson Steven Act have led to an increasingly 
large number of management actions challenged in federal courts. A report from the 
National Academy of Public Administration states that "litigation has grown ten-fold 
since the mid-1990s, reflecting an order of magnitude increase in fisher and 
conservationist dissatisfaction" (NAPA, 2002, p. 10). As of 2003, there were thousands 
of cases filed by citizens, industry and environmentalists (Barclay, 2003). In the case of 
environmental groups, the CLF lawsuit (1991) was a ground-breaking legal action in 
fishery litigation (NAPA, 2002). It forced managers to develop effective groundfish 
management plans that reversed stock declines. This class action suit showed that court 
decisions could have greater impact on regulation than attending public hearings. 
Judicial intervention in environmental politics is a complex issue and there is a 
wealth of research on the topic. I will limit myself to recognizing that the 'judicialization' 
of politics is an important social process that affects fishery management. There are 
obvious reasons why it impacts regulations. First, lawsuits impede democratic and public 
participation processes provisioned by NEPA (Hartley & Robertson, 2006). Second, the 
scope of the judicial policy-making depends on the knowledge, views or attitudes of 
individual judges (Powers, 2004). Third, the cost of governmental response to litigation is 
high and it takes an increasing allocation of NOAA's budget to achieve success in 
defending the system's management actions. Moreover, between 1995 and 2002 NMFS 
won only 50% of the lawsuits (NAPA, 2002; Powers, 2004). Fourth, instead of talking 
about solutions to address overfishing issues, discussion is polarized around litigation or 
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threats of litigation, perceived hidden agendas, and general distrust among stakeholders 
(Hartley & Robertson, 2006). Overall, "litigation and judicial management of our 
Nation's fisheries is unappealing to all" (Witherell, 2003, p. 210). On a positive note, 
litigation often demands further scientific advice, which ameliorates the best information 
available. It also may be a mechanism to strengthen oversight of Council actions and to 
bring management targets more in line with the scientific advice (Powers, 2004; Shelley 
etal., 1995). 
The general public 
Many researchers examined the question of natural resources sovereignty and 
whether entities other than users have a stake in their management. These entities can be 
broadly defined as citizens, who include consumers, municipal authorities, the media, 
local industries and businesses and future generations. One could assume that since 
fisheries are public resources, citizens can make a legitimate claim to be a stakeholder 
(Shelley et al., 1995). However, others conclude that since average individuals are not 
directly affected by or compelled to obey the regulations, they have no urgency. Thus 
they have limited power and are excluded from the management equation (Mikalsen & 
Jentoft, 2001). The Council consultative system starts with the first premise that broader 
public interests should be included in the decision process. In the case of the 
groundfishing collapse, the repercussions of overfishing and poor management were felt 
not only by the local fishing industry but also by local communities. But to what extent 
individual were citizens impacted and what is their role in the causal chain? 
Low public interest: complex regulation and participation system 
Public awareness about fish depletion is a recent phenomenon. In an article 
written in 2001, Mikalsen and Jentoft compared the US, Canada and Norway and noticed 
that there "was relatively little interest in fisheries issues outside the sector itself. 
However, during the last ten years or so, resource scarcity has made the (hitherto 
dormant) interests of other groups more obvious and 'intense' increasing the public 
awareness of, and interest in, fisheries issues" (p.282). In New England, public awareness 
about fisheries was very low prior to the long-standing resource crisis. The media and the 
written press started to take a more serious interest in overfishing and related issues. 
However, it was still not important enough to significantly arouse the interest of the 
public. 
Other than a little bit of public press where people will read it with 
their coffee in the morning and say, "Oh poor fishermen" or "Oh poor 
fish," there are not a lot of people engaged in the political debate. You 
never hear from the general public except on occasional riding campaign 
ran by NGO; and their comments are as what they are. (Personal 
communication, spring 2010) 
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For Amendment 7, approximately 22% of the letters received were from the 
public, out of which 47% were handwritten letters copied from a template provided by a 
conservation organization. Those letters disapproved of the status quo, supported 
Amendment 7 and encouraged the Council to submit the final by January 15, 1996. The 
other written comments were in favor of stronger restrictions. The tone of the letters 
varied from worries about the state of the ocean to anger at commercial fishermen and 
regulators. Most were looking forward to restricting fisheries. Many mentioned being 
concerned about the fish 
stock depletion and stock 
availability for futures 
generations. Others 
wondered how they could 
get involved to find 
solutions. Here is a good 
example (Figure 20). 
JOG Brancaleone, Council Chair 
New England Fishery Council 
Santaug Office Park 
5 Broadway (Rt 1) 
Saugus, MA 0190S 
Dear Council Members; 
7 October 1995 
Managers are responsible to a process, m your case one which 
must balance fisheries resources against fishing livelihoods It 
appears that both of these resources are now seriously 
threatened, perhaps due to inept management decisions and/or 
inadequa te 1n forma11on 
Whatever the case, the Council now is faced with repairing damage 
to a resource and an industry, and must help restore resources 
for its own value as well as its value to future generations of 
fishermen Please let us know if there are ways that ordinary 
citizens such as myself can be of help 
^sincerely, -^
Brian A Harrington 
RFD IS; 205 Valley Rd 
Plymouth. MA 02360 
tel SOS/833-2257 
Figure 20. Letter sent to the Council for Amendment 7 
It is clear that the general public interests were not only underrepresented during 
public consultation periods but also on the Council, and this for two apparent reasons. 
First, as observed by Mikalsen and Jentoft, the transparency and inclusiveness of the 
consultation system may be its greatest weakness because it "provides ample opportunity 
for playing partisan politics by mounting self-serving campaigns on particular issues" 
(2001, p. 290). During the New England crisis, political debates were carried over into 
the consultative process by the commercial fishing industry leaving no room for the 
public and consumers. Second, fisheries issues were complex and required time and 
effort to be understood. There was a lack of knowledge and/or interest at the citizen level. 
Therefore, citizens' leverage depended on the acquisition and exercise of 
consumer power. For the more informed citizens, safety, sustainability and ethical 
reasons may have influenced their fish consumption (Liu & Roberts, 2005). As for the 
general public, the average American may not have known nor much cared about 
fisheries management practices. As long as there was fresh fish available at a reasonable 
price, few consumers addressed concerns other than health risks posed by tainted 
seafood. In the 1990s, the increasing importation of cod replacing the declining local 
catch may have gone unnoticed by many consumers. The provenance of the fish and the 
health of the stock were not preoccupations used to exercise consumer power over 
sustainable practices. But when the market price offish and seafood increased 8% 
between 1990 and 2000, the average American was bound to start asking why and to 
foresee what was next (Bureau of labor statistics, 2011). 
Large scale analysis 
The Magnuson Act was passed primarily to regulate commercial fishing, as 
opposed to any other resource users. From 1976 to mid 1990, it goes without saying that 
the commercial fishing industry was over-represented on the Council. Although the 
Magnuson Act established that the Council system is to include "the fishing industry, 
consumer and environmental organizations, and other interested persons," between 1977 
and 1990 few environmental, recreational or consumer organizations had not enough 
political voice to be appointed on the council or to impact decisions (MSA sec. 2 USC § 
1801 (b)(5). 
During that period of time, the exclusion of the foreign fleet, technological 
advances, favorable economic conditions, the increase in seafood demand, and 
government encouragement and assistance, allowed fishermen to continue further 
expanding their capacity to fish. In the first decade following the passage of the 
Magnuson Act, the number of New England fishing vessels increased by 58% (Anthony, 
1990, 1993). Capital invested in this expansion did not yield the anticipated returns, as 
cod; yellowtail flounder and haddock collapsed. This left the industry's infrastructure 
overcapitalized and the stocks overfished. 
The groundfishing industry was in favor of regulating foreign fleet but was not 
inclined to be regulated itself since the passage of Magnuson Act. Catch quotas were 
broadly unpopular and allocation negotiations counter-productive. There was no political 
will to draw sound regulation nor to enforce any. Therefore many control efforts were 
perceived negatively, as demonstrated by the low compliance rates that plagued 
management of groundfishing for almost two decades (1980-2000). 
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Prior to the Magnuson Act, fishermen collaborated in research and stock 
assessment. As science and statistical analysis evolved, fishermen's on-the-water 
experience was relied upon less and less. The exclusion of traditional knowledge from 
stock assessment alienated fishermen not only from the data collection but also from 
science itself, which became too complex to understand. This situation thus drove a 
wedge between scientists and fishermen. 
Figure 21 shows a large-scale overview of possible outcomes from management 
actions. The federal government, through various policies (e.g., NEPA, Magnuson Act 
and standards) and programs (e.g., Fishing Vessel Obligation Guarantee (FOG) Program, 
Capital Construction Fund (CCF) program) sent contradictory messages to the industry. 
On one hand, policies were designed to control fishing effort and reduce fishing mortality 
to a sustainable yield. On the other hand, programs were still promoting capital 
investment in the construction of vessels. It was well known that stocks were low, but 
until the end of the 1980 there was still direct loan guaranteed by the government with a 
low interest rate and long pay-back period. In the case of the Fishing Vessel Obligation 
Guarantee Program, provisions to limit financing for vessels reconstructions that did not 
add to fishing capacity were taken only in 1996. Fishermen that participated in the 
Capital Construction Fund in the 1980s had to use their funds within 10 years of the 
financial agreement, and many of them were running into their deadline. Restrictions 
impeded fishing yet more vessels were built or improved (Force, 1999). 
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Figure 21. Large scale causal chain of regulatory process 
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These programs which encouraged new or continuous investments were one 
development that fueled fishermen's resistance to change. This opposition to regulation 
also came from a lack of understanding of the situation and of the need for change, the 
comfort with the status quo and fear of the unknown, the opposition to new requirements 
and processes introduced by the change, change to history and culture, and fear of job 
loss and bankruptcy. Moreover, there was no political will to regulate or to change the 
status quo. As most of the appointed members were from the industry, were lobbied by 
the industry, or otherwise represented fishing industries, many had direct financial 
interest in the fisheries that their Councils were responsible to manage and regulate 
(Eagle et al., 2003). Worse still, lager sized vessel/corporations had the financial 
capability to hire lobbyists that advocated their interests with Council members. 
Therefore, there was a significant risk that some interests were considered differently and 
were given more weight in the final decision. In turn, this led to inefficient regulation. On 
a broader level, potential conflicts of interest may have undermined Council integrity, 
which goes against the Nation's commitment to democratic and transparent decision-
making. 
The cause of inefficient regulation resides also in the lack of USCG authority. 
This point becomes even more salient when one considers that the government entity that 
enforces the regulations had little say in the design; the Coast Guard's influence was 
limited to recommendations that were chronically ignored. The power of special interests 
and persistent selfishness resulted in poor decisions that were politically impossible to 
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ignore (Secretarial Amendment 6). The worst policies were the ones influenced by 
interest groups who then ignored recommendations (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). 
The diagram (Figure 21) aims to illustrate the changes in conditions influencing 
interaction over time. For example, amongst the diminishing stock, to illustrate the 
increased in fishing capacity and regulation that prevented fishing. The interactional 
response to that change was resistance from fishermen that did not perceive the decline of 
stock predicted by the science. At first, they thought that regulation was not necessary 
only to later realize the seriousness of the situation. However, they still resisted the 
regulations that they perceived as constraining. The Council faced difficult compromises 
between the application of a series of Acts and the political pressure from fishermen and 
industries. 
The design of regulation and of framework adjustment in particular, reduced 
public participation opportunities. The negotiations were lengthy and the noncompliance 
rate high, to the detriment of the stock health. The consequences that resulted from that 
response were as follows: collapse of the resource, political pressure from court rulings, 
and the social and economical difficulties experienced by fishing communities. These 
consequences became conditions influencing the next interactional sequence. Court 
settlement prescribed a rebuilding time frame that necessitated severe regulation all at 
once. The use of indirect measures such as DAS and closures impacted fishing practices 
and the profitability of fishing and support industries, which in turn affected individuals, 
families and communities. The coping actions were limited by the broad and general 
conditions which bore upon action/interactional strategies, such as unbalanced influences 
212 
on decisions, conflicting policies, conflicts of interest, political pressure and resistance to 
regulation. 
How the model was used 
In order to understand the severity of the impacts related to Amendments 5 and 7, 
I looked at the context, general circumstances and facts surrounding the fishing industry 
prior 1990. To determine the plausibility of causal relationships, I acquired information 
on the context and the conjectural conditions. Identifying the stressor was the first step. 
The list of variables of social impact and social processes assembled in this research 
(methodology section) was used as a menu of possibilities to ease the identification of 
condition-consequences and their plausibility. I selected social processes and impacts 
associated with a particular topic and I grouped them by themes. I choose the variables by 
looking at individual and groups' traits and characteristics, and the triangulation of data 
was useful in this step. These characteristics influenced stakeholders' sensitivity to a 
change (stressor), the severity and likeliness of experiencing the change (exposure), and 
ways to cope with new situation (resilience). 
Sensitivities were determined by the type of change. Therefore, looking at the 
degree of exposure to a stressor, sensitivity to changes, and resiliency led to more 
thorough understanding of how a stressor acts to produce impacts, and thus helped in 
identifying processes and impact variables. These conclusions make examining the 
context and stakeholders' vulnerability an essential conceptual element in the choice of 
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variables and elaboration of causal scenarios. Together, this information made a 
compelling case for plausible predictions about which causal relations were likely to hold 
and which patterns of future events were likely to be observed. 
Causal diagrams were helpful to visualize the occurrence of possible impacts. The 
challenge was to simplify the diagrams in a manner that still captured the key causal 
relations. Figure 21 shows a large-scale overview of possible outcomes from regulatory 
process. The causal chain starts with the stressor: overfishing and the need being for more 
regulations. This it is then followed by various social processes that set conditions for 
further actions to occur, such as unbalanced influences on decisions, conflicting policies, 
conflicts of interest, political pressure and resistance to regulation. 
Different avenues: reflections after the facts 
There were many avenues to rebuild and prevent overfishing. In my opinion, the 
choices made were near-sighted and not in the interest of the greater good. As mentioned 
by a participant. 
That situation might have been created by the fact nothing was 
done to regulate the fisheries for 20 years at the time since the Magnusson 
act. With regulation earlier on, it could have been a very stable fishery 
with quite good income. They would have organized themselves around 
that set of regulation. But now you are trying to fix it after the fact. And 
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the only way you can fix it is by restricting people for what they did for 
the past 20 years. They are not going to like it (Personal Communication, 
Spring 2010) 
In my opinion, education was a key element to preventing overfishing. Elsewhere 
around the world, education is now the avenue not only to rebuild stocks but also to 
prevent overfishing (Norway, New Zealand). Prior to the Magnuson Act, fishermen were 
involved in cooperative research. They should have remained involved. They needed to 
understand the basics of the evolving science. Fishermen could have increased their 
knowledge about the technical aspects of their profession just as other professionals (e.g., 
physicians, architects) or businesses (e.g., airplane industry) did and still do. A long-term 
action plan such as a visioning program (University of New Hampshire Cooperative 
Extension Visioning Program) could have included a vision of the commercial 
groundfishing industry in 20 years. Fishery planning, like urban or transportation 
planning, could have improved the development of economic, social and built 
environments of fishing communities. It would have cost as much to educate fishermen 
about the science or prepare a long-term plan as all the federal aid packages and grants 
but, in the end, it would have yielded greater social dividends. Through being involved 
and knowing more about the science, the fishermen could have had a deeper 
understanding and more opportunities to contribute. However, I understand that the 
problem and the system are complex and this hypothesis alone may not have worked 
either. Complex problems need complex solutions. 
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FIFTH CHAPTER 
DISCUSSION ABOUT THE METHODOLOGY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Evaluating the method 
Theoretically, the application of this exploratory approach to SIA, in part or 
completely, is relatively feasible. The Council would benefit not only from knowing the 
potential impacts but from understanding how and why they are likely to emerge. The 
causal model diagrams would be helpful to that effect. Council members would also gain 
insight from other stakeholders' perspectives about the acceptability of changing 
regulations and fishing practices. By looking at various points of view, more stakeholder 
groups could have an input into management. In practice, the list of variables could be 
best used for three stages of the SIA process : the scoping process, projection and the 
analysis. 
The amendment process includes a first step -"scoping"- to determine the extent 
and significance of ecological, economic, and social issues to be addressed. People who 
may be impacted can contribute at Council meetings and share their concerns regarding 
the future actions/plan. This information is often not enough to predict the full range of 
impacts, but it can be complemented with what it is said in newspapers, in magazines and 
'off the record' through informal consultations with stakeholder representatives including 
commercial and recreational fishermen, the support industry, USCG, scientists, 
20
 Typical stages in the SIA process: 1. Scoping; 2. Formulation of alternative; 3. Profiling community; 4. 
Projection of impacts; 5. Assessment; 6. Evaluation; 7. Mitigation; 8. Monitoring; 9. Ex-post audit (Barrow 
2000). And FMP/amendment and NEPA processes is described in Reviewing Environmental Impact 
Statements for Fishery Management Plans (EPA, 2005). 
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environmentalists, and policy analysts. Based on this information, the assessor can use 
the list of variables to choose which indicators to study and what would be the 
appropriate environmental review document to support the amendment (i.e., EIS/SEIS, 
EA, or CE). This rapid assessment can also be conducted for Framework Adjustments. 
Second, alternative management measures addressing the identified fishery 
problems/issues are drafted. Building on the scoping results, the assessor can use the 
diagram model to make projections of what it is likely to happen for each proposed 
alternative. For example, two scenarios of restrictive measures can be compared, as 
shown in Figures 22 and 23. The analysis can examine short-as well as long-term 
projections (Figures 15 and 16) 
Third, the draft document goes for public review and comments. There, the social 
impacts of each management action alternative are assessed based on public comments. 
The strength of the method is demonstrated here through its use of accurate impact 
variables supported by evidence from a range of sources. This combination can validate 
the plausibility of impact scenarios. Establishing plausibility along with determining the 
level of vulnerability may provide information on the probability of occurrence. At this 
point, the causal model can visually demonstrate how and why impacts emerge different 
from or similar to one alternative or another. It offers transparency about whom is 
included and how the SIA is carried out. This may ease the identification of missing 
components, and it may be useful in showing where to intervene in the causal chain. 
The written report and presentations would benefit from the causal model diagram 
for three practical reasons. Many people in our society prefer visual communication 
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styles as opposed to auditory and kinesthetic. They understand information better when it 
is presented in the form of charts, graphs and 
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tables. As mentioned by Council members, reports and meetings contain a lot of 
information and are often lengthy. Synthesized and visual information may therefore be 
'digested' more easily. 
However, this approach was not tested on New England fishing communities. 
Rather, the model was built as academic research and tested on a case study. Advance 
knowledge of the status offish stocks and the faith of the industry facilitated the 
identification of variables and causality. Hence, the question resides in how to integrate 
and practically use the model within the current management process in New England. 
This is an important point, as SIA are not always conducted by the same assessors. SIA 
are managed by the Council and are the responsibility of the Council's plan development 
teams and the personnel on these teams vary from plan to plan; as a result, how the work 
is actually executes differs, and SIA may be performed by Council staff, NMFS staff or a 
consultant. 
Recently, the risk-based approach to the Rapid Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) 
method has been evaluated (see page 35 for more information on the method (Tuler, 
Webler et al., 2008a; Tuler et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Lessons learned from testing 
their method on three New England fishing communities provide information pertinent to 
this study. The evaluation was based on five criteria: salience, credibility, legitimacy, 
transferability, and cost-effectiveness. The first three criteria are important in creating 
believable, trusted, relevant, fair and representative information (Cash, Clark, Alcock, 
Dickson, & Jager, 2002). Transferability and cost-effectiveness are also important 
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considerations for public administration. Not all RVA lessons learned are applicable to 
this methodology for theoretical reasons; RVA provides a framework to gather routine 
social, economic, and cultural information about vulnerabilities of individuals, groups or 
community, while SIA provides a methodology to identify and characterize the likely 
future impact for those affected by a proposed action, from individuals to entire societal 
systems. Yet credibility, salience and cost-effectiveness are potential shortcomings of 
both methods. 
Credibility comes into question as sensitivities, responses, and cause-and-effect 
relationships are identified by researchers. These attributes can be subject to much debate 
in cases where the plausibility of causal relationships is not supported by evidence. 
Moreover, the relevance of variables may need clarification or may indicate that the issue 
is not well understood. However, the authors suggest that interviews or secondary data 
complement evidence and provide the further information necessary to identify accurate 
variables. At the same time, salience depends on the analysis and findings, which are 
sensitive to whom is interviewed. Thus, the authors suggest that the objectives of the 
study should be clear with respect to which participants and communities are of interest. 
In addition, the data should be triangulated with secondary data from other studies about 
the place or community. 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, RVA as SIA are time-consuming, and such 
laborious studies are expensive. Thus, proper execution could necessitate enhancing staff 
capacity and resources to meet time requirements as well as to be responsive to council 
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needs. Unfortunately, NMFS resource allocation for this type of assessment is low 
relative to stock assessments. Moreover, the Paperwork Reduction Act further delays the 
process, as data collection must be approved by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB); the agency must justify surveys in terms of time and money. However, NMFS 
still has the mandate to consider social, economic and cultural factors in fisheries 
management, and data is required. RVS may fulfill the need for data, but since the 
method does not intend to predict impacts, an SIA remains requisite. Amidst this tension, 
though, the authors highlight two positive points that would benefit SIA. First, RVAs 
may be used as a guide to routinely gather relevant data. If data is collected on a regular 
basis, SIA could focus on more critical variables relevant to a particular amendment. 
Second, the time needed to gather data and analyze findings likely decreases as 
researchers gain experience. This point is also valid for SIA. Consequently, experienced 
staff and readily accessible, relevant data may accelerate the assessment process and 
reduce long-term costs. 
Still, the causal model diagram and the list of variables present their own 
shortcomings. First, the list will always remain incomplete because the number of social 
processes and impacts is potentially infinite and varies according to context. As I was 
documenting the case study, I encountered more and more important variables that were 
not included in the original list. The best approach to addressing this concern would be to 
have an online list based on an openly editable model; for example a 'wikilist.' Like 
Wikipedia, the list could be hosted and managed by an international organization, such as 
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the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), which could provide 
editorial administration and oversight. 
The proposed list would include variables that are costly and difficult, if not 
impossible to accurately measure (e.g. aspiration for future life). But including these 
variables in the causal model along with easily measured variables can support causal 
hypotheses. I found that identifying the best variables was not an easy task but interviews 
combined with other data sources were helpful in pinpointing the accurate impact. I 
found newspapers, magazines and written comments very helpful in identifying all the 
possible impacts and processes used to build the list. The interviews added or validated 
some variables while highlighting other erroneous and inaccurate variables. 
The causal diagram represents only one thread of the web. Many diagrams 
representing different points of view are necessary to represent the reality they intended 
to model. Simplification of causality may be informative if it focuses on plausible 
processes and impacts that are documented with evidence, and this approach might be 
adequate to illustrate visions of proposed amendment alternatives. Perception versus 
reality is to be taken into consideration and triangulation of data may help to that effect. 
Politics, though, plays an important role in determining regulations and negotiations 
amongst groups. For example, fishermen that fish with otter trawls experience different 
impacts than those who fish with gillnets. Thus, illustrating how each group is impacted 
adds transparency. Showing their limits of action in term of resiliency and political 
influence might reduce the manifestation of preconceived ideas and perceptions of hidden 
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agendas. In other words, the model can show what can be done. However, this might be 
useless if the diagram aims to capture all there is to know about changes to a fishing 
community. On the other hand, through over-simplification, important information may 
be missed. In reality, impacts may be caused or affected by many external factors. 
Reaching a consensus that characterizes the causal relationship may be a challenge and 
can stall negotiations. 
Finally, this method does not address all problems with SIA. Certainly the choices 
regarding the 'right approach' and the analytical tools to be used can be imposed by 
agency or made as a function of available rather than in situ data, and thus monetary 
resources play a large role. The need to be on-site is an obstacle and any methods 
involving interviews and qualitative data analysis require experienced consultants. 
However, issues of incompetent professionals and low administrative budgets pertain not 
only to SIA but also to other professions and organizations. 
Conclusions 
For over 400 years, New England has been identified with groundfishing for both 
its economical and cultural importance. Many coastal communities take pride in their 
fishing heritage, but for an industry that has experienced rapid transformations in the past 
35 years21 in the midst of global social changes, it is difficult to pinpoint which social and 
cultural features should be considered in SIA. These pressures are more acutely felt by 
21
 The industry has been in constant change for the past century with the introduction of steam boat; later 
with the coming of large trawlers; regulations and science have tried to cope with the ups and downs of the 
stocks. 
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this specific community because fishermen are affected by the 'shifting baseline 
syndrome' (Pauly, 1995); each subsequent generation of fishermen accepts as a baseline 
the stock and fish size caught at the beginning of their careers, and uses this as a 
reference to evaluate changes. When the next generation of fishermen starts fishing, there 
are more juvenile and fewer mature fish, as the stocks further decline. Yet the stock and 
the fish at that time serve as a new baseline. There is thus a gradual shift of the baseline 
perception of the disappearance of the resource. This shift of the baseline perception also 
occurs when the time comes to evaluate the cultural and social changes in the fishing 
communities. As coastal populations grow and the number of fishermen diminishes, it is 
difficult to set a sociological baseline from which to make comparisons regarding the 
subtle impacts of an amendment or framework adjustment on a specific subgroup of 
resource users (i.e., groundfishermen). It is even more difficult to document changes 
resulting from framework adjustments because such actions are considered according to 
the law to have either no significant impact or the same impact as the previous 
amendment. And this is not to mention the political context and the complex social 
identity of fishermen. 
This research focuses on how stakeholders' perspectives and understanding of 
social impact influence decision processes. Understanding stakeholders' comprehension 
of social impacts provides information as to how they weigh these impacts against others 
when making decisions. Multiple perspectives on management actions provide insight on 
the likely success of implementation, and allow for regulation refinement. Moreover, 
sharing and recognizing the legitimacy of a variety of perspectives enhances everyone's 
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understanding of social impacts. Finally, the way stakeholders influence or are influenced 
by management decisions provides information on the use or development of 
methodologies successful at assessing social impacts and communicating the results. 
Social impact assessment has been an important process in preventing and 
mitigating impacts arising in various contexts, from a single project (e.g., gas pipeline) to 
the ongoing process of regulating renewable resources. During the last two decades, 
social scientists reached a consensus on the methods and tools used to identify and 
predict impacts. Once the principles and guidelines were established, few researchers 
(Burdge & Vanclay, 1996; Vanclay, 2002a) have challenged their relevance, accuracy 
and relationship to predictions made, or how they are used in decision-making. 
In response, one objective of this thesis was to enquire and develop an SIA 
approach that could capture and integrate multiple stakeholders' perspectives in 
predicting impacts from management actions. The approach is based on the premise that 
SIA guidelines including the one published by Interorganizational Committee on 
Principles and Guidelines for Social Impact Assessment (1994 & 2003) are inaccurate for 
fundamental and practical reasons. The fundamental reasons include an inaccurate 
definition of'social impact' as used to measure consequences for individuals, groups and 
communities. Therefore, the guidelines that use generic lists of variables do not have the 
precision to consider the indirect and interactive effects of complex and interactive, 
societal and environmental systems. The complexity of fisheries management 
necessitated a method that would simplify the understanding of social and environmental 
interactions. 
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One objective of this research is to fulfill that need realistically. The exploratory 
approach to SIA aims to expose the components of those relationships which may help to 
explain why two communities may experience very different social impacts. The ability 
to predict changes before they happen helps people prepare for, mitigate, and perhaps 
even prevent unwanted changes. This implies that it is possible to design regulations that 
take into account people's vulnerability to negative impacts because it is easier to plan 
management interventions that stop overfishing than their consequences. Moreover, by 
intervening earlier in the causal chain, it becomes possible to identify potential problems 
that could significantly impede the efficiency of a proposed regulation. Clearly there is 
considerable scope for additional research as to how the method could be practically used 
to inform fisheries management, including evaluating and testing the method by and for 
the institutions for which it might serve it a purpose. 
Rigorous research methods are important in the current political environment, 
particularly as policy makers seek answers to pressing questions about pollution, 
economic and social impacts, and the health of stock. The exploratory approach to Social 
Impact Assessment increases transparency and legitimates stakeholders' perspectives 
because "public policy responds to perceptions as much as it does to reality, and the 
values and norms that shape expectation and influence perception are central to our 
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Standard-Times (New Bedford) 
The Boston Globe 
Gloucester Daily Times 
The Patriot Ledger (Quincy) 
Sunday Telegram (Worcester) 








Portland Press Herald 
Bangor Daily News 
Maine Times (Bath) 
Hampshire 
The Portsmouth Herald 
The Union Leader (Manchester) 
Rhode Island 
o Providence Journal-Bulletin 







Environment and Energy Daily 
The Associated Press 
The New York Times 
Journal of Commerce 
Greenwire 
United Press International 







Table 13. Council's meeting minutes for the Groundfish committee for 1996 
and January 1997. 
Meeting 
January 10, 1996 
January 11, 1996 
January 25, 1996 
January 26, 1996 
February 27, 1996 
February 28, 1996 
April 17, 1996 
April 18, 1996 
June 5, 1996 
June 6, 1996 
July 17, 1996 
July 18, 1996 
August 21, 1996 
August 22, 1996 
Special Meeting 
September 9, 1996 
October 2, 1996 
October 3, 1996 
November 6, 1996 
November7, 1996 
December 11, 1996 
December 12, 1996 
January 16, 1997 
January 29, 1997 
January 30, 1997 
Transcribed 
Partial transcript - 10 pages 
January 25, 4:00 pm 
Complete transcript - 295 pages 
-Groundfish committee starting April 18 
at 10:15AM 
Complete transcript - 186 pages 
- Closure starting June 5, 10:10AM 
- Buyback, June 5, 10 pages 
Partial transcript - 16 pages 
- Closures starting July 17, 1:30PM 
Complete transcript - 208 pages 
- Framework adjustment 1 9 - 2 pages 
-Groundfish committees starting August 
21,1:30PM 
Complete transcript - 199 pages 
- Groundfish committee starting October 
2, 10:15 AM 
Complete transcript - 164 pages 
-Groundfish committee starting 
November 7, 9:30 AM 
Complete transcript - 161 pages 
-Groundfish committee starting December 
11, 10:10 AM 
Complete transcript - 429 pages 
- Groundfish committee starting January 
16,9:05AM 
Complete transcript -751 pages 








starting at 9:30AM -
tape 1 
Not access to tapes or 
transcripts 
Table 14. Public hearing for Amendment 7 to the Northeast 
Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan 
Date - Time 
Tuesday, September 19, 1995 
9:00 AM 
Wednesday, September 20, 1995 
2:00 PM 
Thursday, September 21, 1995 
1:00 PM 
Friday, September 22, 1995 
2:00 PM 
Monday, September 25, 1995 
7:00 PM 
Tuesday, September 26, 1995 
7:30 PM 
Wednesday, September 27, 1995 
1:00 PM 
Thursday, September 28, 1995 
12:30 PM 
Friday, September 29, 1995 
12:30 PM 
Place - transcript 
Gloucester, Massachusetts 
Partial transcript - 17 pages 
Hyannis, Massachusetts 
Partial transcript - 7 pages 
Fairhaven, Massachusetts 
Partial transcript - 6 pages 
South Kingston, Rhode Island 
Partial transcript - 5 pages 
Toms River, New Jersey 
Partial transcript - 2 pages 
Riverhead, New York 
Partial transcript - 3 pages 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire 
Partial transcript - 4 pages 
Ellsworth. Maine 
Partial transcript - 3 pages 
Portland, Maine 
Partial transcript - 7 pages 
Table 15. Written comments for Amendment 7 to the Northeast 
Multispecies Fisheries Management Plan 
Groups 
Commercial fishermen 




Recreational fishermen associations/clubs 
Charter/party boats 




Other (e.g., USCG, other fisheries Councils) 
Number of letters 









79 (31 letters used template 
from environmental groups) 
17 
Table 16. Interviews (8) conducted for Interpersonal Dynamics of 
Interdisciplinary Research Among Participants of the Western Gulf 
of Maine Closure Area Monitoring Project (Spring 2008) 






















































Appendix B: Website used to inform and recruit participants 
What will your 
participation involve? 
If you are interested in 
participating, please contact the 
project coordinator to set up an 
appointment. The interviews will 
be done in a place of your choice 
and will take about an hour of 
your time. 
The interviews will be 
conducted between February and 
May 2010 in English, 
Portuguese, Italian or French. 
We will ask you to talk about 
your recollections of your life at 
the time of amendments 5 and 7 
of the Northeast Multispecies 
Management Plan. 
Confidentiality 
You will have the choice of 
disclosing your name or 
remaining anonymous. If you 
decide not to disclose your 
name, only your occupation will 
be mentioned. You will also 
have the choice of archiving the 
recording of your interview in 
the database "Voices from the 
Fisheries" which is accessible to 
the general public through a 
website. 
To Participate or for more 
information contact: Fabienne 
Lord by phone (603) 988-5853 
or email. 
About this project 
This project is part of a doctoral dissertation project at the University of New 
Hampshire. The research is not funded by any public or private organizations. 
The results of this study do not have any political agenda. Looking at your 
personal stories within the local context will provide us with the perspective to 
examine environmental policy issues at a national level. Your interviews are 
essential information complementing an extensive analysis of public 
documents, reports and other sources of material. A better understanding of the 
changes in the New England fishing industry over time may clarify the social 
dynamics of resource use, as well as the social consequences of management 
tools used to address such issues. 
Overview 
The groundfish fishery in New England has experienced significant social, 
economic and ecological transformations over the past 20 years. The 
documentation of these changes includes facts and perceptions, both of which 
are important. Regardless of whether you are a fisherman, manager, scientist, 
or enforcement officer, your experiences will help illuminate the complex 
socio-ecological interactions that have taken place during this period. Your 
interviews will offer us a glimpse into your lives, work, families, and 
communities. This project is even more important and timely given the future 
use of catch shares and closures. Your experience will help identify what is 
important to you. 
Background 
During the 1990s, the New England groundfish fisheries went from being fully 
exploited to overexploited. A combination of factors including new technology, 
changes in species abundance, marketing for popular and new species, major 
policy changes and fluctuating economy contributed to overfishing. The 
problem of overfishing and regulation grew to be immensely complicated as 
the paperwork, science, terminology, time delays and enforcement became a 
burden for managers. It also became difficult for fishermen to cope with new 
regulations. Everybody has been impacted in different ways by the decline of 
the groundfish fishing industry. The industry changes have altered the 
community and social dynamics forever. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The goal of this project is to document and describe the collapse of the 
groundfishing industry in the 1990s; and the social impact of overfishing and 
the associated management actions (i.e., Amendment 5 (1994) and Amendment 
7 (1996) to the Northeast Multispecies Management Plan. 
We are interested in interviewing 
• Fishermen and former fishermen (speaking English, Portuguese, 
Italian, or French) 
• Fishermen's wives or family members 
• Employees working in the support industry (supply, processing plan) 
• National Marine Fishery Service staff 
• Scientists 
• Council members 
• Environmentalists 
• Local staff and federally elected officials 
• U.S. Coast Guard personnel 
• NGO personnel 
• Social services personnel 
• Journalists 
The project summary is also available in French, Italian and Portuguese: 
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Documentazione del crollo del settore della pesca commerciale del Groundfish del New England, tramite 
interviste con personale legate all'industria nel decennio 1990-2000. 
"La comprensione della dimensione umana, la sua storia e il suo aspetto scientifico, che ha 
influenzato il stock di pesce, i pescatori e le decisioni di gestione e un passo necessario per 
armonizzare la pesca commerciale con l'ecosistema". 
Autore sconosciuto 
Qual e lo scopo di questo studio? 
Questo progetto di ricerca documents e descrive il crollo del settore della pesca commerciale del 
Groundfish negli anni '90 (amendments 5 and 7 di Northeast Multispecies Management Plan), e Pinpatto di 
questo crollo su: 
I pescatori e i pescatori pensionati (di lingua inglese, francese, portoghese o italiano) 
Le mogli e le famiglie dei pescatori 
I lavoratori occupati nei settori secondari e terziari (commercianti di pesce, il trasporto, la 
trasformazione dei frutti di mare) 
1 dipendenti di NMFS 
Gli scienziati 
I membri del Council 
Gli ambientalisti 
II personale sia dei leader locali che quelli federali eletti 
II personale della US Coast Guard 
I dipendenti delle organizzazioni non governative (ONG) 
I servizi sociali personali 
I giornalisti 
L'industria della pesca del Groundfish nel New England ha subito notevoli trasformazioni sociali, 
economiche ed ecologiche nel corso degli ultimi vent'anni. La documentazione dei fatti e delle opinioni e 
fondamentale per capire questi cambiamenti. Propongo, per documentare questo processo, di condurre delle 
intreviste con i membri delle professioni elencate sopra. L'esperienza individuale sia dei pescatori che dei 
funzionari del governo o degli scienziati servira ad illuminare le complesse dinamiche socio-ecologiche di questo 
periodo. La Sua intervista mi dara un panorama della Sua vita, del Suo lavoro, della Sua famiglia e della Sua 
comunita. Questo studio e importante ed attuale, dato l'uso futuro delle catch shares e closures. La Sua esperienza 
ci sara utile per identificare cio che e importante per lei. 
Qual e il Suo coinvolgimento 
Se e interessata a partecipare al progetto, Le pregherei di contattare il coordinatore del progetto per 
fissare un appuntamento. Le interviste verranno condotte a Sua convenienza e in un luogo a Sua scelta. Ci vorra 
circa un'ora per completare l'intervista, la quale verra registrata per assicurare l'esattezza delle trascrizioni. Le 
interviste saranno condotte tra febbraio e maggio del 2010 in inglese, portoghese, italiano o francese. 
Nell'intervista parleremo dei Suoi ricordi e delle Sue esperienze quando sono stati variati gli amendments 5 
(1994) e 7 (1996) di Northeast Multispecies Management Plan. 
Privacy 
Puo scegliere di rivelare il proprio nome o di rimanere anonimo. Se sceglie di non rivelare il proprio 
nome, solo la Sua professione verra menzionata. Puo anche scegliere di archiviare la registrazione del colloquio 
nel database Voices from the Fisheries da NOAA/NMFS che e accessibile al pubblico attraverso un sito web. Se 
preferisce la privacy, la registrazione del Suo intervento rimarra riservata. 
(http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/voicesfrornthefisheries/). 
Su questo progetto 
Questo progetto fa parte di una tesi di dottorato presso la University of New Hampshire. Questa ricerca 
non e finanziata da qualsiasi organizzazione pubblica o privata e le sue conclusioni non sono motivate 
politicamente. Le esperienze personali nel contesto locale ci fornira una prospettiva diversa che aiutera all'analisi 
della politica ambientale a livello nazionale. La compilazione delle interviste e un'informazione essenziale e 
complementare alia piu ampia revisione dei documenti pubblici e delle relazioni scritte. Una comprensione 
migliore dei cambiamenti nel settore della pesca nel New England potrebbe chiarire le dinamiche sociali di 
sfruttamento delle risorse naturali e le conseguenze dei regolamenti utilizzati per rendere la loro gestione. 
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Documentacao do colapso da indiistria de pesca comercial de Groundfish na Nova Inglaterra, atraves de 
entrevistas com pessoas relacionadas com a indiistria nos anos 1990-2000. 
"Entender as dimens5es humanas, historicas, cientificas que influenciaram o peixe, os Pescadores e as 
decisoes de gestao e urn passo necessario para harmonizar a pesca comercial com o ecossistema". 
Autor desconhecido 
Qual e o proposito deste estudo? 
Este projeto de pesquisa documenta e descreve o colapso da indiistria da pesca comercial de Groundfish na 
decada de 1990 (Amendment 5 e Amendment 7 no Northeast Multispecies Management Plan) e seu impacto 
sobre: 
• Os Pescadores e os Pescadores aposentados (que falam Ingles, Frances, Portugues ou Italiano) 
• Esposas de Pescadores ou familia 
• Os empregados que trabalham no sector secundario e terciario (comerciantes de peixe, transporte, 
processamento de frutos do mar) 
• Funcionarios da NMFS 
• Cientistas 
• Os membros do Council 
• Ambientalistas 
• Empregados dos dirigentes locais e eleitos federais 
• Funcionarios da US Coast Guard 
• Funcionarios de organiza9oes nao governamentais (ONG) 
• Pessoal dos Servi90s Sociais 
• Jornalistas 
Ao longo dos liltimos 20 anos, a indiistria da pesca comercial de groundfish experimentou 
transforma9oes sociais, econdmicas e ecologicas. A documenta9ao de fatos e perspectivas e essencial para a 
compreensao dessas mudan9as. Se voce e um pescador, um funcionario do governo, cientista ou agente da 
autoridade, suas experiencias servirao para iluminar a dinamica socio-ecologica complexa desse periodo. Sua 
entrevista oferece-nos uma visao geral da sua vida, seu trabalho, sua familia e sua comunidade, sendo possivel 
identificarmos o importante para voce. Este estudo e importante e atual, dada a utiliza9ao futura de catch shares e 
closures. 
Qual e o seu envolvimento? 
Se voce deseja participar deste estudo, por favor contacte o coordenador do projeto para marcar uma 
entrevista de uma hora em ingles, portugues, trances ou italiano e onde voce escolher. Entrevistaremos entre 
Fevereiro e Maio de 2010, com grava9ao para garantir exatidao de transcri9ao. Pe90-lhe que lembre de sua vida 
no momenta das altera9oes (amendments 5 1994 and 7 e 1996) do Northeast Multispecies Management Plan. 
Confidencialidade 
Voce optara por divulgar seu nome ou mante-lo no anonimato com somente sua ocupa9ao mencionada. 
Voce tambem tera a op9ao de arquivar a grava9ao da sua entrevista no banco de dados Voices from the Fisheries 
NOAA / NMFS que esta disponivel ao publico atraves de um website 
(http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/voicesfromthefisheries/). Preferindo a confidencialidade, a grava9&o de sua 
entrevista sera mantida privada. 
Sobre este projeto 
Este projeto faz parte de uma tese de doutorado na Universidade de New Hampshire. Esta pesquisa nao 
e financiada por qualquer entidade publica ou privada e as suas conclusoes nao tern motivos politicos. A suas 
experiencias pessoais no contexto local ira fornecer-nos uma perspectiva diferente que ajudara na analise da 
politica ambiental a nivel nacional. A compila9ao de entrevistas e uma informa9ao essencial e complementar a 
analise mais ampla de documentos piiblicos e relatorios escritos. Uma compreensao melhor das mudan9as na 
indiistria da pesca poderia esclarecer a dinamica social ligada a explora9ao dos recursos naturais e as 
consequencias dos regulamentos usados para fazer a sua gestao. 
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Documentation de l'effondrement de la peche commerciale de Groundfish en Nouvelle Angleterre au 
moyen d'entrevues 
« La comprehension de la dimension humaine, de son historique et de son aspect scientifique, qui a 
influence les stocks de peche, les pecheurs et les decisions concernant leurs gestions, est une etape 
necessaire afin d'harmoniser la peche et son ecosysteme ». 
Auteur inconnu 
Quel est le but de cette recherche? 
Ce projet de recherche a pour but de documenter et de decrire l'effondrement de l'industrie de la peche 
commerciale de Groundfish dans les annees 1990 (l'amendement 5 et l'amendement 7 au Northeast 
Multispecies Management Plan), et son impact sur : 
• Pecheurs et anciens pecheurs (parlant anglais, fran9ais, portugais ou italien) 
• Epouses de pecheurs ou membres de la famille 
• Employes travaillant dans l'industrie secondaire et tertiaire (mareyeurs, transport, transformation des 
produits de la mer) 
• Fonctionnaires au NMFS 
• Scientifiques 
• Membres du Council 
• Environnementalistes 
• Personnel des dirigeants locaux et elus federaux 
• Personnel des US Coast Guard 
• Personnel d'organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) 
• Personnel des services sociaux 
• Journalistes 
Au cours des 20 dernieres annees, l'industrie de la peche commerciale de groundfish a connu des 
changements sociaux, economiques et ecologiques fondamentaux. La documentation de faits et de differentes 
perspectives est essentielle a la comprehension de ces changements. Peu importe si vous etes un pecheur, un 
fonctionnaire gouvernemental, un scientifique, ou un garde-peche, vos experiences serviront a eclairer la 
dynamique complexe socio-ecologique de cette periode. Votre entrevue nous offrira un aper9u global de votre 
vie, de votre travail, de votre vie familiale et de votre communaute. Cette etude est importante et actuelle compte 
tenu de la future mise en vigueur des catch shares et closures. Votre experience nous sera utile afin d'identifier 
qu'est-ce qui est important pour vous. 
En quoi consiste votre participation 
Si vous desirez participer a cette etude, s'il-vous-plait contactez la coordinatrice du projet afin de 
prendre rendez-vous pour une entrevue d'une heure en anglais, portugais, fran9ais ou italien. L'entrevue aura lieu 
dans un endroit de votre choix. Les entrevues auront lieux entre fevrier et mai 2010 et seront enregistrees afin 
d'assurer l'exactitude de la transcription. Pendant l'entrevue, je vous demanderai de parler de votre vie au 
moment de l'amendement 5 (1994) et l'amendement 7 (1996) au Northeast Multispecies Management Plan. 
Confidentialite 
Vous aurez le choix de divulguer votre nom ou de demeurer anonyme. Si vous decidez de ne pas 
divulguer votre nom, alors seulement votre occupation sera mentionnee. Vous aurez aussi le choix d'archiver 
l'enregistrement de votre entrevue dans la base de donnees Voices from the Fisheries de NOAA/NMFS qui est 
accessible au grand public via un site internet. Si vous preferez la confidentialite, l'enregistrement de votre 
entrevue sera disponible que pour cette recherche, (http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/voicesfromthefisheries/). 
A propos de ce projet 
Ce projet est fait dans le cadre d'un doctorat a l'University of New Hampshire. Cette recherche n'est 
pas financee par aucun organisme public ou prive et ses resultats n'ont pas de motifs politiques sous-jacents. 
L'analyse de vos experiences personnelles et leurs contextes donnera une perspective autre qui nous permettra 
d'examiner les politiques nationales environnementales. La compilation de vos entrevues est une information 
essentielle et complementaire a l'analyse plus large de documents publics et de rapports ecrits. Une meilleure 
comprehension des changements dans l'industrie de la peche en Nouvelle-Angleterre pourrait clarifier les 
dynamiques sociales d'exploitation de ressources naturelles, ainsi que les consequences liees aux reglements 
utilises pour en faire leurs gestions. 
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Anonymity Status of Interview Subject: 
Specific Interviewee Instructions: 
Introduction: 
This project concentrates on documenting perspectives on New England fishing 
industry in the 1990s. In these years, the New England groundfish fisheries went from 
being fully exploited to overexploited. A combination of factors including new 
technology, changes in species abundance, marketing for popular and new species, major 
changes in policy initiatives and in economy contributed to overfishing. Fishermen faced 
unprecedented low stocks of groundfish. The industry shrank in regional importance and 
struggled to maintain historical fishing communities all along the coast of New England. 
The groundfish stock kept declining and the regulation kept increasing. The problem 
grew to be immensely complicated as the paperwork, science, terminology, time delays 
and enforcement became a burden for the task force. Some people have been involved in 
the fishery rebuilding effort, while others have left the industry. However everybody has 
been impacted in different ways by the decline of the fishing industry. I are interviewing 
fishermen, employee from the support industry, regulators, council members, 
environmentalists, congress staff, US coast guard personnel, national marine fishery 
service staff, scientists, and journalists. By documenting your experience, I hope to 
identify trends in changes and common impacts themes in communities, families and 





1) Where were you born? 
2) What do you do for a living? 
a) Fishermen 
b) Other (go to question 7) 
Fishermen 
3) Where were you fishing during the 90's? 
4) During the 1990s, where did you fish out of? What type of fishing did you do? 
5) Are you from a fishing family? 
a) Have you ever fished with family members? 
6) Has fishing always been your primary source of work or have you had other jobs? 
(go to question 7) 
Manager, environmentalist, scientist, enforcement officer, staff agency, employee support 
industry 
I) Were you born around here? 
8) During the 1990s, where did you work? 
9) In general, what is (was?) the relationship between your work and fishery 
management? 
Impacts 
10) What do you remember about Amendment 5, implemented in 1994? 
a) Possible questions to direct the interviewee: 
i) How were you impacted? 
ii) How did you cope with the situation? 
Hi) How these years changed your life? 
iv) Do you still feel the consequences today? 
II) What do you remember about Amendment 7, implemented in 1996? 
a) Possible questions to direct the interviewee: 
i) How were you impacted? 
ii) How did you cope with the situation? 
Hi) How these years changed your life? 
iv) Do you still feel the consequences today? 
12) What is your perception of the present fishing industry? 
13) Any other thoughts or comments you would like to share? 
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Appendix E: Consent form 
Documenting the collapse of the New England groundfishing industry through 
stakeholder interviews 
What is the purpose of this study? 
This research focuses on documenting the collapse of the New England fishing industry in 1990s, 
reconstructing a timeline of events and documenting the impacts on fishermen, employees from the support 
industry, regulators, council members, environmentalists, congress staff, US coast guard personnel, 
national marine fishery service staff, scientists, and journalists. 
What does your participation in this study involve? 
The interviews are part of a doctoral research project at the University of New Hampshire. The 
interviews are essential information complementing an extensive analysis of public documents, reports and 
other sources of material. Through your participation, I hope to get a better understanding of what you have 
experienced. 
I will be asking you to talk about your recollections of your life at the time of amendment 5 and 7 
of the northeast multispecies management plan. The interview will take approximately an hour of your time 
and will be tape recorded. Please understand that your participation in this research is entirely voluntary 
and you do not have to answer any or all of the questions if you so choose. There are no cost, no 
compensations and physical risks associated with your participation in this study. Our ultimate goal is to 
use the information for documenting the collapse of New England fishing industry and understand how it 
impacted stakeholders. 
How will the confidentiality of your interview be protected? 
Disclosing your name 
The recording of the interview will be used for a doctoral research at the University of New 
Hampshire. Your interview will only be partially transcribed and might not be available for review. If you 
decide to participate in this research, you have the choice of disclosing your name or not. Upon your 
agreement, your name will be disclosed while citing your story in the dissertation, presentation, and 
publications. If you decide not to disclose your name, only your occupation will be mentioned (e.g., 
fishermen, manager, congress staff). 
Archiving your interview 
You may choose to archive the recording of your interview in the database Voices from the 
Fisheries (http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/voicesfromthefisheries/). The purpose of this database is to collect 
and archive audio and video-recorded oral history interviews related to commercial, recreational, and 
subsistence fishing in the United States and its territories. The database is housed on NOAA/NMFS servers 
and is accessible to the public through a website. These oral histories and related materials serve as a record 
of the US commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisheries and as a scholarly and educational resource 
for NOAA and the general public. 
If you choose confidentiality, the recording of your interview will be kept private and will not be 
archived on the Voices from the Fisheries database. Subsequent to the analysis of the interviews, the hard-
copy transcript or computer files will remain protected. 
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Whom to contact if you have questions about this study 
If you have any questions pertaining to the research you can contact the following 
individuals to discuss them. 
Fabienne Lord Dr. Robert Robertson 
PhD Candidate Associate Professor 
Dept. of Natural Resources, UNH Dept. of Natural Resources, UNH 
fyh2@unh.edu Rob.Robertson@unh.edu 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you can contact Julie 
Simpson in the UNH Office of Sponsored Research, 603-862-2003 or e-mail her at 
Julie.simpson@unh.edu to discuss them. 
Statement of Consent: 
I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked. 
I, CONSENT/AGREE to participate 
in this research study. 
D I authorize disclosure of my name. 
• I do not authorize disclosure of my name, only my occupation will be mentioned. 
And 
• I want the audio recording of my interview to be archived in the database Voices from the 
Fisheries (NOAA/NMFS). I give permission to researchers and the public to use the 
audio recording my interview for educational purposes including publications, 
exhibitions, World Wide Web, and presentations. 
D I do not want the audio recording of my interview to be archived in the database Voices 
from the Fisheries (NOAA/NMFS). The recording and partial transcripts will be kept 
protected. 
Signature Interviewee Date 
Signature of the interviewer Date 
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Appendix F: Abstracts of articles using similar methodologies published in 
peer-reviewed journals 
Lord, F. (2011). Understanding social impacts by using new variables and causal model 
diagram in New England Fisheries. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 29(1), 59-
68. 
Abstract: This paper reviews the applicability of the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) 
process within the framework of US national environmental policy used in New England 
fishery management. Its aim is to develop a new approach to SIA that goes beyond 
identifying impacts through guidelines, to include an understanding and portrayal of 
causality and emergent relationships. The emphasis is on creating a new list of variables 
identifying social impacts and social change processes. These variables are used in a 
causal chain model to diagrammatically portray impact dynamics over time and scale. 
This approach intends to fulfill a need for an accurate and timely methodology used in 
fishery management to identify potential social impacts of management actions, in order 
to achieve ecological and socioeconomic sustainability. 
Lord, F., Tuler, S., Webler, T., & Dow, K. (2011). Human dimensions of the Bouchard-
120 oil spill in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts. Journal of Environmental Assessment 
Policy and Management, Accepted Jun 02, 2011. 
Abstract: Technological hazards research and oil spill contingency planning are giving 
greater attention to human dimension impacts resulting from oil spills and spill response. 
We introduce a framework to understanding processes leading to the social distribution of 
impacts using concepts from hazard and vulnerability assessment and apply it to the 
Bouchard-120 oil spill in Buzzards Bay, MA. Our assessment covers the spill, emergency 
response, clean-up, damage assessment, and long-term recovery. This approach 
demonstrates that the spill influenced a variety of human activities and, by acting upon 
these, produced a range of positive and negative impacts on people and institutions. 
These impacts included economic, social, psychological harm as well as increased 
community solidarity and improvements to oil spill response preparedness. We also 
address ways in which the framework may help spill managers to learn from events and 
improve contingency planning by anticipating risks to social systems and identifying 
strategies to reduce impacts. 
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Webler, T., & Lord, F. (2010). Planning for the Human Dimensions of Oil Spills and 
Spill Response. Environmental Management, 45(4), 723. 
Abstract: Oil spill contingency planners need an improved approach to understanding 
and planning for the human dimensions of oil spills. Drawing on existing literature in 
social impact assessment, natural hazards, human ecology, adaptive management, global 
change and sustainability, we develop an integrative approach to understanding and 
portraying the human dimensions impacts of stressors associated with oil spill events. 
Our approach is based on three fundamental conclusions that are drawn from this 
literature review. First, it is productive to acknowledge that, while stressors can produce 
human impacts directly, they mainly affect intermediary processes and changes to these 
processes produce human impacts. Second, causal chain modeling taken from hazard 
management literature provides a means to document how oil spill stressors change 
processes and produce human impacts. Third, concepts from the global change literature 
on vulnerability enrich causal models in ways that make more obvious how management 
interventions lessen hazards and mitigate associated harm. Using examples from recent 
spill events, we illustrate how these conclusions can be used to diagrammatically portray 
the human dimensions of oil spills. 
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Appendix G: Before the Fishery Conservation and Management Act - 1950-
1976 
From 1950 to 1977, the New England fisheries were managed by the International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). They were essentially open-
access with only a few regulations: minimum mesh size, quotas and occasional time or 
area closures. This lack of regulation combined with increased foreign overcapacity 
harvests contributed to a constant stock decline (Crestin, 2000; Mayo et al., 1992). 
Foreign harvest effort was directed toward all species, including cod, haddock, and 
flounders; fish of traditional importance to New England. During the 1960s and early-
1970s, it was reported that more than 300 foreign vessels from as many as 18 countries 
fished on Georges Bank, resulting in the subsequent commercial collapse of several fish 
populations (Crestin, 2000). Total fish biomass declined by approximately 50% on 
Georges Bank (Fogarty & Murawski, 1998). The New England fleet, composed of 
wooden or steel-hulled side trawlers (fix gear), could not compete with large, efficient 
foreign stern trawlers. These inequitable circumstances triggered a political process 
involving US Congress. 
The passage in 1977 of the 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act established a 200-mile 
US- exclusive fishing zone, subsequently 
changed to the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ), and established the eight regional 
fishery management councils in existence 
today. In New England, the Council is 
responsible for managing fishery resources 
throughout Maine, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut. However, following the 
exclusion of distant fleet, there was 
excessive overexpansion of the domestic 
fisheries. Side trawlers were replaced by 
stern trawlers, increasing the fishing effort 
to three times what had prevailed before th< 
act (Weber, 2002). Thus, the free-for-all 
fishing system continued for domestic fleet and the fishing stock were still heavily 
harvested. When the Magnuson Act was enacted, the groundfish stocks were depleted 
(Figure 24). Then, implementation of the EEZ, followed by a modernization and 
increased capacity of the domestic fleet, resulted in further declines in groundfish 
populations on Georges Bank, reaching record-low levels in late 1970s (Fogarty & 
Murawski, 1998; Jin et al., 2002; Mayo et al., 1992). 
Figure 24 Trends in reported landings for groundfish and 
flounders (black bars), pelagic fish (herring and 
mackerel, open bars), and other species (elasmobranches, 
hatched bars) from North Atlantic Fishery The vertical 
line demarcates the implementation of EEZ in 1977 
Standardized fishing effort (days fished) is indicated by 
the solid line (Source Fogarty and Murawski, 1998 p 
S12) 
283 
Appendix H: Government programs and subsidies 
Table 18. Major government programs providing financial assistance during the period 
1977 to 1999 
Program 










Fund program (CCF) 







Created in 1978 (Amendment 
to the Fisherman's Protective 
Act, PL 95-376, Section 10 
(f)(1) 
Amended again in 1980, P L 
96-561 
Created in 1972 under the 
Merchant Marine Act, 46 
U S C 1271 etseq 
Created in 1978 
(Amendment of the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 
P L 95-372, Section 402) 
Created in 1936 
Amended in 1970 
(Merchant Marine Act, 46 
U S C 1177, amended 
several time) 
Created in 1956 as part of the 
Fish and Wildlife Act (16 
USC 742c 50 CFR 250) 
Amended in July 1, 1970, 
Section 3 of Pub L 91-387 
Amended in 1965, Section 5 
ofP L 89-85 
Fishermen's Protective Act of 
1967, Section 7, Public Law 
90-482, as amended, Public 
Law 92-569, 22 U S C 1971-
1977, Public Law 94-265, as 
amended, Public Law 99-
659, Public Law 104-43, 
Public Law 106-450, Public 
Law 108-219 
Created in 1954 as part of the 
Saltonstall-Kennedy Act 
signs (68 Stat 
376, 15 U S C §713c-3) 
Amended in 1980, Section 
210 of the American 
Fisheries Promotion Act (P L 
96-561) 
Again in 1983 Section 423 of 
PL 97-424 
Description 
This Fund provides compensation to fishing vessel owners who sustain 
losses or damage to their gear or vessels attributed to other fishing 
vessels 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the program financed direct loan 
guaranteed by the government with low interest rate and long pay-back 
period for the up-grade or construction of new boat The program was 
changed late 1980s Provides direct loans for certain fisheries costs 
Vessel financing available for the purchase of used vessels or the 
reconstruction of vessels (nowadays it is limited to reconstructions that 
do not add to fishing capacity) The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 
changed the name of the FOG program to the Fisheries Finance 
Program (FFP) 
This Fund provides compensation to domestic fishermen for the 
damage or loss of fishing gear, and resulting economic loss due to 
obstructions related to oil and gas exploration, development, or 
production in areas of the Outer Continental Shelf 
The CCF program enables fishermen to construct, reconstruct, or 
under limited circumstances to acquire fishing vessels with before-tax, 
rather than after-tax dollars It allows fishermen to defer taxable 
income from operation of their fishing vessels This tax-deferred 
fishing income under the CCF program when used to help pay for a 
vessel project is, in effect, an interest-free loan from the Government 
The purpose of the CCF program is to improve the fishing fleet by 
allowing fishermen to accelerate their accumulation of funds with 
which to replace or improve their fishing vessels 
Loans to commercial fishermen for financing or refinancing costs of 
purchasing, constructing, equipping, maintaining, repairing, or 
operating new or used commercial fishing vessels or gear 
Moratorium on the program in 1977 to its conclusion in 1980 
To provide for reimbursement of losses incurred as a result of the 
seizure of a U S commercial fishing vessel by a foreign country on the 
basis of rights or claims in territorial waters or on the high seas, which 
are not recognized by the United States Effective November 28, 1990, 
the United States acknowledges the authority of coastal States to 
manage highly migratory species, thus reducing the basis for valid 
claims under the Fishermen's Protective Act 
The Saltonstall-Kennedy (S-K) Act established a fund (known as the 
S-K Fund) that the Secretary of Commerce uses to finance projects and 
cooperative agreements for fishery research and development Under 
this authority, projects or cooperative agreements are selected annually 
on a competitive basis to assist NOAA Fisheries (previously known as 
the National Marine Fisheries Service) in addressing concerns related 
to U S commercial and recreational fisheries 
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Tax Exemptions 
Fuel Tax Credit 
(FTC) 





Tax Reform (part of 
ITC) 
Promote and Develop 







The enactment of §209 of 
P L 99-659 creates the 
Fisheries Promotional Fund, 
to be capitalized with S-K 
funds 
Issues in 1997 26 USC 4221 
(3) 
Issued in 1998 IRC 4041(f) 
See task force, part 2, p 72 
Created in 1973 (Amendment 
to the Fishermen's Protective 
Act of 1971 2 2 U S C 1971-
1980 
Amended several time 
The 1980 tax reform was not 
directed specifically at the 
fishing industry 
Created on 1980 as part of 
the American Fisheries 
Promotion Act (Section 210 
of P L 96-561) 
Created in 1994, financial 
disaster assistance is provided 
under Sections 308(b) and 
308(d) of the 
Interjurisdictional Fisheries 
Ac t (16USC §4107) 
From 1976 to 1999, 10 
buyback programs were 
funded by the federal 
government (2 in New 
England) which were 
authorized or proposed under 
a variety of laws, including 
the Interjurisdictional 
Fisheries Act, the Sustainable 
Fisheries Act, and the 
American Fisheries Act 
Tax exemptions for fishing vessels supplies 
Federal highway tax exemptions on diesel fuel for vessels employed in 
fisheries based on the theory that vessels do not use highways 
Reimbursement to fishermen for financial charges and losses sustained 
as the result of seizure by a foreign country outside that country's 
territorial waters 
From 1962 to 1986, Investment Tax Credit was available to any 
taxpayer making a capital investment The ITC allowed the taxpayer to 
take a credit against taxes of up to 10% of the cost of capital additions 
There was a low annual limit on used assets 
Accelerated depreciation schedules for capital property, 10% tax 
credit From From 1981 to 1986, assets were allowed to be written off 
at an accelerated rate that was typically much shorter than the 
economic useful life of the asset 
This grants program for fisheries research and development projects 
and a National Fisheries Research and Development Program to be 
carried out with Saltonstall-Kennedy (S-K) funds 
Funds for disaster assistance have been used for a wide variety of 
purposes, and may include direct assistance to New England ground 
fishermen such as compensation, community grants, training, loans 
and debt refinancing, and employment on fishery related projects 
1994-Fishing industry grants that included employment for fishermen 
(training, new business opportunities, aquaculture, marketing, and by-
catch reduction), demonstration buyback program, loan program, and 
family assistance centers 
1995-Vessel buyback, administration, and fisherman health program 
1999 Continuation from 1994 failure with assistance that included 
compensation for lost fishing time and cooperative research 
2000- Continuation from 1994 failure with assistance that included 
permit buyback and cooperative research 
2001- Continuation from 1995 of the fisherman health program 
2008-Funding for fishermen, fishing businesses, and a health insurance 
program 
Buyback program addressed overcapacity (excess fishing vessels, 
permits, and related gear) by buying back fishing vessels and fishing 
permits in attempt to reduce overcapacity 
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